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NOTE 
The Public Policy Exclusion and Insurance for Intentional 
Employment Discrimination 
Sean W. Gallagher 
INTRODUCTION 
Within two years after passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964,1 employers subject to the Act began obtaining insurance in-
demnifying them against civil liability for employment discrimina-
tion. 2 Insurance for employment discrimination liability remains 
available today3 under commercial general liability policies, 4 excess 
umbrella policies designed to supplement commercial general liability 
1. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, 78 Stat. 241, 253-266 (codified as 
amended principally at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. III 1991)). 
2. The first policies offering coverage for employment discrimination were available in 1966. 
See Solo Cup Co. v. Federal Ins. Co., 619 F.2d 1178, 1181-82 (7th Cir.) (describing coverage 
under an umbrella liability insurance policy issued in 1974), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1033 (1980). 
3. See Larry M. Golub, Insurance Coverage Issues in Employment Discrimination and Civil 
Rights Action, in ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY: EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AND CIVIL 
RIGHTS ACTIONS IN FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS 922 (1992) (discussing the availability of 
coverage for employment discrimination under existing policies); Thomas J. Hagarty, Insurance 
Coverage and Civil Rights Litigation, 27 FEDN. INS. CouNs. Q. 3 (1976) (discussing the availabil-
ity of coverage for civil rights liability under existing policies); Alan M. Koral, Liability Insur-
ance Coverage of Discrimination and Other Employment-Related Claims, 17 EMPLOYEE REL. 
L.J. 7, 7-8 (1991) (discussing the availability of coverage for discrimination and other employ-
ment-related claims under existing policies); John E. Peer & Ronald E. Mallen, Insurance Cover-
age of Employment Discrimination and Wrongful Termination Actions, 54 DEF. CoUNS. J. 464, 
465 (1987) (same). 
4. See SL Indus. v. American Motorist Ins. Co., 591 A.2d 677, 680-81 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 1991) (finding coverage for pain and suffering arising from age discrimination under a gen-
eral liability policy), modified, 607 A.2d 1266 (N.J. 1992); Louis A. Lehr, Jr., CGL Insurance 
Coverage for Civil Rights and Employment Related Claims, 38 FEDN. INS. & CORP. CouNs. Q. 
397 (1988) (describing coverage for employment discrimination claims under comprehensive 
general liability (CGL) policies). 
The Insurance Services Office, which provides the form under which many CGL policies are 
written, has responded to findings of coverage for employment discrimination under the CGL 
policy by proposing a new exclusionary endorsement. See COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY 
124 (Donald S. Malecki & Arthur L. Flitner eds., 3d ed. 1990) [hereinafter ISO POLICY] 
(describing the exclusionary endorsement styled "CG 21 47" and entitled the "Employment-
Related Practices Exclusion"). This endorsement excludes from the CGL policy any coverage 
for "bodily injury" or "personal injury" arising out of the following employer actions: 
(1) Refusal to employ; 
(2) Termination of employment; 
(3) Coercion, demotion, evaluation, reassignment, discipline, defamation, harassment, hu-
miliation, discrimination or other employment-related practices, policies, acts or omissions; 
or 
(4) Consequential "bodily [or personal]" injury as a result of (1) through (3) above. 
ISO POLICY, supra, at 125. The exclusion also precludes coverage for imputed liability because it 
"applies whether the insured may be held liable as an employer or in any other capacity.'' Id. 
1256 
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insurance, 5 and specially designed "employment practices liability in-
surance" policies. 6 One can interpret these policies to find coverage 
for liability incurred as a result of intentional as well as unintentional 
employment discrimination. 7 
Despite the adoption of this exclusion, insurers may continue to provide coverage to employers 
willing to pay an extra premium to "buy back" the excluded coverage. 
5. See Solo Cup, 619 F.2d at 1181 (finding coverage for unintentional discrimination under 
an "umbrella excess liability policy" issued in 1974); Union Camp Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 
452 F. Supp. 565 (S.D. Ga. 1978) (finding that an umbrella excess coverage policy insured 
against liability for discriminatory employment practices). Introduced into the U.S. market by 
Lloyd's of London in the 1940s, the umbrella policy has been largely copied by U.S. insurers. 
Eugene R. Anderson et. al., Heads We Win, Tails You Lose: Insurance Companies Short-Change 
Policyholders on Advertising and Personal Injury, in THE ADVERTISING INJURY ENDORSEMENT 
IN INSURANCE DISPUTES: ITS SCOPE, APPLICATION, AND COVERAGE 99, 106-07 (PLI Com. L. 
& Practice Course Handbook Series No. 620, 1992). Unlike the CGL policy, which only pro-
vides coverage under a broad reading of its coverage provisions, see Golub, supra note 3, at 2-6; 
Peer & Mallen, supra note 3, at 466, umbrella policies typically provide direct coverage for em-
ployer liability that arises out of "discrimination." Anderson et al., supra, at 107-08 (quoting the 
"broad form liability endorsement" drafted by U.S. insurers in response to the introduction of 
the Lloyd's umbrella policy into the U.S. market); see also Union Camp, 452 F. Supp. at 566 
(describing coverage under a 1966-version umbrella excess insurance policy). In much the same 
way that the Insurance Services Office limited coverage under its CGL policy, some insurers have 
excluded discrimination coverage from their umbrella policies. See, e.g., Transport Ins. Co. v. 
Lee Way Motor Freight, 487 F. Supp. 1325, 1327 (N.D. Tex. 1980) (describing the exclusion of 
discrimination coverage from an umbrella policy in 1972). Nevertheless, umbrella policies con-
tinue to offer coverage for employment discrimination. See School Dist. for Royal Oak v. Conti-
nental Cas. Co., 912 F.2d 844, 846 (6th Cir. 1990) (describing and quoting the umbrella policy 
offered by the Continental Casualty Company); Town ofS. Whitley v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 724 F. 
Supp. 599, 601-02 (N.D. Ind. 1989) (quoting the Cincinnati Insurance Company's umbrella pol-
icy in full), affd., 921 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1990); University of Ill. v. Continental Cas. Co., 599 
N.E.2d 1338, 1343-45 (Ill. App. Ct.) (describing the Continental policy), appeal denied, 606 
N.E.2d 1235 (Ill. 1992); Clark-Peterson Co. v. Independent Ins. Assocs., 492 N.W.2d 675, 676 
n.3 (Iowa 1992) (describing the policy offered by the Cincinnati Insurance Company). 
6. The insurance industry only recently introduced "employment practices liability insur-
ance," which is designed to cover corporate and individual liability for employment discrimina-
tion, sexual harassment, and wrongful termination. See Golub, supra note 3, at 939-59 
(providing specimen forms of new policies offered expressly to cover employment discrimina-
tion); Meg Fletcher, Firms Fear Rise in Discrimination Suits: New Policies Cover Employment 
Claims, Bus. INS., Mar. 23, 1992, at 2; Tammy Joyner, Discriminating Insurers Explore a New 
Niche, DETROIT NEWS, Dec. 13, 1992, at DI. 
The policy provided by the Lexington Insurance Company, which is characteristic of this 
type of insurance, covers "employment related Wrongful Termination, Discrimination and Sex-
ual Harassment liability." LEXINGTON INSURANCE Co., EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES LIABILITY 
INSURANCE POLICY I (Mar. 1992) (on file with author) [hereinafter LEXINGTON POLICY]. The 
policy defines discrimination to include "termination of an employment relationship or a demo-
tion or a failure or refusal to hire or promote any individual because of race, color, religion, age, 
sex, disability, pregnancy or national origin." Id. at 6. Lexington's policy also covers the wrong-
ful acts of employees and other agents of the insured corporation, "but only for the conduct of 
[the employer's] business within the scope of their employment." Id. at 4. 
7. See, e.g., Royal Oak, 912 F.2d at 849 (interpreting an umbrella insurance policy to find 
coverage for intentional employment discrimination). The employment practices policy offered 
by Lexington might also be interpreted to provide some coverage for intentional employment 
discrimination. The policy excludes coverage for the intentional acts of any insured, including 
individual employees, stating that "[t]his insurance does not apply for the benefit of any individ-
ual insured who intentionally caused the harm alleged to have arisen out of an insured event." 
LEXINGTON POLICY, supra note 6, at 5. The policy does cover, however, the liability of individ-
ual employees acting within the scope of their employment. Id. These provisions leave room for 
a court to find coverage for some forms of employer liability for intentional employment discrim-
1258 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 92:1256 
Despite the strong public policy favoring the enforcement of con-
tracts as they are written, 8 courts have often refused to enforce some 
forms of employment discrimination insurance on the grounds that 
such insurance itself violates "public policy."9 Courts have univer-
sally agreed that insurance for unintentional discrimination does not 
violate public policy, 10 and they have therefore enforced insurance 
policies to cover employer liability for disparate impact discrimina-
tion.11 But courts often refuse to enforce, on public policy grounds, 
insurance policies that cover intentional employment discrimination, 12 
ination. For instance, the exclusion suggests that the insurance could be applied "for the benefit" 
of the corporation when the corporation is vicariously liable for the intentional acts of its supervi· 
sors acting within the scope of their employment because in those circumstances it is unlikely 
that the corporation "intentionally caused the harm" to the employee who was discriminated 
against. See also Golub, supra note 3, at 953 (quoting a "Discrimination Errors and Omissions 
Liability Insurance" policy offered by Lloyd's that covers "wrongful acts of discrimination" and 
excludes "intentional acts" but does not impute the intentional acts of one insured to another). 
8. See, e.g., Royal Oak, 912 F.2d at 849 ("Public policy normally favors enforcement of 
insurance contracts according to their terms." (citing Ranger Ins. Co. v. Bal Harbour Club, Inc., 
549 So. 2d 1005, 1010 n.1 (Fla. 1989) (Ehrlich, C.J., dissenting))); Northwestern Natl. Cas. Co. 
v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 444 (5th Cir. 1962) (Gewin, J., concurring) (noting the public policy 
favoring the enforcement of contracts); Union Camp, 452 F. Supp. at 568 ("Exercise of the free· 
dom of contract is not lightly to be interfered with. It is only in clear cases that contracts will be 
held void as against public policy."). 
9. See infra sections II.A, II.B. 
10. See Solo Cup Co. v. Federallns. Co., 619 F.2d 1178, 1187 (7th Cir.)(upholding coverage 
for disparate impact discrimination), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1033 (1980); Transport Ins. Co. v. 
Lee Way Motor Freight, 487 F. Supp. 1325, 1328 (N.D. Tex. 1980) (finding insurance for pattern 
and practice discrimination to be valid, on the erroneous assumption that "[i]ntent to discrimi· 
nate is irrelevant in a pattern and practice case"); Union Camp, 452 F. Supp. at 567-68 (uphold· 
ing coverage for disparate impact discrimination but not disparate treatment discrimination); 
School Dist. No. 1 v. Mission Ins. Co., 650 P.2d 929 (Or. Ct. App. 1982) (approving coverage for 
disparate impact but not disparate treatment discrimination in the context of an employer's re· 
fusal to approve a variable annuity pension plan); see also Steven L. Willborn, Insurance, Public 
Policy, and Employment Discrimination, 66 MINN. L. REV. 1003, 1005-06 (1982) (suggesting 
that evolving insurance law doctrine prohibits insurance for disparate treatment but allows it for 
disparate impact cases); Effie F. Anastassiou, Comment, Insurance Against Civil Liability for 
Employment Discrimination, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 192, 195-96 (1980) (stating that unintentional 
conduct is usually insurable but that intentional conduct is not insurable). 
11. Disparate impact discrimination "involve[s] employment practices that are facially neu-
tral in their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than 
another and cannot be justified by business necessity." International Bhd. of Teamsters v. 
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 n.15 (1977). Paradigmatic examples of disparate impact dis· 
crimination include the use of "invalid" standardized tests. See, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. 
Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (use ofWonderlic Personnel Test and high school diploma require-
ment); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (same). Other examples of disparate 
impact discrimination include the use of height and weight requirements that disproportionately 
exclude women or minorities, or experience requirements that exclude minorities from fields that 
traditionally have been closed to them. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) 
(height and weight requirements excluding women from prison guard jobs); Chrisner v. Com-
plete Auto Transit, Inc., 645 F.2d 1251 (6th Cir. 1981) (experience requirement disproportion· 
ately excluding female truck drivers). Congress codified disparate impact analysis in the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991, which amended Title VII. See Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 703(k), 105 Stat. 1099 
(1991) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (Supp. III 1991)). 
12. See, e.g., Solo Cup, 619 F.2d at 1187; Union Camp, 452 F. Supp. at 567-68. But see, e.g., 
Royal Oak, 912 F.2d at 848-50 (applying Michigan law to allow coverage for intentional religious 
discrimination in employment); Ranger Ins. Co. v. Bal Harbour Club, Inc., 509 So. 2d 945 (Fla. 
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such as disparate treatment discrimination, 13 retaliatory discharge, 14 
and sexual harassment. 15 
Although courts in other contexts invoke public policy to void the 
provisions of otherwise valid contracts, 16 the practice of voiding con-
tracts that violate public policy has taken on unique application in the 
Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (en bane) (allowing coverage for discrimination in private housing), revd., 
549 So. 2d 1005 (Fla. 1989); University of Ill. v. Continental Cas. Co., 599 N.E.2d 1338, 1351 
(Ill. App. Ct.) (approving coverage for retaliatory discharge and noting that "we find there is no 
Illinois public policy prohibiting insuring for damages caused by one's intentional 'acts except to 
the extent that the insured wrongdoer may not be the person who recovers the policy proceeds"), 
appeal denied, 606 N.E.2d 1235 (Ill. 1992); Independent Sch. Dist. No. 697 v. St. Paul Fire & 
Marine Ins., 495 N.W.2d 863, 868 (Minn. Ct. App.) (holding that public policy does not pre-
clude coverage for intentional age discrimination), review granted, No. 92-1625, 1993 Minn. 
LEXIS 225 (Minn. Mar. 30, 1993). 
13. Solo Cup, 619 F.2d at 1186 (suggesting that disparate treatment discrimination is inten-
tional discrimination within the public policy exclusion); Legg Mason Wood Walker v. INA, 23 
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 778, 782 n.12 (D.D.C. 1980) ("An insurance policy covering inten-
tional discrimination by the insured would likely violate public policy and thus be held unen-
forceable." (citing Union Camp, 452 F. Supp. at 567-68)). But see Andover Newton Theological 
Sch., Inc. v. Continental Cas. Co., 930 F.2d 89, 93 (1st Cir. 1991) ("Massachusetts public policy 
does not bar insurance coverage for an employment action solely because it is found to violate the 
ADEA in an individual disparate treatment case."); Town of S. Whitley v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 
724 F. Supp. 599, 604 (N.D. Ind. 1989) (holding that "reckless disregard" under ADEA is insur-
able), ajfd., 921 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1990); Andover Newton Theological Sch., Inc. v. Continental 
Cas. Co., 566 N.E.2d 1117, 1118-19 (Mass. 1991) (finding, on a certified question from the First 
Circuit, that Massachusetts public policy does not prohibit coverage for "reckless disregard" 
under the ADEA). 
14. See, e.g., Chicago Bd. of Options Exch., Inc. v. Harbor Ins. Co., 738 F. Supp. 1184, 1187 
(N.D. Ill. 1990) (stating that liability for retaliatory discharge may be uninsurable but that a 
corporation's vicarious liability for a retaliatory discharge would be insurable); Rubenstein Lum-
ber Co. v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 462 N.E.2d 660, 662 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (stating in dicta that 
retaliatory discharge is uninsurable). But see Continental Cas. Co. v. Canadian Universal Ins. 
Co., 924 F.2d 370, 374 (1st Cir. 1991) (enforcing coverage for retaliatory discharge and sexual 
harassment); U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Heitmann N. Am. Co., 695 F. Supp. 941, 948-49 (N.D. Ill. 
1988) (permitting employer to insure liability for retaliatory discharge), revd. on other grounds, 
883 F.2d 564 (7th Cir. 1989); Dixon Distrib. Co. v. Hanover Ins. Co., 612 N.E.2d 846, 855 (Ill. 
App. Ct.) (finding coverage for retaliatory discharge under an umbrella policy and finding that 
this coverage did not violate public policy), appeal granted, 622 N.E.2d 1203 (Ill. 1993); Ellis v. 
Transcontinental Ins. Co., 619 So. 2d 1130, 1135 (La. Ct. App.) (finding coverage for retaliatory 
discharge under CGL and umbrella policies even though retaliatory discharge is an intentional 
tort), cert. denied, 625 So. 2d 1043 (La. 1993). 
15. See, e.g., Continental Ins. Co. v. McDaniel, 772 P.2d 6, 9 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988) (denying 
coverage under policy exclusion that was the functional equivalent of a public policy limitation); 
Coit Drapery Cleaners, Inc. v. Sequoia Ins. Co., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 692, 697 (Ct. App. 1993) 
(denying coverage for sexual harassment under California's statutory exclusion); B&E Convales-
cent Ctr. v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 894, 906-07 (Ct. App. 1992) (denying 
coverage based on statutory exclusion of coverage for willful wrongdoing). But see Canadian 
Universal, 924 F.2d at 374 (enforcing coverage for retaliatory discharge and sexual harassment); 
Seminole Point Hosp. Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 675 F. Supp. 44, 47 (D.N.H. 1987) (per-
mitting insurance to cover a hospital's liability for sexual harassment committed by its presi-
dent); Clark-Peterson Co. v. Independent Ins. Assocs., 492 N.W.2d 675, 676 (Iowa 1992) 
(denying coverage for intentional discrimination under a straight interpretation of the policy but 
enforcing coverage under the "reasonable expectations" doctrine). 
16. It is well settled that "[p]arties may incorporate in their agreements any provisions that 
are not illegal or violative of public policy." 17A AM. JuR. 2o Contracts§ 238 (1991). For a 
discussion of the application of public policy to police the provisions of private contracts, see 
generally 17A id. 
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area of insurance law. Courts vigorously invoke public policy to po-
lice the provisions of insurance contracts, and they have refused to 
enforce or have voided provisions in insurance contracts for a wide 
variety of reasons.17 In some cases, the insured raises public policy to 
contest the enforcement of unconscionable policy provisions.18 In 
these cases, the insured asks the court not to enforce the contract pro-
vision beqause enforcement of the provision would work an inequita-
ble hardship on the insured. 19 This Note addresses the similar, but not 
entirely analogous, circumstance in which an insurance company 
raises public policy as a reason not to enforce the insurance contract, 
and a court must decide whether to impose a "public policy exclu-
sion"20 to preclude an insured employer from enforcing its insurance 
contract to cover liability for intentional employment discrimination. 
Courts consider whether to adopt such a public policy exclusion in 
the following context: An employer buys general liability insurance 
that protects against a wide range of risks, including employment dis-
crimination liability. Subsequently, an employee sues the employer for 
intentional discrimination. When the employer requests defense and 
indemnification coverage from its insurance company, the insurance 
company either refuses to defend the suit or defends the suit under a 
reservation of rights,21 claiming that intentional discrimination is not a 
17. For example, courts have refused to enforce insurance contracts that violate express stat· 
utory or regulatory requirements, or that allow the insurance company to take advantage of the 
insured. See, e.g., Travelers lndem. Co. v. Williams, 167 S.E.2d 174, 176 (Ga. Ct. App. 1969) 
(voiding provisions of an automobile policy that conflicted with the state uninsured motorist 
statute). Courts have also questioned the notice and timing restrictions insurers include in health 
insurance policies because these restrictions force insureds to engage in perverse behavior in or· 
der to obtain coverage. Strickland v. Gulf Life Ins. Co., 242 S.E.2d 148, 149-50 (Ga. 1978). 
18. See, e.g., Strickland, 242 S.E.2d at 149-50 (questioning notice requirements forcing an 
insured to engage in perverse behavior in order to obtain coverage); C&J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied 
Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169, 171, 179-81 (Iowa 1975) (holding that the provisions of an 
insurance policy covering theft were void to the extent that they required the insured to prove 
"visible marks" of theft before recovering under the policy). 
19. Like other contracts, insurance policies can be "held invalid under the doctrine of uncon· 
scionability." 69 N.Y. JuR. 2Dinsurance § 685 (1988). For a discussion of the application of the 
unconscionability doctrine to insurance, see Donald M. Zupanec, Annotation, Doctrine of Un· 
conscionability as Applied to Insurance Contracts, 86 A.L.R.3o 862 (1978). 
20. Courts do not expressly draft a "public policy exclusion" into contracts of insurance. 
Rather, they invoke public policy to refuse to enforce insurance coverage for certain forms of 
liability, primarily liability for intentionally incurred losses. See infra sections I.A., I.B. In ac· 
cordance with the convention used in the literature, this Note refers to the practice of voiding 
coverage that is contrary to public policy as either a "court-imposed intentional act exclusion" or 
more broadly as the "public policy exclusion." See Gary T. Schwartz, The Ethics and the Eco-
nomics of Tort Liability Insurance, 15 CORNELL L. REV. 313, 341 n.125 (1990) (noting that the 
prohibition against insuring intentional wrongdoing "is a blend of a public-policy prohibition and 
an 'implied exception' read into the insurance policy" (citing ROBERT E. KEETON, INSURANCE 
LAW: BASIC TEXT 292-93 (1971))); W.E. Shipley, Annotation, Liability Insurance as Co~·ering 
Accident, Damage, or Injury Due to Wanton or Wilful Misconduct or Gross Negligence, 20 
A.L.R.3o 320, 331 (1969) (referring to the "public policy preclusion"). 
21. The insurer could also defend the suit without reserving its right to contest coverage, 
which would give rise to claims by the insured employer that the insurer had waived its right to 
contest coverage or that coverage arose as a matter of estoppel. See ROBERT H. JERRY II, UN· 
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covered risk under the policy. At this point, the court must determine 
the extent of coverage under the policy22 - a question of contract 
interpretation.23 In resolving this dispute, the court will look to the 
coverage provisions of the policy, particularly the definitions of "oc-
currence" or "wrongful acts," and to any exclusions in the policy, par-
ticularly any "intentional act," "employer liability," or 
"discrimination" exclusion. 24 Interpreting the policy in light of these 
DERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW§§ 114[a]-[c] (1987) (describing the options that· are available 
to an insurance company that wants to contest coverage under the policy without creating a 
conflict of interest in the insurance company's representation of the insured, and without incur-
ring liability for failing to defend the underlying case). This Note does not consider whether 
insurance for intentional employment discrimination could arise by waiver or estoppel, and it 
does not consider whether coverage by estoppel would comport with public policy. For an exam-
ple of a court's consideration of this issue, see St. Paul Ins. Cos. v. Talladega Nursing Home, 
Inc., 606 F.2d 631, 634 n.2 (5th Cir. 1979). 
22. This Note addresses the validity and legality of insurance for intentional employment 
discrimination. It does not separately address the validity of insurance for the cost of defending 
employment discrimination cases. However, courts are generally willing to enforce insurance to 
cover defense costs even in cases in which the underlying liability might be uninsurable as a 
matter of public policy. See, e.g., Andover Newton Theological Sch., Inc. v. Continental Cas. 
Co., 930 F.2d 89, 95 (1st Cir. 1991) ("Although an argument can be made that a public policy is 
to some extent subverted by insurance against defense costs, the basic fact is that this is not 
insurance against liability."); B&E Convalescent Ctr. v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 9 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 894, 903 (Ct. App. 1992) ("[E]ven though public policy ... precludes an insurer from 
indemnifying an insured in an underlying action the duty to defend still exists so long as the 
'insured reasonably expect[s] the policy to cover the types of acts involved in the underlying 
suit.'" (quoting Republic lndem. Co. v. Superior Ct., 273 Cal. Rptr. 331, 335 (Ct. App. 1990))). 
The substantial cost of defending employment discrimination lawsuits makes the enforceability 
of insurance for defense costs important to employers. See Fletcher, supra note 6, at 39 (citing 
defense costs and the uncertainty surrounding the standard of liability for employment discrimi-
nation as two reasons that employers might be inspired to buy insurance for employment 
discrimination). 
23. The interpretation issues change depending upon the wording of the insurance contract, 
but the public policy question remains the same. See infra Part II (considering public policy 
challenges to coverage under a wide variety of different insurance policies). Some courts and 
judges do not view the public policy exclusion as an exclusion at all, but rather view public policy 
considerations as a guide to the interpretation of the insurance contract. These courts do not 
find coverage and then declare it void. Rather, they use public policy as a guide to the interpreta-
tion of the parties' intent in making the contract. See, e.g., Ranger Ins. Co. v. Bal Harbour Club, 
Inc., 509 So. 2d 940, 945 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (Ferguson, J., dissenting) (refusing to inter-
pret a policy to find coverage for intentional religious discrimination on the grounds that such an 
interpretation would require the court to enforce coverage that violates public policy), revd .• 549 
So. 2d 1005 (Fla. 1989); United Servs. Auto. Assn. v. Elitzky, 517 A.2d 982, 989 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1986) ("[W]e feel that an 'intended' harm clause should be coterminous with the public policy 
exclusion.''), appeal denied, 528 A.2d 957 (Pa. 1987). The effect of these two methods of inter-
pretation is the same: no coverage that is contrary to public policy. 
24. Great Global Assurance Co. v. Shoemaker, 599 So. 2d 1036, 1040 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1992) (Farmer, J., dissenting) (describing exclusion for "claims made by anyone related to their 
employment" and suggesting that this exclusion was meant to exclude coverage for Title VII 
liability and liability under state antidiscrimination laws); Lehr, supra note 4, at 397 (describing 
in general the construction of comprehensive general liability policies and courts' interpretations 
of "occurrence"); Peer & Mallen, supra note 3 (discussing the availability of coverage for em-
ployment discrimination under existing policies). Some policies expressly exclude coverage for 
"discrimination." See ISO POLICY, supra note 4, at 124; see also Reliable Springs Co. v. St. Paul 
Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 869 F.2d 993, 995 (6th Cir. 1989) (finding no coverage for violation of 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act under a general liability policy that excluded cover-
age for "any offense related to discrimination or unfair employment practices"); Ottumwa Hous. 
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provisions, the court may find that the insurance policy was intended 
to provide coverage for intentional employment discrimination. 25 The 
insurance company, however, will often argue that public policy con-
siderations should prevent enforcement of this coverage.26 Insurance 
companies argue that courts should not enforce insurance to cover an 
employer's liability for intentional employment discrimination because 
such insurance promotes wrongdoing,27 and because it allows employ-
ers to benefit from their own wrongful acts of discrimination.28 In this 
situation, the court must decide whether to impose a public policy ex-
clusion - at the behest of the insurance companies responsible for 
drafting policies - that precludes an employer from enforcing cover-
age that is provided by the policy. 
This Note argues that courts choosing to apply29 the public policy 
exclusion to insurance for intentional employment discrimination lia-
bility should nevertheless permit employers to enforce insurance cov-
ering negligent supervision liability and liability imputed to an 
employer as a result of the intentional discrimination committed by its 
employees. Part I establishes a framework for understanding the cases 
in which courts have invoked public policy to refuse enforcement of 
insurance contracts, arguing that the rationale behind the public pol-
icy exclusion is utilitarian and that courts refuse to enforce insurance 
Auth. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 495 N.W.2d 723, 729 (Iowa 1993) (refusing to enforce 
coverage for discrimination under a worker's compensation and employer liability policy because 
the policy expressly excluded coverage for "discrimination"). Courts also refuse to enforce cov-
erage for employment discrimination under Title VII because an award of back pay is not "dam-
ages," see, e.g., Maryland Cup Corp. v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 568 A.2d 1129, 1133 
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1990), for sexual harassment because it "aris[es] out of ..• employment" 
and thus falls under a contractual exclusion, Omark Indus., Inc. v. Safeco Ins. Co., 590 F. Supp. 
114, 120 (D. Or. 1984), and for proceedings before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion because they are not adversarial proceedings or actions for damages. Campbell Soup Co. v. 
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 571 A.2d 969, 970 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.), cert. denied, 584 A.2d 230 
(N.J. 1990). 
25. See, e.g., School Dist. for Royal Oak v. Continental Cas. Co., 912 F.2d 844, 848-49 (6th 
Cir. 1990) (finding coverage for intentional employment discrimination); University of Ill. v. 
Continental Cas. Co., 599 N.E.2d 1338, 1351 (Ill. App. Ct.) (same), appeal denied, 606 N.E.2d 
1235 (Ill. 1992); Independent Sch. Dist. No. 697 v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 495 N.W.2d 
863, 867-68 (Minn. Ct. App.) (same), review granted, No. 92-1625, 1993 Minn. LEXIS 225 (Mar. 
30, 1993). 
26. The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in another context, has succinctly defined the two-
tiered inquiry courts undertake in deciding whether to require an insurance company to indem-
nify the insured when coverage would arguably violate public policy. Interpreting a professional 
liability policy to determine whether it provided coverage for breach of fiduciary duty, the court 
stated that "[t]here are, as we see it, two main issues: (1) Does the insurance policy, by its terms, 
cover forfeited attorney's fees? (2) If so, is such a policy provision unenforceable as a matter of 
public policy?" Perl v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 345 N.W.2d 209, 211 (Minn. 1984). 
27. See infra sections I.B, II.A. 
28. See, e.g., Royal Oak, 912 F.2d at 847-48; Solo Cup v. Federal Ins. Co., 619 F.2d 1178 
1187-88 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1033 (1980); Independent Sch. Dist. No. 697. 495 
N.W.2d at 867. 
29. Some courts choose not to apply the public policy exclusion to void coverage for inten-
tional employment discrimination. See infra section 11.B. 
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for liability arising out of intentional wrongdoing on the grounds that 
such insurance detracts from the deterrent effect of civil liability. Ap-
plying this framework, Part I also explores the rationale behind the 
exceptions to the public policy exclusion that some courts have created 
to permit employers to insure against imputed liability arising out of 
intentional torts committed by employees and against negligent super-
vision liability.30 Part II summarizes the position taken by the courts 
that have applied the public policy exclusion to refuse enforcement of 
coverage for intentional employment discrimination. Part II then con-
trasts this position with the position taken by courts that have refused 
to adopt a public policy exclusion and by courts that have applied the 
negligent supervision exception to enforce insurance for sexual harass-
ment liability. Part III relies on the analytic framework of Part I and 
the case discussion of Part II to suggest a three-part test for applying 
the negligent supervision and imputed liability exceptions to insurance 
for intentional employment discrimination. Part IV considers and re-
jects the contention that courts should not enforce coverage for inten-
tional employment discrimination liability on the grounds the 
enforcement of such coverage would be inconsistent with the expres-
sive function of Title VII liability. This Note concludes that courts 
applying the public policy exclusion to insurance for intentional em-
ployment discrimination should, in some circumstances, permit em-
ployers to enforce insurance policies that cover imputed liability and 
negligent supervision liability incurred as a result of intentional dis-
crimination committed by employees. 
I. THE PUBLIC POLICY EXCLUSION IN INSURANCE LAW 
This Part considers the rationale behind the public policy exclu-
sion in insurance law and the principle behind the exceptions courts 
have drawn to permit enforcement of insurance covering an em-
ployer's imputed and negligent supervision liability. Section I.A de-
scribes the historical foundation of the public policy doctrine in first-
party insurance31 and explains that courts apply the public policy ex-
30. In some circumstances, employers face derivative liability as a result of their negligence 
in failing to prevent an employee from committing intentional torts, not because courts impute 
liability for the employee's intentional tort to the employer under an agency theory. See infra 
note 109 and accompanying text. 
31. The difference between first-party and third-party insurance has been explained as 
follows: 
An insurance policy may contain both first party property and third party liability cover-
ages .... 
Where insured is seeking coverage against Joss or damage sustained by insured, for dam-
age to his own property, the claim is first party in nature. If, however, insured is seeking 
coverage against liability of insured to another, the claim is third party in nature. 
46 C.J.S. Insurance § 861 (1993) (footnotes omitted); see also KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, ENVI-
RONMENTAL LIABILITY INSURANCE LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF Toxic TORT AND HAZARDOUS 
WMITE INSURANCE COVERAGE ISSUES 23 (1991) (noting that a property insurance policy is "a 
'first-party' policy because it covers the insured against physical Joss of or injury to his or her 
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clusion to void coverage in that context in part to protect innocent 
third parties to the insurance contract. Section I.B explains how 
courts have imported this rationale into the liability insurance context 
to void those forms of insurance that "promote wrongdoing" and 
demonstrates how the public policy exclusion in liability insurance has 
produced inconsistent and conflicting rules among the states. Section 
I.C describes the exceptions courts have drawn to permit coverage for 
some forms of intentional misconduct, with a particular focus on the 
imputed liability and negligent supervision exceptions, and argues that 
these exceptions comport with the rationale behind the public policy 
exclusion. 
A. The Origins of the Public Policy Doctrine 
The practice of voiding insurance coverage on public policy 
grounds developed in the context of first-party life, health, and prop-
erty insurance. 32 In this context, courts have held that public policy 
prohibits an insured from recovering insurance proceeds for intention-
ally self-inflicted injuries or for losses over which the insured has com-
plete control. 33 For instance, courts invoke public policy to prohibit 
the beneficiary of a life insurance policy from recovering the policy 
proceeds if he has murdered the named insured.34 Similarly, courts 
own property"); JERRY, supra note 21, § 130[a], at 43 ("In first-party insurance, the contract 
between the insurer and the insured is designed to indemnify the insured for a loss suffered 
directly by the insured .... Liability insurance, on the other hand, is sometimes described as 
third-party insurance because the interests protected by the contract are ultimately those of third 
parties injured by the insured's conduct."). 
32. See U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Beltmann N. Am. Co., 695 F. Supp. 941, 948 (N.D. Ill. 1988) 
(noting that Illinois courts developed the public policy exclusion for first-party insurance and 
refusing to import that exclusion to void coverage under a liability insurance policy because "the 
public policy considerations that preclude insurance coverage for self-inflicted injury lose a great 
deal of their force in the context of insurance for tortious liability to innocent third parties"), 
revd. on other grounds, 883 F.2d 564 (7th Cir. 1989); St. Paul Ins. Cos. v. Talladega Nursing 
Home, Inc., 606 F.2d 631, 633 (5th Cir. 1979) (describing how the Alabama public policy exclu-
sion was "extended" from the first-party to the third-party context); University of Ill. v. Conti-
nental Cas. Co., 599 N.E.2d 1338, 1350-51 (Ill. App. Ct.) (reaching a conclusion similar to that 
reached in Beltmann and stating: "Based on our analysis of the cases •.. we find there is no 
Illinois public policy prohibiting insuring for damages caused by one's intentional acts except to 
the extent that the insured wrongdoer may not be the person who recovers the policy pro-
ceeds."), appeal denied, 606 N.E.2d 1235 (Ill. 1992). 
33. See, e.g., Hussar v. Girard Life Ins. Co. of Am., 252 So. 2d 374, 374 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.' 
1971) (holding that public policy prohibits recovery from health insurer for self-inflicted inju-
ries); see also 1 WARREN FREEDMAN, RICHARDS ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE§ 1:13, at 48 (6th 
ed. 1990) ("Insurance, by its very definition, covers injury, damage or loss which is fortuitous 
and not within the control of the ... insured."); JERRY, supra note 21, § 63A, at 302 ("Insureds 
should not receive coverage for destroying their own property."). 
34. See New Eng. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Null, 605 F.2d 421, 424 (8th Cir. 1979) (citing "the 
accepted rule that a life insurance policy is void ab initio when it is shown that the beneficiary 
thereof procured the policy with a present intention to murder the insured"); Commercial Trav-
elers Mut. Accident Assn. v. Witte, 406 S.W.2d 145, 149 (Ky. 1966) (holding that a beneficiary 
cannot recover life insurance proceeds if he murders the insured); 1B JOHN A. APPLEMAN & 
JEAN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE§ 481 (1981) ("It has uniformly been held 
that a beneficiary under a contract of personal insurance who murders the insured cannot recover 
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generally refuse to require insurance companies to pay the proceeds of 
a property insurance policy to an insured who intentionally destroys 
his own property35 through, for instance, arson. 36 
Courts rely on both equitable and utilitarian rationales in applying 
public policy to void coverage in these circumstances. First, courts 
prohibit the insured from recovering the policy proceeds to cover in-
tentionally incurred losses on the basis of the "fundamental principle" 
that "no one shall be permitted to profit from his own wrongdoing."37 
Insurance is designed to indemnify an insured against the risk of 
loss, 38 and, in the cases that have recognized a public policy against 
enforcing life or property insurance, the insured has at least implicitly 
concealed the fact that he has obtained coverage for the certainty that 
losses will occur. If an insured knows that damages have already oc-
curred, or if the insured intentionally suffers losses to his property that 
he has insured against, the insured commits a fraud against the insur-
ance company by seeking recovery under the policy.39 The insured 
has obtained insurance to cover losses he knows will occur without 
revealing to the insurance company that the insured-against losses are 
sure to obtain. The insured can thus "profit" - by receiving the pol-
the policy benefits."). See generally F.S. Tinio, Annotation, Killing of Insured by Beneficiary as 
Affecting Life Insurance or Its Proceeds, 27 A.L.R.3D 794 (1969). Even though public policy 
forbids the beneficiary from recovering, it does not discharge the insurance company from its 
responsibility to pay the policy proceeds into the insured's estate. See 1B APPLEMAN, supra, 
§ 482. 
35. 12 APPLEMAN & APPLEMAN, supra note 34, § 7031 ("[A]rson by the insured will pre-
vent him from recovering."); JERRY, supra note 21, § 63A, at 302. 
36. See, e.g., Checkley v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 100 N.E. 942, 944 (Ill. 1913) ("A fire insurance 
policy issued to [anyone], which purported to insure his property against his own willful and 
intentional burning of the same, would manifestly be condemned by all courts as contrary to a 
sound public policy .•.. "), quoted in Beltmann, 695 F. Supp. at 948. One commentator has 
called this the "barn burning defense," stating that "the insured who intentionally burns his own 
barn is not entitled to collect the insurance on it!" 1 FREEDMAN, supra note 33, § 1:13, at 48-49. 
37. See Messersmith v. American Fidelity Co., 133 N.E. 432, 433 (N.Y. 1921) (noting that 
insurance coverage for some forms of wrongdoing should be barred by "the fundamental princi-
ple that no one shall be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong"); Peoples Sec. Life Ins. 
Co. v. Arrington, 412 S.E.2d 705, 707 (Va. 1992) (noting that the statutory bar against a mur-
derer's recovering life insurance proceeds reflects the public policy that "no person shall be al-
lowed to profit from his wrongful acts"); 1 FREEDMAN, supra note 33, § 1:13, at 48 ("The thrust 
is clear that an insured ... should not gain upon the occurrence of the insured event, which event 
is brought about deliberately by the insured .... "). 
38. See JERRY, supra note 21, § 63, at 300 ("It is a fundamental requirement in insurance law 
that the insurer will not pay for a loss unless the loss is 'fortuitous' .... "). 
39. Similar concerns with the potential for fraud underlie the "insurable interest" require-
ment in insurance. An insured cannot obtain insurance unless he has an "insurable interest" in 
the property insured, and the value of recovery against an insurance policy cannot exceed the 
insured's interest in the property. The reason for this latter rule is obvious: if an insured could 
obtain insurance coverage in excess of the value of the property insured, the insured would have 
an extraordinary incentive to destroy the property and collect the insurance proceeds. See gener-
ally id. §§ 40-46 (describing the insurable interest requirement in life, property, and liability 
insurance). Moreover, "[t]he public policy supporting [the exclusion of coverage for intentional 
wrongdoing] is identical to that which supports the insurable interest requirement." Id. § 63A, 
at 302. 
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icy proceeds - as a result of his wrongdoing, the fraud against his 
insurance company. 
Second, courts void insurance coverage in these circumstances to 
deter wrongdoing and to prevent harm to third parties and the public 
at large.40 This second rationale focuses on the incentives insurance 
creates for the insured to engage in wrongdoing, not simply on the 
prospect of an inequitable recovery of policy proceeds by the insured. 
For example, the prospect of a large payoff in the form of insurance 
proceeds might inspire the beneficiary of a life insurance policy to 
murder the insured party. The public policy exclusion protects the life 
of the insured party by removing this incentive for wrongdoing. One 
can provide a similar explanation for the ban on recovering for arson. 
If arsonists could enforce their property insurance, they would have an 
incentive to destroy their property whenever the proceeds from their 
insurance policy exceeded their subjective valuation of the property.41 
Again, the public policy exclusion removes this incentive. 
These incentives reflect moral hazard, which is the tendency of in-
surance to change the behavior of insured parties. 42 In the particular 
context of the public policy exclusion, the moral hazard is the ten-
dency of insurance to induce the insured party to incur losses that are 
covered under the policy. This tendency can manifest itself either as 
increased negligence on the part of the insured - failing to take ap-
propriate steps to avoid losses - or as intentional wrongdoing in reli-
ance on the availability of insurance - consciously incurring losses in 
order to collect the insurance proceeds.43 For example, the theory of 
moral hazard predicts that a driver with automobile insurance will 
take fewer steps to avoid getting into an accident or that the driver 
40. See L'Orange v. Medical Protective Co., 394 F.2d 57, 60 (6th Cir. 1968) (noting that "the 
violation of public policy is measured by the tendency of the contract to injure the public good"). 
41. See 1 FREEDMAN, supra note 33, § 1:13; JERRY, supra note 21, § 63A, at 302. 
42. In Western Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Western World Ins. Co., 769 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1985), 
Judge Easterbrook described the moral hazard problem by stating that "[o]nce a person has 
insurance, he will take more risks than before because he bears less of the cost of his conduct." 
769 F.2d at 385. Other descriptions of the problem abound. See, e.g., JERRY, supra note 21, 
§ 10[c][2], at 13 ("[T]he existence of insurance could have the perverse effect of increasing the 
probability of loss .... This phenomenon is called moral hazard."); Scott E. Harrington, Prices 
and Profits in the Liability Insurance Market, in LIABILITY: PERSPECTIVES AND POLICY 42, 47 
(Robert E. Litan & Clifford Winston eds., 1988) ("Moral hazard is the tendency for the presence 
and characteristics of insurance coverage to produce inefficient changes in buyers' loss prevention 
activities, including carelessness and fraud .... "); Schwartz, supra note 20, at 338 n.117 
(" 'Moral hazard' is sometimes distinguished from 'morale hazard,' the former referring to delib· 
erate acts like arson, the latter to the mere relaxation of the defendant's discipline of carefulness." 
(citing c. ARTHUR WILLIAMS, JR. & RICHARD M. HEINS, RISK MANAGEMENT AND INSUR· 
ANCE 217 (4th ed. 1981))). 
43. See George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 
1521, 1547 (1987) ("Moral hazard refers to the effect of the existence of insurance itself on the 
level of insurance claims made by the insured ..•. Ex ante moral hazard is the reduction in 
precautions taken by the insured to prevent the loss, because of the existence of insurance." 
(second emphasis added)). 
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might intentionally wreck his automobile because he knows that insur-
ance will pay for his losses.44 Although courts recognize moral hazard 
and often prohibit those forms of insurance that promote wrongdoing, 
they do not invalidate all insurance it infects.45 Rather, courts have 
found that insurance for negligence does not promote wrongdoing, 46 
while they assume that insurance for intentional wrongdoing is tar-
nished with an impermissible moral hazard. On the basis of this dis-
tinction, courts have generally voided coverage for intentionally 
incurred losses on public policy grounds, while they have enforced in-
surance that covers losses resulting from the insured party's own 
negligence. 47 
44. See JERRY, supra note 21, § 63A, at 302. 
45. Moreover, courts do not void all forms of insurance that allow an insured to be unjustly 
enriched by the availability of insurance. Take, for example, the case of a taxi driver insured 
against liability for injuries she causes while driving her cab. If she intentionally speeds, she can 
take on more fares and earn more money than if she obeys the traffic Jaws. Further, if she injures 
someone while speeding, her liability would be insurable. Though she relied on insurance to act 
negligently - driving in excess of the speed limit is generally negligent - and although she has 
been unjustly enriched at the expense of the victims of her negligence, the taxi driver can be 
indemnified against the liability she incurs. 
46. Corbin noted this assumption in his treatise on contracts: 
Liability insurance policies, taken out by employers, owners of automobiles, and others, are 
contracts for indemnity against consequences of tortious negligence on the part of servants 
and employees. Such contracts are not made illegal by the fact that they provide for indem-
nity against consequences of the negligent conduct of the employer or owner himself. It is 
not believed that harmful negligence is made more probable by such indemnification .... 
6A ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CoRBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1471, at 587-88 (1962), quoted in Harrell v. 
Travelers Indem. Co., 567 P.2d 1013, 1016 (Or. 1977); see also Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. Title 
Guar. Co., 520 F.2d 1170, 1175 (D.C. Cir. 1975) ("It is settled Jaw that a person may insure 
himself against the results of his own negligent violations of Jaw."). Some courts recognize that 
insurance for negligence might promote wrongdoing but nevertheless refuse to adopt a public 
policy exclusion to void such coverage. See, e.g .. Kansas City Stock Yards Co. v. A. Reich & 
Sons, 250 S.W.2d 692, 698 (Mo. 1952) (observing that insurance for negligence provides a temp-
tation to negligence on the part of the insured but declining to adopt a public policy exclusion for 
negligent wrongs). 
47. See, e.g., A. Reich & Sons, 250 S.W.2d at 698 (holding that public policy does not forbid 
property insurer from indemnifying insured against losses to value of property in a case in which 
the Joss is attributable to the insured's negligence). Insurance for negligence was at one time the 
subject of a public policy debate similar to the one that now rages over the availability of insur-
ance for intentional wrongdoing. See Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 383 S.W.2d I, 
7 (Tenn. 1964) (White, J., concurring) ("In the early years of the casualty insurance business it 
was argued by some that by allowing one to insure against his own negligent acts that careless-
ness would be encouraged, resulting in increased injuries and deaths on the highways."); W. 
PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS§ 82, at 585-86 (5th ed. 
1984) ("For a time ... there was considerable uncertainty as to whether any contract by which 
one was to be protected against the consequences of one's own negligence ... was not contrary to 
public policy .... [W]hen it became apparent that no dire consequences in fact resulted, those 
objections passed out of the picture .... "); Mary C. McNeely, Illegality as a Factor in Liability 
Insurance, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 26, 33 (1941) ("When the validity of liability insurance was 
attacked as contrary to public policy, the most seriously urged contention was that indemnifying 
the assured against his own negligence would result in a relaxation of vigilance toward the rights 
of others."). 
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B. The Public Policy Exclusion in Liability Insurance 
Courts impose a similar public policy exclusion to preclude the en-
forcement of liability insurance for intentional wrongdoing. Borrow-
ing the public policy doctrine developed in the first-party context, 48 
courts have indicated that liability insurance for intentional wrong-
doing "would be barred by the fundamental principle that no one shall 
be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong."49 In contrast to 
the first-party context, however, courts generally void liability insur-
ance coverage for intentional wrongdoing only because that form of 
insurance "promotes wrongdoing"50 and "encourage[s] conduct which 
is socially undesirable because it is injurious to others,"51 and not be-
cause it leads to the inequitable enrichment of insured tortfeasors. 
Nor do they limit the exclusion only to those forms of liability that are 
particularly egregious. 52 The rationale behind the public policy exclu-
sion in the liability insurance context is largely utilitarian, 53 and courts 
48. See St. Paul Ins. Cos. v. Talladega Nursing Home, Inc., 606 F.2d 631, 633 (5th Cir. 1979) 
(applying the Alabama public policy exclusion that was developed in first-party insurance to 
liability insurance); U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Beltmann N. Am. Co., 695 F. Supp. 941, 948 (N.D. Ill. 
1988) (arguing that "the public policy considerations that preclude insurance coverage for se)f. 
inflicted injury Jose a great deal of their force in the context of insurance for tortious liability to 
innocent third parties"), revd. on other grounds, 883 F.2d 564 (7th Cir. 1989); University of Ill. v. 
Continental Cas. Co., 599 N.E.2d 1338, 1350-51 (Ill. App. Ct.) ("Based on our analysis of the 
cases ... we find there is no Illinois public policy prohibiting insuring for damages caused by 
one's intentional acts except to the extent that the insured wrongdoer may not be the person who 
recovers the policy proceeds."), appeal denied, 606 N.E.2d 1235 (Ill. 1992). 
49. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Village of Hempstead, 397 N.E.2d 737, 742 (N.Y. 
1979) (quoting Messersmith v. American Fidelity Co., 133 N.E. 432, 433 (N.Y. 1921)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
50. The public policy exclusion therefore derives from the observation that "insurance, by 
removing from the defendant the threat of actual liability, obviously calls into question tort Jaw's 
ability to achieve deterrence." Schwartz, supra note 20, at 313. 
51. James A. Fisher, The Exclusion from Insurance Coverage of Losses Caused by the Inten-
tional Acts of the Insured: A Policy in Search of a Justification, 30 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 94, 94 
(1990); see also Donald F. Farbstein & Francis J. Stillman, Insurance for the Commission of 
Intentional Torts, 20 HAsrlNGS L.J. 1219 (1969); Judith A. Warshawsky, Comment, The Expan-
sion of Insurance Coverage To Include the Intentional Tortfeasor, 23 LOY. L. REV. 122 (1977). 
52. For instance, courts applying the public policy exclusion to liability insurance do not 
distinguish between intentional assault and intentional sexual assault in determining whether 
assault should be insurable. See infra notes 70-71 and accompanying text. 
53. Some courts have recognized another rationale behind the imposition of a public policy 
ban against insurance for intentional or willful wrongdoing. Largely relying on then Judge Car-
dozo's opinion in Messersmith v. American Fidelity Co., 133 N.E. 432, 433 (N.Y. 1921), these 
courts recognize "unjust enrichment" and "avoidance of punishment" as the evils to which the 
public policy exclusion should be addressed. Consequently, one court has noted: 
[P]unishment rather than deterrence is the real basis upon which coverage should be ex-
cluded. A person should suffer the financial consequences flowing from his intentional con-
duct and should not be reimbursed for his Joss, even though he bargains for it in the form of 
a contract of insurance. A similar idea is expressed in the cases which exclude coverage on 
the ground that "a person should not profit from his own wrong." 
Isenhart v. General Cas. Co. of Am., 377 P.2d 26, 28 (Or. 1962). This logic animates the ration-
ale by which many courts refuse to enforce insurance to indemnify punitive damages. See infra 
notes 97-100 and accompanying text. This rationale for the public policy exclusion, however, 
itself has a utilitarian component, as the purpose of punishing wrongdoers is largely to deter their 
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void those forms of liability insurance that impermissibly detract from 
the deterrent effect of civil liability.54 
In the process of importing the public policy doctrine from first-
party to liability insurance, the courts have ignored differences be-
tween the two forms of insurance. 55 In the first-party context, courts 
apply the public policy exclusion to prevent recovery when the insured 
destroys his own property, or property that he controls, and the in-
sured-against loss is the lost value of the property.56 In contrast, in 
the liability insurance context, courts prohibit recovery when the in-
sured engages in intentional wrongdoing that causes harm to a third 
party, the loss insured being the liability that results from the insured's 
wrongful conduct. 57 In each case, the insured "controls" the loss in 
the sense that he can, at least nominally, determine whether it will 
occur. A party insured against liability for intentional wrongdoing, 
however, cannot "benefit from his own wrongdoing" through the 
mechanism of insurance in the same way as a party insured against 
losses to his property can; the injured third party ultimately receives 
wrongdoing. See, e.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 2.03 (1987). 
Therefore, to say that insurance detracts from the intended punishment is also to say that insur-
ance detracts from the deterrent effect of liability. 
S4. In determining which forms of liability insurance impermissibly detract from the deter-
rent effect of civil liability, most courts that have applied the public policy exclusion to liability 
insurance have recognized a distinction between intentional behavior that results in harm to an-
other person and the intentional infliction of harm. The logic behind this distinction is that an 
"intentional act may result in an unintended injury." Spruill Motors, Inc. v. Universal Under-
writers Ins. Co., S12 P.2d 403, 408 (Kan. 1973); see also 1 FREEDMAN, supra note 33, § 1:13; 43 
AM. JuR. 2o Insurance § 708 (1982). Thus, courts only invoke public policy to void coverage for 
intentional wrongdoing when the insurance company can show that the insured also intentionally 
injured another person. See generally 1 FREEDMAN, supra note 33, § 1:13 (describing the issues 
that arise when courts consider coverage for intentional wrongdoing and noting that the " 'inten-
tional act' exclusion generally calls for a specific intent to cause injury"). Courts therefore permit 
an insured to enforce coverage for liability that results from the unexpected harmful conse-
quences of a wrongful, intentional act. As explained by one court, "[o]ne who intentionally 
injures another may not be indemnified for any civil liability thus incurred. However, one whose 
intentional act causes an unintended injury may be so indemnified." Public Serv. Mut. Ins. Co. 
v. Goldfarb, 42S N.E.2d 810, 814 (N.Y. 1981). Consequently, the public policy exclusion in 
insurance law is a court-imposed "intentional injury" exclusion, rather than a court-imposed 
exclusion of coverage for any liability that stems from an "intentional act." See Continental Ins. 
Co. v. McDaniel, 772 P.2d 6, 9 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988) (making an explicit comparison between 
the scope of the pubic policy exclusion and the scope of a contractual intentional acts exclusion); 
1 FREEDMAN, supra note 33, § 1:13 (noting the distinction between intentional acts that result in 
injury and intentionally caused injuries and suggesting that most courts recognize this 
distinction). 
SS. Courts that do recognize a distinction between the public policy exclusion in first-party 
and third-party insurance, however, abandon the public policy exclusion in the liability insurance 
context. See U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Beltmann N. Am. Co., 69S F. Supp. 941, 948 (N.D. Ill. 1988), 
revd. on other grounds, 883 F.2d S64 (7th Cir. 1989); University of Ill. v. Continental Cas. Co., 
S99 N.E.2d 1338, 13SO-Sl (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 606 N.E.2d 123S (Ill. 1992). 
S6. See supra note 31 (describing the difference between first- and third-party insurance). 
S7. See supra note 31; see also Willborn, supra note 10, at lOlS ("The employer has not acted 
with the 'design of producing loss under his insurance contract;' the insurance proceeds will go to 
the victims of discrimination, not to the employer."). 
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the proceeds of a liability insurance policy,58 while the insured retains 
the proceeds of a property insurance contract. 
Although it derives from the public policy doctrine developed in 
first-party insurance, the public policy exclusion in liability insurance 
reflects a different set of priorities. The courts employ the same rheto-
ric as in the first-party context - they claim, for instance, to impose 
the public policy exclusion to prevent an insured from benefiting from 
his own wrongdoing. Additionally, they apply the exclusion to the 
same class of wrongdoing, invoking public policy to void coverage for 
intentional but not negligent wrongdoing. 59 The concern in liability 
insurance, however, is not the avoidance of fraud or unjust enrich-
ment; rather, it is maintaining the deterrent effect of civil liability.60 
Courts applying the public policy exclusion to liability insurance 
therefore stress that liability insurance covering intentional wrong-
doing tends to increase the incidence of wrongdoing. 61 Thus, the pub-
lic policy exclusion in liability insurance reflects a utilitarian calculus; 
liability insurance violates public policy to the extent that it "promotes 
wrongdoing" by insuring intentional misconduct, not to the extent 
that it confers an undeserved profit on the insured tortfeasor. 
The courts have arrived at widely varying interpretations of this 
doctrine in applying the public policy exclusion to intentional torts. 62 
58. See Vigilant Ins. Co. v. Kambly, 319 N.W.2d 382, 385 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (noting 
that the proceeds of a medical malpractice policy do not permit a doctor to "benefit" from hav-
ing sexually assaulted a patient because the proceeds are ultimately paid to the innocent victim). 
59. See infra notes 62-84 and accompanying text (describing the various approaches to defin-
ing intent); see also Great Am. Indem. Co. v. Saltzman, 213 F.2d 743, 748 (8th Cir.) ("[N]o 
public policy is involved in permitting one to insure against the results of [negligent] acts."), cert. 
denied, 348 U.S. 862 (1954); Isaacson Iron Works v. Ocean Accident & Guar. Corp., 70 P.2d 
1026, 1029 (Wash. 1937) ("Nowadays many policies are written which by their terms protect the 
insured against his own negligence. The ordinary automobile indemnity coverage and insurance 
against fire are of this class. Such policies are not against public policy.") The Eighth Circuit in 
Saltzman noted that the maxim "one cannot profit from one's own wrong" does not apply to 
liability insurance. The court stated: 
It is argued that to permit plaintiff to recover ... would in effect permit him to profit by his 
own wrong, but plaintiff is not profiting by his own wrong but is simply being indemnified 
against the result of his own wrongful acts and that . . • is the very purpose of liability 
insurance. To commit an act of negligence is a wrongful act ... but it is perfectly legitimate 
that one protect himself against the result of his own negligence by a contract of insurance. 
213 F.2d at 748. 
60. See Farbstein & Stillman, supra note 51, at 1245-46; Willborn, supra note 10, at 1009 
("Insurance [for intentional discrimination] would undermine the deterrent effect of damages. 
Hence, to preserve the deterrent effect, [public policy] prohibits insurance for such liability."), 
61. See, e.g., Ranger Ins. Co. v. Bal Harbour Club, Inc., 549 So. 2d 1005, 1007 n.4 (Fla. 
1989). 
62. The court-imposed public policy exclusion therefore resembles its contractual counter-
part, the language of which has sparked numerous interpretations. A typical contractual exclu-
sion might prevent coverage for "bodily injury or property damage caused intentionally by or at 
the direction of the insured." 70 NEW YORK JuR. 2o Insurance§ 1416, at 247 (1988). Courts 
commonly interpret this exclusion, and others like it, to require proof that the insured "intended 
the act and to cause some kind of bodily injury." Id. However, some courts interpret the clause 
less strictly, excluding coverage for injuries that are the natural and probable consequence of an 
intentional act, while others require even more specific proof that the insured intended both the 
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Some courts have arrived at a strict standard for applying the public 
policy exclusion to liability insurance, 63 categorically refusing to en-
force coverage for any intentional tort. The courts in other states have 
yet to settle on a single standard. The Illinois courts, for instance, 
have taken conflicting approaches to the public policy exclusion. One 
Illinois state court has concluded that intentional torts are categori-
cally uninsurable as a matter of public policy, 64 but at least two Illinois 
courts have refused to follow this proclamation, 65 and one federal 
court in Illinois has arrived at a less stringent definition of the public 
policy exclusion. 66 Some state legislatures have codified the public 
act and a specific injury in order for coverage to be excluded. See generally 43 AM. JUR. 2o 
Insurance § 710 (1982) (discussing the various ways in which courts interpret the contractual 
exclusion for intentional acts); James L. Rigelhaupt, Jr., Annotation, Construction and Applica-
tion of Provision of Liability Insurance Policy Expressly Excluding Injuries Intended or Expected 
by Insured, 31 A.L.R.4TH 957 (1984) (discussing cases in which the court construed or applied 
an intentional injury clause). 
63. For instance, Alabama adheres to a categorical prohibition against insurance that indem-
nifies a person against the consequences of his own intentional acts, without respect to the in-
sured's intent to cause harm. St. Paul Ins. Cos. v. Talladega Nursing Home, Inc., 606 F.2d 631, 
633 (5th Cir. 1979) (citing Pruet v. Dugger-Holmes & Assocs., 162 So. 2d 613 (Ala. 1964), and 
Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co. v. Murphy, 146 So. 387 (Ala. 1933)). The Alabama courts have 
declared that "all contracts insuring against loss from intentional wrongs are void in Alabama as 
against public policy," Talladega, 606 F.2d at 633, and they have defined "intentional wrong" to 
include "both intentionally causing injury and 'intentionally doing some act which reasonable 
and ordinary prudence' would indicate likely to result in injury." 606 F.2d at 634 (quoting 
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Blakeney, 340 So. 2d 754, 756 (Ala. 1976), overruled on other grounds 
by Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Dyer, 454 So. 2d 921 (Ala. 1984)). Other states 
have adopted a similarly unforgiving definition of intent, particularly in guiding the interpreta-
tion of the contractual exclusion for "intentional acts." See ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. 
WIDiss, INSURANCE LAW§ 5.4(d)(2), at 520 (1988) (describing the five possible interpretations 
of the contractual exclusion); Fisher, supra note 51, at 128; Rigelhaupt, supra note 62, at 983-99. 
64. In Rubenstein Lumber Co. v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 462 N.E.2d 660 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1984), the Illinois appellate court considered whether, as a matter of contract interpretation, a 
liability insurance policy covered a retaliatory discharge claim leveled against an employer. 
Under its interpretation of the policy, the court denied coverage because it held that the judg-
ment in a retaliatory discharge case does not constitute "benefits" within the coverage of the 
employer's worker's compensation insurance. 462 N.E.2d at 661. The court noted in dicta, 
however, that, "even if the policy was written to expressly require the [insurance company] to 
defend and indemnify the [employer] in the retaliatory discharge action, we believe that such a 
provision would be void as against public policy." 462 N.E.2d at 662. In reaching this conclu-
sion, the court appeared to rely exclusively on the fact that Illinois courts have classified retalia-
tory discharge as an intentional tort. 462 N.E.2d at 662. 
65. See Dixon Distrib. Co. v. Hanover Ins. Co., 612 N.E.2d 846, 857 (Ill. App. Ct.) ("The 
courts, however, should be very cautious in establishing public policy by court fiat."), appeal 
granted, 622 N.E.2d 1203 (Ill. 1993); University oflll. v. Continental Cas. Co., 599 N.E.2d 1338, 
1350-51 (Ill. App. Ct.) ("Based on our analysis of the cases ... we find there is no Illinois public 
policy prohibiting insuring for damages caused by one's intentiOnal acts except to the extent that 
the insured wrongdoer may not be the person who recovers the policy proceeds."), appeal denied, 
606 N.E.2d 1235 (Ill. 1992). 
66. U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Beltmann N. Am. Co., 695 F. Supp. 941 (N.D. Ill. 1988), revd. on 
other grounds, 883 F.2d 564 (7th Cir. 1989). In Beltmann, the District Court for the Northern 
District of Illinois refused to apply Illinois public policy to void coverage for retaliatory dis-
charge. The court reasoned that Illinois state courts had applied the public policy exclusion 
exclusively to first-party insurance, and the court refused to import that exclusion into a liability 
insurance policy because the "public policy considerations that preclude insurance coverage for 
self-inflicted injury lose a great deal of their force in the context of insurance for tortious liability 
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policy exclusion;67 courts in these states interpret the statutory public 
policy exclusion in much the same way as other courts have inter-
preted the judicially created public policy exclusion - as if it were a 
contractual exclusion for "intentional acts" or "intentional injuries."68 
Finally, some courts have simply abandoned the public policy exclu-
sion and enforced insurance to cover compensatory and even punitive 
damages that result from intentional wrongdoing. 69 
This confusing array of standards has led courts to arrive at incon-
sistent and conflicting results. Some courts have invoked public policy 
to void insurance for relatively innocuous risks, while others have en-
forced insurance for remarkably egregious misconduct. For instance, 
some courts have enforced professional liability insurance to cover a 
physician's liability for sexually assaulting his patients during the 
course of their treatment. 70 In contrast, other courts have invoked 
to innocent third parties." 695 F. Supp. at 948. The court instead adopted a public policy exclu-
sion modeled on the standard that Illinois applies to void coverage for punitive damages and 
thereby found that liability insurance "is allowed to cover at least compensatory damages flowing 
from intentional or willfully inflicted harms." 695 F. Supp. at 949. Consequently, the court 
found that Illinois public policy only forbids coverage for punitive damages resulting from willful 
wrongdoing and not compensatory damages flowing from an intentional wrong. 695 F. Supp. at 
949. 
67. Section 533 of the California Insurance Code provides that "[a]n insurer is not liable for a 
loss caused by the willful act of the insured ... but he is not exonerated by the negligence of the 
insured .... " CAL. INS. CODE§ 533 (West 1993). California courts read this limitation into 
every contract for insurance that is written in California. See J.C. Penney Cas. Ins. Co. v. M.K., 
804 P.2d 689, 694 (Cal.) (noting that § 533 is " 'an implied exclusionary clause which by statute 
is to be read into all insurance policies'" (quoting United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Ameri· 
can Employer's Ins. Co., 205 Cal. Rptr. 460 (Ct. App. 1984))), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 280 
(1991). Other states that have provided for a statutory public policy exclusion include Massa-
chusetts, see MASS. GEN. L. ch. 175, § 47 (1992) (precluding companies from insuring "any 
person against liability for causing injury, other than bodily injury, by his deliberate or inten-
tional crime or wrongdoing"), and North Dakota, see N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-32-04 (1989). 
Some states have codified an exclusion for punitive damages. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 3937.182 (Baldwin 1993). 
68. Despite the apparently stringent language of the statute, California courts do not require 
a showing of "willfulness" before invoking § 533 to void coverage. Just as the Illinois courts 
have yet to settle on a single standard for the judicially created public policy exclusion, the 
California courts have yet to agree on the proper interpretation of the statutory prohibition em· 
bodied in § 533. Some courts have invoked the exclusion only when there is proof of a " 'precon-
ceived design to inflict injury,' " Clemmer v. Hartford Ins. Co., 587 P.2d 1098, 1110 (Cal. 1978) 
(quoting Walters v. American Ins. Co., 8 Cal. Rptr. 665, 670 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960)), while others 
have been willing to infer an intent to injure from the circumstances of the wrongful act. J.C. 
Penney, 804 P.2d at 698 (holding that § 533 "does not require a showing by the insurer of its 
insured's 'preconceived design to inflict harm' when the insured seeks coverage for an intentional 
and wrongful act if the harm is inherent in the act itself"). For an analysis of the standard in 
California, see Gary L. Fontana & Anthony J. Barron, Insurance Coverage for Intentional Acts, 
in COMPREHENSIVE GENERAL LIABILITY POLICIES 1993: INSURANCE CLAIMS AND COVER· 
AGE LITIGATION, (Practising Law Institute, May-June 1993). 
69. See, e.g., Harris v. County of Racine, 512 F. Supp. 1273, 1280 (E.D. Wis. 1981) (enforc-
ing insurance to cover punitive damages imposed for violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Colson v. 
Lloyd's of London, 435 S.W.2d 42, 47 (Mo. Ct. App. 1968) (enforcing coverage for false arrest); 
see also infra section 11.B. 
70. See, e.g., St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Asbury, 720 P.2d 540 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) 
(holding that a professional liability insurance policy covers liability for sexual assault); St. Paul 
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public policy to refuse to allow indemnification for simple assault. 71 
Moreover, some courts have enforced insurance to provide coverage 
for punitive damages imposed as a result of intentional civil rights vio-
lations, 72 and the majority of courts have enforced insurance to cover 
punitive damages in one form or another, 73 in spite of the fact that 
courts impose punitive damages largely to punish and deter egregious 
wrongdoing. 74 Various courts have also enforced insurance to cover 
many other forms of intentional wrongdoing, 75 including false arrest, 76 
Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Shernow, 610 A.2d 1281 (Conn. 1992) (same); St. Paul Fire & Marine 
Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 296 S.E.2d 126 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982) (same); Vigilant Ins. Co. v. Kambly, 
319 N.W.2d 382 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (same); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Love, 459 
N.W.2d 698 (Minn. 1990) (same); L.L v. Medical Protective Co., 362 N.W.2d 174 (Wis. Ct. 
App. 1984) (same). But see St. Paul Ins. Co. v. Cromeans, 771 F. Supp. 349, 352 (N.D. Ala. 
1991) (finding professional liability for sexual abuse uninsurable under Alabama law); Public 
Serv. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Goldfarb, 425 N.E.2d 810 (N.Y. 1981) (holding as a matter of public 
policy that a dentist's liability insurance policy could not cover his liability for sexually abusing a 
patient). 
71. See, e.g., Fire Ins. Exch. v. Altieri, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 360, 365 (Ct. App. 1991) {finding that 
California's statutory exclusion of coverage for "willful" wrongdoing precludes indemnification 
in a case in which the insured intended to punch another person even though he did not intend 
the resulting harm), review denied, 1992 Cal. LEXIS 383 (Jan. 22, 1992). 
72. See, e.g., Harris, 512 F. Supp. at 1284 (permitting coverage for punitive damages assessed 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); see also Eric Chen, Insurance of Section 1983 Punitive Damages: 
Wrong Law, Wrong Result, 51 INS. COUNS. J. 533, 533-36 (1984) (describing the emerging 
caselaw on the validity of insurance for § 1983 damages). 
73. JERRY, supra note 21, § 65[f], at 352 n.74 (citing Jurisdiction Survey on the Insurability of 
Punitive Damages, in INSURANCE, EXCESS AND REINSURANCE DISPUTES 1986, at 115-33 (Barry 
R. Ostranger & Thomas R. Newman eds., 1986) (punitives are insurable in two-thirds of the 
states that have considered the issue)); Michael A. Rosenhouse, Annotation, Liability Insurance 
Coverage as Extending to Liability for Punitive or Exemplary Damages, 16 A.L.R.4TH 11 (1982) 
(listing the various approaches taken by different states). 
74. See, e.g., Northwestern Natl. Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 442 (5th Cir. 1962) 
("[B]y 'punitive damages' we mean damages awarded with a view to punish ... and to deter 
.... "). 
75. As noted above, see supra text accompanying notes 21-28, the question whether insur-
ance contracts can be enforced to cover intentional torts involves two issues - whether the 
contract provides coverage and whether coverage comports with public policy. With respect to 
the first issue, insurance contracts often provide coverage for intentional torts. See 12 
APPLEMAN & APPLEMAN, supra note 34, § 7031, at 150 ("Insurance companies, in comprehen-
sive liability policies, . . • generally cover liability arising from libel and slander, invasion of 
privacy, false arrest, and false imprisonment, as well as malicious prosecution .... Every one of 
the acts recited requires a deliberate, and generally thoughtful and purposeful, act."). Insurance 
companies providing coverage for such intentional torts may also include intentional act exclu-
sions in their policies. Some courts have resolved the clear conflicts between the provision and 
the exclusion of intentional tort coverage in favor of the insured by finding that the policies 
provide coverage for intentional torts. See, e.g., Davidson v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 572 N.E.2d 
502, 507-08 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (finding that a policy providing coverage for malicious prosecu-
tion was rendered "illusory" by the inclusion of an intentional act exclusion and conseqµently 
requiring the insurance company to satisfy the reasonable expectations of the insured by defend-
ing a malicious prosecution action); Levinson v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 346 N.Y.S.2d 428, 430 
(App. Div. 1973) (finding that a similarly ambiguous policy provided coverage for malicious 
prosecution). 
76. See, e.g., Colton v. Swain, 527 F.2d 296, 303-05 (7th Cir. 1975) (assuming an insurance 
policy would provide coverage for false arrest and malicious prosecution in a case in which the 
evidence also supported an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); see also City of Cedar Rapids v. 
Northwestern Natl. Ins. Co., 304 N.W.2d 228, 230 (Iowa 1981) (enforcing insurance policy that 
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malicious prosecution, 77 defamation,78 and retaliatory discharge. 79 
Because of the conflicting formulations of the public policy exclu-
sion and because of its inconsistent application from state to state, it is 
difficult to formulate one approach the various states should adopt in 
applying the exclusion to insurance for intentional employment dis-
crimination. Nevertheless, courts applying the public policy exclusion 
at least nominally adhere to the same underlying rationale. Alabama 
courts void insurance coverage for liability that flows from intentional 
acts because "no one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or 
to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his 
own iniquity."80 In Illinois, the rationale behind the public policy ex-
clusion is that enforcing coverage for intentional wrongdoing would 
allow the insured to benefit from his own wrongdoing.st California's 
section 533 "is a 'codification of the jurisprudential maxim that no 
man shall profit from his own wrong.' " 82 Each of the courts employ-
ing this rhetoric voids liability insurance that in one way or another 
"promotes wrongdoing."83 Therefore, the basic rationale underlying 
the public policy exclusion, regardless of its formulation by the court, 
is "to prevent encouragement of willful torts."84 
C. The Imputed Liability and Negligent Supervision Exceptions 
Most states have drawn exceptions to the public policy exclusion 
and have enforced insurance for some forms of intentional wrong-
doing. 85 Courts recognize these exceptions in two circumstances. 
First, they permit insurance to cover intentional wrongdoing in cases 
provided coverage for punitive damages arising out of a false arrest), overruled on other grounds 
by Parks v. City of Marshalltown, 440 N.W.2d 377, 379 (Iowa 1989). 
77. See Davidson, 572 N.E.2d at 507-08; Levinson, 346 N.Y.S.2d at 430. But see Ledford v. 
Gutoski, 855 P.2d 196, 199 (Or. Ct. App. 1993) (excluding malicious prosecution from coverage 
because it necessarily involves an "intent to do harm"), review granted, 318 Or. 325 (1994). 
78. See Ranger Ins. Co. v. Bal Harbour Club, Inc., 549 So. 2d 1003, 1012 n.3 (Fla. 1989) 
(Ehrlich, C.J., dissenting). 
79. See, e.g., Continental Cas. Co. v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 924 F.2d 370, 374 (1st 
Cir. 1991) (enforcing coverage for retaliatory discharge and sexual harassment). 
80. Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co. v. Murphy, 146 So. 387, 390 (Ala. 1933) (quoting Riggs v. 
Palmer, 22 N.E. 188, 190 (N.Y. 1889)). 
81. Rubenstein Lumber Co. v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 462 N.E.2d 660, 662 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1984) (dictum). 
82. American States Ins. Co. v. Borbor, 826 F.2d 888, 894 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting Don 
Burton, Inc. v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 575 F.2d 702, 705 (9th Cir. 1978)). 
83. 6A CORBIN, supra note 46, § 1471, quoted in Harrell v. Travelers Indem. Co., 567 P.2d 
1013, 1016 (Or. 1977). 
84. American States, 826 F.2d at 894. 
85. Even Alabama has recognized an exception to its rule against insuring intentional torts. 
The Alabama courts have recognized an exception for imputed liability, noting that "it is not 
against public policy to indemnify an insured against the consequences of a violation of law by 
others without his direction or participation." Armstrong v. Security Ins. Group, 288 So. 2d 
134, 136 (Ala. 1973). 
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in which the availability of insurance cannot be expected to promote 
wrongdoing, 86 that is, in cases in which insurance is not likely to cre-
ate a substantial moral hazard for the insured to commit intentional 
wrongdoing. Second, courts enforce coverage for intentional wrong-
doing in cases in which the public policy favoring the compensation of 
victims outweighs the public policy against the promotion of 
wrongdoing. 87 
These two principles in fact explain many of the inconsistencies in 
the application of the public policy exclusion. Take for example the 
cases in which courts have enforced insurance for a physician's liabil-
ity for sexual assault of his patients. 88 First, insurance for a physi-
cian's sexual assault liability may not promote wrongdoing by 
physicians. Physicians cannot insure against the threat of criminal 
sanction, nor can they insure against loss of reputation or the revoca-
tion of their physician's license. 89 Given these auxiliary, uninsurable 
deterrents, it is unlikely that a physician would decide to sexually as-
86. See, e.g., Preferred Mut. Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 491 N.E.2d 688, 691 (Ohio 1986) (per-
mitting insurance for an assault committed in self-defense and noting that, under the circum-
stances, intentional act insurance could not be expected to promote wrongdoing). 
87. Automobile insurance illustrates these principles. Applying the public policy exclusion 
consistently with its underlying rationale, courts might enforce automobile liability insurance to 
cover some intentional torts. Some courts might note that drivers are not likely to wreck their 
cars intentionally, even though they are insured, because other factors besides tort liability pro-
vide a deterrent. For instance, drivers are deterred from getting in accidents by the threat of 
criminal sanction, and by the fear of personal injury in the wreck. See Fleming James, Jr., Acci-
dent Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance, 51 YALE L.J. 549, 558 (1948) 
(listing the "deterrents" to wrongdoing besides civil liability and noting that accidents sometimes 
"involve the threat of criminal liability"); see also Northwestern Natl. Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 
F.2d 432, 444 (5th Cir. 1962) (Gewin, J., concurring) ("If the criminal penalties provided [for 
reckless driving] fail to deter the wrongdoer, I seriously doubt that closing the market to insur-
ance coverage will do so."); Travelers lndem. Co. v. Hood, 140 S.E.2d 68, 70 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1964) ("We hold that it is not against public policy for a contract for automobile insurance to 
cover liability of the insured arising out of willful and wanton misconduct in unlawfully racing 
automobiles on a public highway."); S.S. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 808 S.W.2d 668, 671 
(Tex. Ct. App. 1991) (noting that "public policy discourages vehicle operators from negligently 
injuring others with their vehicles," but also noting that "it cannot be said that enforcement of 
the indemnity provisions of an automobile insurance policy encourages collisions"), a.ffd., 858 
S.W.2d 374 (Tex. 1993). 
Some courts find an exception to the public policy exclusion that permits the enforcement of 
automobile insurance to cover intentional torts because they feel that compensating the victims 
of automobile accidents is more important than preventing insured drivers from being indemni-
fied against their liability. See Hudson v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 569 A.2d 1168, 1170-71 
(Del. 1990) (refusing to void coverage for intentional wrongdoing under an automobile policy, 
despite the public policy exclusion because of the competing public policy behind the state motor 
vehicle financial responsibility law); S.S., 808 S.W.2d at 671 (concluding that a homeowner's 
insurance policy provides coverage for negligent transmission of a sexually transmitted disease by 
relying on the analogous context of automobile insurance in which public policy favors the com-
pensation of tort victims); Vigilant Ins. Co. v. Kambly, 319 N.W.2d 382, 385 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1982) (allowing insurance to cover a physician's sexual assault of his patient based in part on the 
public policy that favors the compensation of tort victims). 
88. See sources cited supra note 70. 
89. See Glen O. Robinson, Rethinking the Allocation of Medical Malpractice Risks Between 
Patients and Providers, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 173, 176-77 ("[L]egal liability 
imposes some costs that are uninsurable, such as harm to reputation, disruption of the physi-
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sault his patients simply because he has insurance to cover his civil 
liability.90 Therefore, the sexual assault cases reflect a logic of "surro-
gate deterrence"; when other significant deterrents to intentional 
wrongdoing exist, courts do not need to invoke the public policy exclu-
sion to void coverage because the availability of insurance probably 
would not cause the insured to commit wrongful acts.91 Second, the 
public policy favoring compensation of tort victims supports the en-
forcement of coverage for a physician's sexual assault. In the words of 
one court, sexual assault by a physician should be insurable in some 
cases because "it is not the insured who will benefit, but the innocent 
victim who will be provided compensation for her injuries."92 
This section explores the exceptions some courts have drawn, 
based largely on the first of these rationales - that not all insurance 
for intentional acts promotes wrongdoing - to permit employers to 
obtain insurance for imputed liability and negligent supervision liabil-
ity arising out of the intentional wrongdoing of their employees. 
Courts do not base these exceptions on competing public policies 
favoring the enforcement of insurance, but rather on the utilitarian 
rationale underlying the public policy exclusion. The purpose of the 
public policy exclusion is to remove the incentive to wrongdoing cre-
ated by insurance covering intentional wrongdoing. That purpose 
does not apply to insurance for imputed liability and negligent supervi-
sion liability because those forms of insurance do not promote inten-
tional wrongdoing. 
1. The Imputed Liability Exception 
Some courts have created an exception to the public policy exclu-
sion that permits employers to obtain insurance against liability that is 
imputed93 to them as a result of the intentional torts committed by 
cian's practice, and emotional stress caused by litigation. These are real costs which a physician 
presumably will seek to avoid even if they are not accompanied by direct economic penalties."). 
90. See Kambly, 319 N.W.2d at 385 ("[I]t is unlikely that the insured was induced to engage 
in the unlawful conduct by reliance upon the insurability of any claims arising therefrom or that 
allowing coverage here would induce future similar unlawful conduct by practitioners."). 
91. Courts have also permitted recovery for intentional wrongdoing when the circumstances 
suggest that the availability of insurance did not actually "promote" the wrongdoing. For in· 
stance, courts have permitted coverage in assault cases when the insured did not have time before 
committing the assault to reflect upon the availability of insurance to cover his losses. JERRY, 
supra note 21, § 63B ("Allowing coverage of intentional acts committed in self-defense is not 
clearly violative of public policy."); see also Preferred Mut. Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 491 N.E.2d 
688, 691 (Ohio 1986) (permitting insurance for an assault committed in self-defense and noting 
that, under the circumstances, intentional act insurance will not promote wrongdoing). 
92. Kamb/y, 319 N.W.2d at 385; see also St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Asbury, 720 P.2d 
540, 542 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (permitting insurance for a physician's sexual assault and quoting 
Kambly). 
93. In applying this "imputed liability" exception to the public policy exclusion, courts have 
looked to the insured's actual conduct rather than the particular "theory" under which liability 
is imputed to the insured. See Arenson v. National Auto. & Cas. Ins. Co., 286 P.2d 816, 818 
(Cal. 1955) (enforcing coverage under a homeowner's policy for liability parents incurred as a 
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their employees.94 Imputed liability in this context is any liability an 
employer incurs because of the employer's agency relationship with its 
employees. The employer faces liability not for its own conduct, but 
for the conduct of agents for which the employer can be held responsi-
ble. Courts recognize an "imputed liability" exception to the public 
policy exclusion for two reasons, each of which relates to whether the 
insurance promotes intentional wrongdoing. First, courts generally 
hold that public policy forbids an insured from obtaining insurance 
against his own intentional wrongdoing, not someone else's intentional 
wrongdoing.95 Here, the intentional wrong is committed by an agent, 
not the insured employer. Second, and more significantly, courts rec-
ognize that insurance for liability imputed to an employer under 
result of the intentional wrongdoing of their son); Dayton Hudson Corp. v. American Mut. Liab. 
Ins. Co., 621 P.2d 1155, 1160 (Okla. 1980) (holding vicarious liability to be insurable "unless the 
employer's volition was either directly or indirectly an element in the commission of the harm"); 
McLeod v. Tecorp Intl., Ltd., 844 P.2d 925, 927 n.3 (Or. Ct. App. 1992) (noting that the fact 
that an employee was acting within the scope of his employment is of little concern in determin-
ing whether an employer's imputed liability should be insurable because it "is the insured's actual 
conduct, not the imputed conduct of another" that matters), modified, 850 P.2d 1161 (Or. Ct. 
App.), revd., 865 P.2d 1283 (Or. 1993). 
94. See, e.g., Dart Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 484 F.2d 1295, 1297 (9th Cir. 1973) 
(considering California's statutory bar against insuring willful wrongdoing and determining that 
California caselaw "clearly indicates the policy of the statutory exclusion as being limited to a 
situation where the insured is personally at fault"); Scott v. Instant Parking, Inc., 245 N.E.2d 
124, 126 (Ill. App. Ct. 1969) ("This case ... involves only the right of a corporation to insure 
against liability caused by its agents and servants. There is no reasonable basis to declare the 
latter type insurance is against public policy."); Leon Lowe & Sons, Inc. v. Great Am. Surplus 
Lines Ins. Co., 572 So. 2d 206, 210 (La. Ct. App. 1990) ("Public policy forbids a person from 
insuring against his own intentional acts, but does not forbid him from insuring against the 
intentional acts of another for which he may be vicariously liable."); Perl v. St. Paul Fire & 
Marine Ins. Co., 345 N.W.2d 209, 216 (Minn. 1984) (refusing to enforce a professional liability 
policy to permit an individual attorney to be indemnified for the attorney's fees he forfeited for 
breaching his fiduciary duty to his client but permitting recovery by the attorney's law firm); 
Floralbell Amusement Corp. v. Standard Sur. & Cas. Co., 9 N.Y.S.2d 959, 963 (N.Y. City Ct. 
1937) (noting that it is "far fetched" to assume that coverage of one employer's liability incurred 
as the result of an unauthorized assault committed by one of its employees would be an induce-
ment to the insured employer to encourage its employees to commit assaults because it can with 
equal force be said that liability insurance encourages negligence). In at least one state, the 
imputed liability exception is statutory with respect to punitive damages. See KAN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 40-2, 115 (1986). 
95. See American States Ins. Co. v. Barbor, 826 F.2d 888, 894 (9th Cir. 1987) ("Section 533 
is a 'codification of the jurisprudential maxim that no man shall profit from his own wrong.' " 
(quoting Don Burton, Inc. v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 575 F.2d 702, 705 (9th Cir. 1978)) (empha-
sis added)); Chicago Bd. of Options Exch., Inc. v. Harbor Ins. Co., 738 F. Supp. 1184, 1187 
(N.D. Ill. 1990) ("[The Exchange] did not insure itself ... against its own intentional torts. 
Rather ... [it] insured itself against the intentional torts of its officers and directors."); Dayton 
Hudson Corp. v. American Mut. Liab Ins. Co., 621P.2d1155, 1160 (Okla. 1980). Interestingly, 
the courts have recognized a similar exception to the rule forbidding first-party insurance from 
covering the deliberate destruction of property. "In recent years, a number of courts have moved 
away from the rule barring recovery [for intentionally incurred losses to property] to a rule that 
permits recovery by an innocent coinsured of a loss intentionally caused by ... another coin-
sured." JERRY, supra note 21, § 63A, at 303 (emphasis added). This innocent coinsured excep-
tion arises in the case of joint ownership of property, particularly marital property. Id. The 
rationale for the exception, at least in part, is that "it is one individual who is responsible for the 
wrongdoing, not all the coinsureds." Id. at 304. 
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agency principles does not necessarily provide coverage for an 
employer's intentional wrongdoing.96 
Although courts have recognized this exception to the public pol-
icy exclusion in cases involving insurance for intentional wrong-
doing, 97 they have developed the rationale behind the imputed liability 
exception more fully in the context of insurance for punitive dam-
ages. 98 Punitive damages are designed to deter as well as to punish 
wrongdoing, and insurance arguably detracts from this deterrent ef-
fect. 99 Many courts therefore refuse to enforce insurance that covers 
punitive damages on public policy grounds. 100 Of the courts that for-
bid insurance for punitive damages, however, many have enforced 
coverage for imputed liability for punitive damages. 101 
96. See KEETON & Wrn1ss, supra note 63, § 5.4(d)(5), at 528 ("In most circumstances, 
courts hold both (1) that the express provisions commonly used in liability insurance policies do 
not preclude coverage for damages awarded for an intentional tort when the insured is held to be 
responsible on a theory of vicarious liability, and (2) that it would not be appropriate to imply a 
limitation that would restrict the coverage."). 
97. See, e.g., McBride v. Lyles, 303 So. 2d 795, 799 (La. Ct. App. 1974); see also Arenson, 286 
P.2d at 818. Commentators also have expressly recognized the exception, both as a guide to 
interpreting contractual exclusions and as a limitation on the public policy exclusion. See KEE· 
TON & Wrn1ss, supra note 63, § 5.4(d)(5) (describing the imputed liability exception to the con-
tractual exclusion and suggesting the exception is tied to public policy). 
98. See Dayton Hudson, 621 P.2d at 1160 ("In almost all jurisdictions which disallow insur-
ance coverage for punitive damages, an exception is recognized for those torts in which liability is 
vicariously imposed on the employer for a wrong of his servant."). See generally Rosenhouse, 
supra note 73 (describing the approach taken by the various courts that have considered the 
insurability of punitive damages and describing the imputed liability exception). 
99. See JERRY, supra note 21, § 65[f], at 351 ("The major battleground in the debate over the 
insurability of punitive damages concerns the question of deterrence. Opponents of insurability 
argue that allowing punitive damages to be insured frustrates the very purpose of the award and 
therefore contravenes public policy.") (emphasis omitted). 
100. Many states disallow coverage for punitive damages in some circumstances. See Rosen· 
house, supra note 73. The rationale behind this public policy exclusion of coverage tracks the 
rationale behind the court-imposed intentional act exclusion. See Public Serv. Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Goldfarb, 425 N.E.2d 810, 814 (N.Y. 1981) (noting that punitive damages are "a punishment for 
intentional wrongdoing ... [and] to allow insurance coverage for such damages 'is totally to 
defeat the purpose of punitive damages'" (quoting Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Village of 
Hempstead, 397 N.E.2d 737, 744 (N.Y. 1979))); American Home Assurance Co. v. Safway Steel 
Prods. Co., 743 S.W.2d 693, 700 n.6 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) ("The entire public policy argument 
behind not enforcing policies which insure against punitive damages changes from state to 
state."), writ denied (Tex. 1988). However, the principle behind the imposition of "punishment" 
is largely the deterrence of wrongdoing, see supra note 53, so the refusal to allow insurance 
against punishment reflects, at least in part, the same concerns with antideterrent insurance that 
underlie the public policy exclusion. Moreover, even those courts that insist that the purpose of 
punitive damages is to punish, recognize an exception for imputed liability. In permitting insur-
ance to cover vicarious liability for punitive damages, these courts stress that the "avoidance of 
punishment" reasoning behind the public policy exclusion does not apply: "[I]f the employer did 
not participate in the wrong the policy of preventing the wrongdoer from escaping the penalties 
for his wrong is inapplicable." Northwestern Natl. Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 440 (5th 
Cir. 1962). 
101. Several courts have noted that in "almost all jurisdictions which disallow insurance 
coverage for punitive damages, an exception is recognized for those torts in which liability is 
vicariously imposed on the employer for a wrong of his servant." Dayton Hudson, 621 P.2d at 
1160; see also McNulty, 307 F.2d at 439-40 (finding punitive damages uninsurable but suggesting 
an exception for imputed liability); Perl v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 345 N.W.2d 209, 216 
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The rationale behind the exception permitting insurance for im-
puted liability for punitive damages is relatively straightforward. 
Courts impute liability for punitive damages to an employer on the 
theory that punitive damages will inspire the employer to take better 
care in supervising its employees.102 Insurance for imputed liability, 
however, removes only part of the incentive employers have for polic-
ing the conduct of their employees.103 Moreover, insurance for an em-
ployer's imputed liability does not inspire individual employees to act 
wrongfully because it does not indemnify them for purely personal lia-
bility. Therefore, even though this form of imputed liability is based 
on the employer's relationship to its employees and not on proof of an 
employer's wrongdoing, an employer's imputed liability resembles lia-
bility for negligence.104 Ultimately, an employer is held liable in these 
circumstances because the employer has failed to take appropriate 
steps to prevent its employees from engaging in wrongful conduct. 
Consequently, as long as the employer's failure to prevent its employ-
ees' wrongdoing does not itself reflect the employer's intentional 
wrongdoing, courts should enforce insurance for vicariously imposed 
punitive damages.10s 
(Minn. 1984) (citing cases allowing insurance coverage for punitive damages for imputed liabil-
ity). Courts recognize this exception largely because they do not perceive a connection between 
the availability of insurance for vicariously imposed punitive damages and the promotion of 
wrongdoing. See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Columbia Cas. Co., 682 P.2d 975, 981 (Wyo. 1984) (refus-
ing to void coverage for vicariously imposed punitive damages and noting "we know of no stud-
ies, statistics or proofs which indicate that contracts of insurance to protect against liability for 
punitive damages have a tendency to make willful or wanton misconduct more probable"). 
102. See, e.g., Harrell v. Travelers lndem. Co., 567 P.2d 1013, 1020 (Or. 1977) ("[T]he basis 
for the imposition of vicarious liability for punitive damages upon a corporation or other em-
ployer is also one of deterrence - i.e. the deterrent effect upon an employer of an award of 
punitive damages by encouraging him to exercise closer control over his employees."). 
103. Floralbell Amusement Corp. v. Standard Sur. & Cas. Co., 9 N.Y.S.2d 959, 963 (N.Y. 
City Ct. 1937) (noting that it is "far fetched" to assume that coverage of an employer's liability 
incurred as a result of an unauthorized assault committed by one of its employees would be an 
inducement to the insured employer to encourage its employees to commit assaults, because one 
can argue with equal force that liability insurance encourages negligence). Individual employees 
are deterred largely by the sanction imposed against them by their employer, not by the prospect 
of liability. If the employer is jointly liable, it is likely to bear the cost of defending the suit, and 
the individual employee is likely to be '1udgment proor• - that is, unlikely to have assets suffi-
cient to cover her share of the liability. STEVEN SHA VELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT 
LA w 207 (1987) ("[I]n making judgments about the importance of risk aversion [it is important 
to] consider the size of losses in relation to the parties' assets."). Therefore, the only significant 
deterrent the individual employees face is the prospect of an internal sanction imposed by their 
employer. This sanction is of course uninsurable, except to the extent that employees can obtain 
unemployment benefits. 
104. See Flora/be//, 9 N.Y.S.2d at 962-63 (noting that insurance for imputed liability is the 
equivalent of insurance for negligence); see also JERRY, supra note 21: 
Where punitive damages are vicariously imposed, the public policies against coverage of 
punitive damages are much less compelling .... The employer [may have] no meaningful 
ability to prevent the conduct of an employee bent on acting in ... a destructive way. At 
best, the employer [might be] simply negligent - not reckless or grossly negligent - in 
failing to supervise the employee. 
Id. § 65[t], at 353. 
105. See McNulty, 307 F.2d at 439-40 ("[I]f the employer did not participate in the wrong 
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This imputed liability exception applies equally to the public policy 
against insuring liability for intentional torts. 106 As with imputed lia-
bility for punitive damages, the primary actor responsible for an em-
ployer's imputed liability for intentional torts is the agent or employee 
who committed the tort. Insurance for imputed liability may create 
some incentive for employers to permit their agents to commit inten-
tional wrongs, but it does not directly promote intentional wrongdoing 
- it does not indemnify intentional wrongdoing.107 The imputed lia-
bility exception thus comports with the rationale underlying the public 
policy exclusion; it is insurance for an employer's failure to prevent 
wrongdoing, not insurance for an employer's intentional wrongdoing. 
Therefore, although it is not based on a finding that the employer has 
been negligent, an employer's imputed liability for the intentional torts 
committed by its employees is analogous to employer liability for neg-
ligence, which is insurable under the public policy exclusion.108 
2. The Negligent Supervision Exception 
Courts also recognize a related exception that allows employers to 
insure against the liability they incur for negligent supervision of their 
employees. 109 Like imputed liability, negligent supervision liability 
arises out of an employer's failure to ensure that its employees will not 
commit intentional torts. In the case of negligent supervision liability, 
however, the employer's liability is predicated directly on its own 
the policy of preventing the wrongdoer from escaping the penalties for his wrong is 
inapplicable."). 
106. The California Supreme Court explained the rationale behind the imputed liability ex-
ception in Arenson v. National Auto. & Cas. Ins. Co., 286 P.2d 816 (Cal. 1955). In Arenson, the 
plaintiff sought coverage under his liability policy after his son started a fire that damaged school 
property. The plaintiff had been held liable for the son's wrongdoing under a California statute 
that imposed liability on parents for the willful torts of their children. The insurance company 
contested coverage, a defense that implicated § 533's prohibition against insuring "willful" mis-
conduct. However, the California Supreme Court found that § 533 did not prevent coverage, 
stating that "Section 533 ... has no application to a situation where the plaintiff [insured] is not 
personally at fault." 286 P.2d at 818 (emphasis added). 
107. See infra note 109. 
108. An employer liable on the grounds of respondeat superior is an " 'innocently con-
demned' civil obligor," and the imputed liability does not reflect the employer's own wrongdoing. 
Dayton Hudson Corp v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 621 P.2d 1155, 1160 n.19 (Okla. 1980). 
On the other hand: 
When recovery against the employer for an act of his servant is rested on [the employer's] 
prior knowledge of the servant's propensity to commit the very harm for which damages are 
sought, the basis of liability is not respondeat superior but rather the employer's own negli-
gence in not discharging the unfit servant. 
621 P.2d at 1161. However, in either case the loss results from negligent omission to prevent 
rather than an intent to commit the harm, and it should be insurable under the public policy 
exclusion. 
109. See, e.g., Chicago Bd. of Options Exch., Inc. v. Harbor Ins. Co., 738 F. Supp. 1184, 
1187-88 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (retaliatory discharge is uninsurable, but the corporation's vicarious 
liability would be insurable); Seminole Point Hosp. Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 675 F. Supp. 
44, 47 (D.N.H. 1987) (holding that an employer may insure against harm resulting from "negli-
gent supervision," including harm caused by the intentional acts of its employees). 
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wrongdoing - its failure to take adequate steps to prevent the em-
ployee's tortious conduct - and not on the agency relationship be-
tween the employer and its employees. 
The principle underlying the imputed liability exception applies 
equally in cases of negligent supervision liability. As with imputed 
liability, insurance for negligent supervision liability cannot be ex-
pected to promote wrongdoing in the sense forbidden under the public 
policy exclusion. Insurance for negligent supervision liability does not 
indemnify the employer or its employees against liability for their own 
intentional wrongs. Regardless of whether an indivi~ual employee in-
tentionally causes the harm giving rise to the employer's liability, the 
employer has been merely negligent in failing to prevent the em-
ployee's conduct. Therefore, although insurance for negligent supervi-
sion liability may create an incentive for employers to act negligently 
in supervising their employees, it does not violate the public policy 
exclusion because it does not insure or promote intentional wrongs. 
3. Limitations 
In keeping with the rationale behind the public policy exclusion, 
courts have limited the imputed liability and negligent supervision ex-
ceptions to cases "where the [insured employer] is not personally at 
fault" 110 and have intimated that insurance for imputed liability only 
comports with public policy to the extent that "the employer [does] 
not participate in the wrong."111 The reason for this limitation is 
clear: courts are willing to enforce insurance for imputed liability and 
negligent supervision liability only to the extent that such liability re-
flects an employer's negligence rather than the employer's own inten-
tional wrongdoing. Like the courts' formulations of the public policy 
exclusion, however, these efforts to limit the imputed liability and neg-
ligent supervision exceptions have not been consistent, and the courts 
have arrived at varying definitions of the employer involvement neces-
sary to destroy the exceptions. 
Thus, courts have upheld coverage in cases in which an employer 
has been "innocently condemned" through the mechanism of imputed 
liability for the wrongful conduct of its employees.112 The rationale of 
these courts is that "indemnity [in this situation] is not contrary to 
public policy because the insured ... is guilty of no wrong-doing, but 
simply has the misfortune to be legally responsible for the wrong-
110. Arenson, 286 P.2d at 818. 
111. Northwestern Natl. Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 440 (5th Cir. 1962); see also 
Beaver v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 420 N.E.2d 1058, 1061 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (allowing insurance 
for imputed liability, but only if " 'the employer did not participate in the wrong' " (quoting 
McNulty, 307 F.2d at 440)); JERRY, supra note 21, § 65[t], at 353-54 (suggesting that courts limit 
the imputed liability exception to cases of employer liability in which there is nothing greater 
than mere negligence in the wrongdoing on the part of the employer). 
112. Dayton Hudson, 621 P.2d at 1160. 
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doing of another." 113 By contrast, these courts would likely refuse to 
enforce coverage when the employer intended its employees to cause 
harm or when the employer directed the intentional misconduct of its 
employees. 114 Rather than reflecting insurable negligence, employer 
liability in these cases would reflect uninsurable intentional miscon-
duct by the employer. 
Courts have not adequately considered the gray area between these 
extremes. Some courts have stated that they would not enforce cover-
age when an employer knows of an employee's propensity to commit 
wrongdoing and fails to take any action to prevent it. 115 Other courts 
have intimated they would void coverage if an employer was grossly 
negligent in permitting its employees to commit intentional wrongs. 116 
Still other courts, however, have stated that they would permit an em-
ployer to recover under the exceptions as long as the employer did not 
authorize or direct the wrongdoing. Presumably, these courts would 
enforce coverage even if the employer had been grossly negligent in 
failing to supervise his employees. 117 
In sum, the courts have not distilled any clear or principled dis-
tinction between employer involvement that precludes coverage and 
employer involvement that is merely insurable negligence. Conse-
quently, although the courts have recognized the imputed liability and 
negligent supervision exceptions, they have not provided clear gui-
dance as to how courts should apply these exceptions in close cases. 
Clearly, however, the exceptions comport with the rationale behind 
the public policy exclusion. The only unresolved question is what 
level of employer involvement should preclude enforcement of 
coverage. 
113. Dart Indus. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 484 F.2d 1295, 1298 (9th Cir. 1973) (quoting 
Hendrix v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 98 F. Supp. 84, 87 (E.D.S.C. 1951), revd. on other 
grounds, 199 F.2d 53 (4th Cir. 1952)). 
114. See Coit Drapery Cleaners, Inc. v. Sequoia Ins. Co., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 692, 702 (Ct. App. 
1993) ("Here, the trial court found [the insured was] well aware of, and ratified and condoned, 
the sexual harassment of female employees as a way of satisfying [the president's) urges for sex-
ual domination of females. [The insured corporation] should not receive insurance coverage for 
the liability it, thus, intentionally created."). 
115. See, e.g., Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Welfare Fin. Co., 75 F.2d 58, 60 (8th Cir. 1934), cert. 
denied, 295 U.S. 734 (1935), cited in Dayton Hudson, 621 P.2d at 1161. According to Dayton 
Hudson, the court in Ohio Casualty "reasoned that if a master had reason to know in advance 
that his servant was likely to commit the injurious act for which liability was imposed, the situa-
tion may be legally analogous to that where the insured himself commits a willful or intentional 
injury." Dayton Hudson, 621 P.2d at 1161. 
116. Dayton Hudson, 621 P.2d at 1161 ("We think the ultimate answer depends in each case 
on whether prior knowledge makes the master's negligence 'ordinary• or 'gross.'"). 
117. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Security Ins. Group, 288 So. 2d 134, 136 (Ala. 1973) (consider-
ing whether one coinsured owner of a sandwich shop could be insured against liability incurred 
after the other owner shot a patron); McLeod v. Tecorp Intl., Ltd., 844 P.2d 925, 927 (Or. Ct. 
App. 1992) ("[Employer's] liability ... could be based on vicarious liability. The relevant in-
quiry on those claims is whether [the employer] expected, foresaw or intended the alleged con-
duct."), modified, 850 P.2d 1161 (Or. Ct. App.), revd., 865 P.2d 1283 (Or. 1993). 
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D. Summary 
Courts have adopted a "public policy exclusion" that precludes the 
enforcement of liability insurance for intentional wrongdoing, 
although courts adhere to this exclusion with varying degrees of in-
transigence. The rationale behind the public policy exclusion is clear. 
Courts assume that insurance for intentional torts promotes wrongdo-
ing and that it tends to encourage conduct that may cause harm to 
innocent third parties. Therefore, they hold that public policy requires 
them to prevent this result by refusing to enforce coverage. In apply-
ing this public policy exclusion, some courts have adopted a blanket 
rule, and other courts have been more flexible. Most courts, however, 
have enforced insurance coverage for an employer's imputed liability 
or negligent supervision liability incurred as a result of the intentional 
torts committed by its employees and other agents. These exceptions 
are consistent with the rationale behind the public policy exclusion 
because they effectively permit insurance for liability arising out of an 
employer's negligence. 
II. THREE APPROACHES TO THE PUBLIC POLICY EXCLUSION IN 
INSURANCE FOR INTENTIONAL EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION 
Relatively few courts have addressed the question of whether to 
enforce insurance covering employer liability for intentional employ-
ment discrimination. The purpose of this Part is to catalogue and as- · 
sess the three general approaches that these courts have taken and to 
lay a foundation in case precedent for the argument that courts should 
enforce coverage for some forms of intentional discrimination liability 
under the negligent supervision and imputed liability exceptions. Sec-
tion II.A summarizes the approach taken by courts that have applied 
the public policy exclusion to void coverage for intentional employ-
ment discrimination and compares that approach with the approach 
taken by courts that have refused to adopt the public policy exclusion. 
Section II.A also analyzes the arguments that support each of these 
approaches and suggests that the debate over the public policy exclu-
sion can be reduced to an unresolved empirical question concerning 
the effect of insurance on the behavior of insured employers. Without 
offering to resolve this debate, section II.B describes the most recent 
approach courts have adopted in applying the public policy exclusion 
to insurance for employment discrimination. Section H.B. also de-
scribes how some courts have begun to consider the enforceability of 
insurance coverage for sexual harassment liability under a negligent 
supervision exception to the public policy exclusion. 
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A. The Debate over the Adoption of the Public Policy Exclusion 
1. The Rigid Public Policy Exclusion 
Many courts refusing to enforce insurance for intentional employ-
ment discrimination liability have adhered to a blanket rule against 
insuring intentional wrongdoing. The first court to adopt this ap-
proach, and one of the first courts to have considered the validity of 
insurance for employment discrimination, 118 was the Seventh Circuit 
in Solo Cup Co. v. Federal Insurance Co. 11 9 In this case, the Seventh 
Circuit considered the scope and enforceability of an insurance policy 
that provided defense and indemnification coverage for "discrimina-
tion," but that excluded coverage for intentional wrongdoing. 120 
Although Solo Cup did not involve intentional discrimination, 121 the 
court considered the general issue of the insurability of liability for 
employment discrimination. The court decided that insurance for dis-
parate impact discrimination did not violate public policy, but that 
insurance for disparate treatment or intentional employment discrimi-
nation would be unenforceable as a matter of public policy. 122 To 
118. The first case to consider the validity of insurance for intentional employment discrimi-
nation was Union Camp Corp. v. Continental Cas., 452 F. Supp. 565 (S.D. Ga. 1978). In that 
case, the Southern District of Georgia considered an insurance company's obligation to provide 
coverage for the back pay settlement of a Title VII class action. The "umbrella excess policy" 
that the employer in Union Camp carried expressly covered personal injuries arising out of "dis-
crimination." 452 F. Supp. at 566. The insurance company argued, however, that the court 
should not enforce those coverage provisions because to do so would "encourage violation of the 
Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1964" and therefore would injure the public. 452 F. Supp. at 567. 
Therefore, the question in Union Camp closely resembled the question posed in Solo Cup Co. v. 
Federal Ins. Co., 619 F.2d 1178 (7th Cir.), cen. denied, 449 U.S. 1033 (1980): the claimed dis-
crimination was presumably "unintentional," as it involved claims of disparate impact discrimi-
nation, and the policy directly indemnified acts of unintentional discrimination. Union Camp, 
452 F. Supp. at 566. Like the court in Solo Cup, the court in Union Camp concluded that the 
purpose of awarding back pay damages under Title VII was at least in part the deterrence of 
employment discrimination, but the court enforced the coverage because it held that coverage for 
those awards would not be injurious to the public good. 452 F. Supp. at 567-68. The Union 
Camp court never directly addressed the validity of insurance for intentional conduct, as the 
policy contained an exclusion for "discrimination ... committed by, at the direction of, or with 
the consent of the insured." 452 F. Supp. at 566. In fact, the court appeared to rely on this 
exclusion to some extent in determining the validity of the policy before it, stating, "[h]ere the 
policy would not cover intentional or consensual acts of discrimination by the insured. The fact 
that coverage would be excluded in these circumstances would in itself be a deterrent to incentive 
to violate the Civil Rights Act." 452 F. Supp. at 568. 
119. 619 F.2d 1178 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1033 (1980). 
120. 619 F.2d at 1181-82. The policy excluded coverage for intentional wrongdoing by defin-
ing covered "occurrences" under the policy to include only "an accident ... which unexpectedly 
and unintentionally results in personal injury .... " 619 F.2d at 1181. 
121. The underlying action was for disparate impact discrimination, which the court inter-
preted to be unintentional discrimination. 619 F.2d at 1186-87. 
122. The court intimated that coverage for "disparate treatment" discrimination would be 
excluded from coverage under the policy's definition of coverage. 619 F.2d at 1186 ("The extent 
[of coverage under the policy] is ... inconsistent with liability predicated on the disparate treat-
ment theory since such a liability would necessarily involve a determination that Solo acted with 
a discriminatory motive or purpose."). However, the court also suggested that coverage for such 
liability would be void as a matter of public policy. 619 F.2d at 1187. 
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reach that conclusion, the court adopted a rigid, court-imposed inten-
tional act exclusion, 123 citing Seventh Circuit authority for the propo-
sition that a "contract of insurance to indemnify a person for damages 
resulting from his own intentional misconduct is void as against public 
policy."124 Because the court did not consider disparate impact dis-
crimination to be intentional discrimination, the court held that insur-
ance for disparate impact discrimination did not violate this 
exclusion. 125 
The Florida Supreme Court's more recent consideration of insur-
ance for intentional religious discrimination in Ranger Insurance Co. 
v. Bal Harbour Club, Inc. 126 exemplifies the rigidity of this approach. 
Like the court in Solo Cup, the Ranger court held that unintentional 
discrimination is "clearly a legitimate business risk and as such is in-
surable." 127 The court undertook a two-part analysis, however, to 
hold that insurance for intentional discrimination is void as against 
public policy. 128 The court first concluded that intentional discrimina-
tion is "a type [of conduct] that will be encouraged by insurance."129 
The court then considered the purposes behind the imposition of lia-
bility for intentional discrimination and determined that liability for 
intentional discrimination is designed primarily to deter wrongdoing 
rather than to compensate its victims.130 The court therefore con-
cluded that it would violate public policy to enforce insurance cover-
age for intentional discrimination because such coverage is infected 
with an impermissible moral hazard. 131 
123. The court stated that it did "not think that allowing an employer to insure itself against 
losses incurred by reason of disparate impact liabilities will tend in any way to injure the public 
good, which we equate here with that equality of employment opportunity mandated by Title 
VII." 619 F.2d at 1188. 
124. 619 F.2d at 1187 (quoting Industrial Sugars, Inc. v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 338 
F.2d 673, 675 (7th Cir. 1964)). 
125. 619 F.2d at 1187. 
126. 549 So. 2d 1005 (Fla. 1989). Although this case did not involve employment discrimi-
nation, the court's reasoning could just as easily apply to void insurance for intentional employ-
ment discrimination because the court did not limit its reasoning to a particular type of 
discrimination in making its decision. In fact, the Florida Supreme Court drew extensive analo-
gies to Title VII and relied heavily on a student Note addressing the public policy implications of 
insuring intentional employment discrimination. 549 So. 2d at 1009 (quoting and citing Anastas-
siou, supra note 10). In fact, the court specifically noted that the Florida antidiscrimination 
statute "appears to be patterned after Title VII of the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964." 549 
So.2d at 1009. Courts commonly interpret state statutes in accordance with the purposes behind 
Title VII. See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 106 & n.26 (1983) (citing cases). 
127. Ranger. 549 So. 2d at 1006; see also Solo Cup, 619 F.2d at 1186-88. 
128. Ranger borrowed the structure of this analysis from a student Note published in the 
Columbia Law Review, which in turn borrowed the structure from Northwestern National Casu-
alty Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962). See Ranger. 549 So. 2d at 1007 (citing 
Anastassiou, supra note 10, at 195-96). McNulty is one of the leading cases finding insurance for 
punitive damages to be invalid. 
129. 549 So. 2d at 1007. 
130. 549 So. 2d at 1008. 
131. The court reasoned that "[t]he rationale underlying this rule [against insurability] is 
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The Ranger "test," like the test to which the court in Solo Cup 
referred, is, in effect, a blanket rule against insuring intentional wrong-
doing. As illustrated above, all insured conduct is of the "type that 
will be encouraged by insurance,"132 at least in the sense that the the-
ory of moral hazard predicts that the availability of insurance will in-
spire negligent as well as intentional wrongdoing by insured 
employers. Consequently, the Ranger court's determination that in-
surance for intentional but not unintentional discrimination encour-
ages wrongdoing is nothing more than adherence to a blanket 
presumption that insurance for intentional acts promotes wrongdoing. 
In fact, the Ranger court explained the purpose of its "test" as follows: 
"An examination of the first factor leads to the determination of 
whether the existence of insurance will directly stimulate commission 
of a wrongful act, and an examination of the second factor leads to the 
determination of whether deterrence or compensation should be given 
priority."133 However, the court's "examination of the first factor" -
whether the insured conduct is "a type that will be encouraged by 
insurance" - was utterly conclusory. The court merely stated that 
"[i]t is axiomatic in the insurance industry that one should not be able 
to insure against one's own intentional misconduct."134 The court did 
not inquire into any special factors that might mitigate the moral haz-
ard of insurance for intentional discrimination,135 nor did the court in 
any way question the assumption that insurance for intentional 
wrongs always promotes wrongdoing. 
In sum, the courts that have voided coverage for intentional dis-
crimination have done so on the basis of a categorical public policy 
exclusion that precludes coverage for intentional wrongdoing. 136 In 
applying this exclusion, they have ignored the special nature of em-
ployment discrimination liability and instead have relied on the char-
acterization of liability as either "intentional" or "unintentional" 
wrongdoing. It is unclear from the opinions whether these courts have 
applied the exclusion under an "intent to injure" or "intent to act" 
standard, 137 but it does appear that they have assumed without ques-
tion that insurance for "intentional" discrimination promotes wrong-
that the availability of insurance will directly stimulate the intentional wrongdoer to violate the 
law." 549 So. 2d at 1007. Although Florida courts have departed from this assumption about 
the antideterrent effect of insurance for other forms of liability, 549 So. 2d at 1007 (citing cases), 
the Ranger court was unwilling to carve an exception for intentional discrimination. 
132. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text. 
133. 549 So. 2d at 1007. 
134. 549 So. 2d at 1007. 
135. See infra notes 169-71 and accompanying text. 
136. But see Coit Drapery Cleaners, Inc. v. Sequoia Ins. Co., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 692, 699-702 
(Ct. App. 1993) (considering a more flexible application of the public policy exclusion that would 
permit coverage for "negligent supervision" in some circumstances but rejecting that approach 
based on the particular facts of the case). 
137. See supra note 54 (describing the distinction courts sometimes draw between intentional 
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doing. 138 Moreover, the courts taking this approach have not 
considered the potential application of the imputed liability or the neg-
ligent supervision exceptions. 
2. Abandoning the Public Policy Exclusion 
At the other end of the spectrum, an increasing number of courts 
have abandoned the public policy exclusion altogether and have en-
forced insurance for intentional employment discrimination. 139 The 
Sixth Circuit's consideration of insurance for intentional employment 
discrimination in School District for Royal Oak v. Continental Casualty 
Co. 140 best exemplifies this approach. The insured school board in 
Royal Oak settled an intentional employment discrimination suit 
brought by an aggrieved teacher and then sought indemnification for 
that settlement under its general liability insurance policy.141 The pol-
icy covered " 'all loss' that the school district or its employees become 
legally obligated to pay," provided that "the subject of the loss does 
not include 'matters which shall be deemed uninsurable under [state] 
law.' " 142 The policy did not contain an intentional act exclusion. 143 
The court in Royal Oak found that the policy covered the school 
district's liability for its intentional religious discrimination. 144 The 
insurance company invoked both the contractual exclusion for "mat-
ters that are uninsurable under [state] law" and the public policy ex-
clusion to argue that Michigan public policy precluded enforcement of 
the coverage. 145 Citing cases in which Michigan courts enforced in-
surance to cover a psychiatrist's liability for "felonious sexual activ-
ity," the district court had held that" 'Michigan does not as a general 
rule bar recovery under public liability policies [simply] because some 
illegal act was involved in the damage.' " 146 The district court had 
further noted that it was " 'unaware of any Michigan law that deems 
acts and intentional injuries in deciding whether to enforce insurance under the public policy 
exclusion). 
138. Neither the Ranger court nor the Solo Cup court distinguished between intent to injure 
and intent to act. 
139. These courts include: the Sixth Circuit in School Dist. for Royal Oak v. Continental 
Cas. Co., 912 F.2d 844 (6th Cir. 1990) (applying Michigan law); the Florida appellate court in 
Ranger Ins. Co. v. Bal Harbour Club, Inc., 509 So. 2d 945 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (en bane), 
revd., 549 So. 2d 1005 (Fla. 1989); and the Minnesota Court of Appeals in Independent Sch. 
Dist. No. 697 v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 495 N.W.2d 863 (Minn. Ct. App.), review 
granted, No. 92-1625, 1993 Minn. LEXIS 225 (Mar. 30, 1993). 
140. 912 F.2d 844 (6th Cir. 1990). 
141. 912 F.2d at 845-46. 
142. 912 F.2d at 846. 
143. See 912 F.2d at 846. 
144. 912 F.2d at 849-50. 
145. 912 F.2d at 847-48. 
146. 912 F.2d at 849 (quoting Bowman v. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co., 83 N.W.2d 434, 436 
(Mich. 1957)). 
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intentional discrimination "uninsurable."' "147 
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the coverage for intentional discrimina-
tion on several grounds. The court first questioned the assumption 
that insurance for intentional discrimination promotes wrongdoing: 
"Perhaps the existence of liability insurance might occasionally 'stim-
ulate' [discrimination], but common sense suggests that the prospect 
of escalating insurance costs and the trauma of litigation, to say noth-
ing of the risk of uninsurable punitive damages, would normally neu-
tralize any stimulative tendency the insurance might have."148 The 
Sixth Circuit also noted that "[p]ublic policy normally favors enforce-
ment of insurance contracts according to their terms."149 The court 
further reasoned that the insurance company responsible for drafting 
the policy, not the court, was in the best position to avoid undesirable 
coverage.150 In this regard, the district court in Royal Oak had stated 
that " 'insurers can always exclude or limit coverage' " for discrimina-
tion.151 The Sixth Circuit also emphasized that, "[h]ad the company 
wished to exclude coverage for intentional religious discrimination in 
employment, it could and should have said so."152 
Other courts that have abandoned the public policy exclusion have 
echoed these sentiments. Some have questioned whether the inference 
that insurance stimulates wrongdoing can overcome the "competing 
public policies ... [that] favor freedom of contract and the enforce-
ment of insurance contracts according to their terms."153 Others have 
adverted to the deterrent effect of mechanisms in the market for insur-
ance.154 These courts have noted that insurance companies are capa-
ble of policing their own contracts and that insurance companies have 
147. 912 F.2d at 849 (quoting the transcript of the proceedings in the district court). 
148. 912 F.2d at 848; see also Ranger Ins. Co. v. Bal Harbour Club, Inc., 509 So. 2d 945, 948 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) ("[W]rongdoers can be adequately punished under present law by the 
imposition of punitive damages, where appropriate, since it is against the public policy of this 
state to insure against such damages."), revd .. 549 So. 2d 1005 (Fla. 1989); 509 So. 2d at 947 
("The proposition that insurance taken out by an employer to protect against liability under Title 
VII will encourage violations of the Act is •.• speculative and erroneous." (quoting Union Camp 
Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 452 F. Supp. 565, 567 (S.D. Ga. 1978))); Independent Sch. Dist. 
No. 697 v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 495 N.W.2d 863, 867 (Minn. Ct. App.) (quoting 
Royal Oak, 912 F.2d at 848), review granted, No. 92-1625, 1993 Minn. LEXIS 225 (Mar. 30, 
1993). 
149. Royal Oak, 912 F.2d at 849 (citing Ranger, 549 So. 2d at 1010 n.I (Ehrlich, C.J., 
dissenting)). 
150. 912 F.2d at 849. 
151. 912 F.2d at 849 (quoting the transcript of the proceedings in the district court). 
152. 912 F.2d at 849. 
153. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 697 v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 495 N.W.2d 863, 
868 (Minn. Ct. Ap.) (citing Ranger, 549 So. 2d at 1010 n.1 (Ehrlich, C.J., dissenting)), review 
granted, No. 92-1625, 1993 Minn. LEXIS 225 (Mar. 30, 1993); see also Royal Oak, 912 F.2d at 
849. 
154. Ranger, 509 So. 2d at 948 ("[T]he marketplace itself will discourage wrongful acts of 
discrimination."); Independent Sch. Dist., 495 N.W.2d at 867 (quoting Royal Oak, 912 F.2d at 
848). 
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ample motivation to prevent insureds from recovering for intentionally 
incurred losses or fraudulent claims.155 
The courts that have refused to adopt the public policy exclusion 
have therefore done so on the basis of three arguments. First, they 
have noted the lack of empirical proof for the assumption that insur-
ance promotes intentional wrongdoing.156 Second, they have noted 
the competing public policy that favors the enforcement of contracts 
as they are written and the need to compensate the victims of inten-
tional wrongdoing.157 Third, they have emphasized that insurance 
companies can themselves exclude coverage for intentional wrongdo-
ing and have frowned on attempts to avoid contractual obligations by 
appealing to vague public policy concems. 158 
3. Assessing the Arguments 
In essence, the courts that apply the public policy exclusion to void 
coverage for intentional employment discrimination and those that 
have abandoned it disagree over an unresolved empirical question con-
cerning the tendency of insurance to promote wrongdoing.159 Adher-
ents to the public policy exclusion assume that insurance for 
intentional discrimination provides an incentive to wrongdoing on the 
part of insured employers and that such insurance therefore promotes 
discrimination. 160 The courts that have refused to adopt the public 
policy exclusion refuse to rely on this assumption in order to interfere 
with the right of private parties to contract. 161 Starting with a strong 
155. See, e.g., Royal Oak. 912 F.2d at 849 ("Had the company wished to exclude coverage 
for intentional religious discrimination in employment, it could and should have said so."); 
Union Camp Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 452 F. Supp. 565, 568 (S.D. Ga. 1978) ("Continental 
and other insurers which have issued policies containing such clauses have not up to now con-
ceived that they were violating public policy by writing insurance policies insuring against losses 
resulting from discriminatory employment practices."); Ranger, 509 So. 2d at 947 (citing Union 
Camp, 452 F. Supp. at 567-68); University of Ill. v. Continental Cas. Co., 599 N.E.2d 1338, 
1350-51 (Ill. App. Ct.) ("[T]he insurer is an informed contracting party with no inferiority in 
bargaining position and should not be allowed to escape from the contract it freely entered 
into .... This court will not rewrite the .•. policy to create an exclusion."), appeal denied, 606 
N.E.2d 1235 (Ill. 1992); Independent Sch. Dist., 495 N.W.2d at 868 ("The carrier is, of course, 
free to expressly provide an exclusion for such conduct in the future."). 
156. See supra note 148 and accompanying text. 
157. See supra note 153 and accompanying text. 
158. See supra text accompanying notes 152-56. 
159. Compare Union Camp, 452 F. Supp. at 567 (assumption that insurance promotes 
wrongdoing is "speculative and erroneous") and Dixon Distrib. Co. v. Hanover Ins. Co., 612 
N.E.2d 846, 857 (Ill. App. Ct.) ("We decline to assume that insured employers would be more 
inclined to fire employees for asserting protected rights without facts to support [that assump-
tion]."), appeal granted, 622 N.E.2d 1203 (Ill. 1993) and Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Columbia Cas. Co., 
682 P.2d 975, 981 (Wyo. 1984) ("We know of no studies, statistics or proofs which indicate that 
contracts of insurance to protect against liability for punitive damages have a tendency to make 
willful or wanton conduct more probable ... . ")with Ranger Ins. Co. v. Bal Harbour Club, Inc., 
549 So. 2d 1005, 1007 (Fla. 1989) (uninsurability of intentional wrongdoing is "axiomatic"). 
160. See supra section II.A.I. 
161. See School Dist. for Royal Oak v. Continental Cas. Co., 912 F.2d 844, 849 (6th Cir. 
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presumption favoring the enforcement of contracts as they are written, 
the courts abandoning the public policy exclusion have looked for, and 
failed to find, any substantial connection between the availability of 
insurance and the increased incidence of wrongdoing. 162 Not finding 
any justification for court intervention, they leave the avoidance of 
moral hazard to the private market in insurance, trusting that insur-
ance companies will only provide coverage for intentional employment 
discrimination if the companies themselves can control for moral 
hazard. 
Strong arguments support the positions of the courts on both sides 
of this disagreement. Courts invoking the public policy exclusion rely 
on an assumption that has significant intuitive appeal. First, the the-
ory of moral hazard supports the assumption that insurance for inten-
tional wrongdoing stimulates the commission of intentional torts. 163 
Second, current insurance practices seem to confirm its accuracy. In-
surance companies generally do not provide coverage for intentional 
wrongdoing, 164 presumably because they recognize that insurance for 
intentional wrongdoing promotes wrongdoing. By contrast, insurance 
companies do insure negligence, presumably because they can control 
the moral hazard associated with insurance for negligence. 165 
However, equally strong arguments support the position taken by 
1990). The determination of "public policy" is an inherently legislative function that involves 
balancing complex interests and issues outside the context of a particular factual setting. Some 
courts have expressed discomfort at invading the province of the legislature to "create" the pub-
lic policy exclusion. See, e.g., Dixon, 612 N.E.2d at 8S7 (refusing to "assume that insured em· 
ployers would be more inclined to fire employees [in retaliation] for asserting protected rights" 
and noting that courts "should be very cautious about establishing public policy by court fiat •.• 
[because] courts are ill equipped to determine what the public policy should be"). In the words 
of the U.S. Supreme Court: 
[T]he right of private contract is no small part of the liberty of the citizen, and ... the usual 
and most important function of courts of justice is rather to maintain and enforce contracts, 
than to enable parties thereto to escape from their obligation on the pretext of public policy 
Baltimore & 0. Sw. Ry. v. Voigt, 176 U.S. 498, SOS (1900). 
162. According to one court, "[a] contract to indemnify the insured for damages he is forced 
to pay as a result of an intentionally inflicted injury upon another should not be regarded as 
contrary to public policy unless the fact of insurance coverage can be related in some substantial 
way to the commission of wrongful acts of that character." Isenhart v. General Cas. Co. of Am., 
377 P.2d 26, 28 (Or. 1962) (emphasis added). The courts abandoning the public policy exclusion 
have not found this connection. See Royal Oak, 912 F.2d at 848. 
163. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text. 
164. Most liability insurance policies expressly exclude coverage for intentional wrongdoing. 
See JERRY, supra note 21, § 63 (noting that almost all insurance policies exclude recovery for 
deliberate destruction or intentional wrongdoing because of the implicit requirement that insur-
ance cover only fortuitous losses). Indeed, "[v]irtually all liability insurance policies contain 
exclusions (or definitions of covered losses) precluding coverage of liability for intentionally-
caused harm." ABRAHAM, supra note 31, at 21. 
16S. See Harrell v. Travelers Indem. Co., S67 P.2d 1013, 1017 (Or. 1977) ("It has long been 
recognized that there is no empirical evidence that contracts of insurance to protect against lia-
bility for negligent conduct are invalid ... because of any 'evil tendency' to make negligent 
conduct 'more probable' or because there is any 'substantial relationship' between the fact of 
insurance and such negligent conduct."). 
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courts refusing to adopt the public policy exclusion. Some insurance 
companies do provide insurance for intentional wrongdoing, 166 and 
the trend in the insurance industry and in the courts is toward a 
greater acceptance of insurance for intentional wrongs. 167 Moreover, 
the public policy exclusion may even be unnecessary. 168 Insurance 
166. Royal Oak, 912 F.2d at 846 (quoting terms of excess policy coverage for "'false arrest, 
libel, slander, defamation of character, invasion of privacy, wrongful eviction, assault or bat-
tery'"); see supra notes 70-79 and accompanying text. 
167. Historically, the courts have not always recognized a distinction between negligent and 
intentional wrongdoing as the touchstone for applying the public policy exclusion, and at one 
time the courts even entertained the idea of a public policy exclusion to prohibit insurance for 
negligence. See Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 383 S.W.2d 1, 7 (Tenn. 1964) 
(White, J., concurring) ("In the early years of the casualty insurance business it was argued by 
some that by allowing one to insure against his own negligent acts that carelessness would be 
encouraged, resulting in increased injuries and deaths on the highways."); KEETON ET AL., supra 
note 47, § 82, at 585; McNeely, supra note 47, at 33. In much the same way that critics now 
decry liability insurance for intentional wrongdoing, critics once argued that courts should not 
enforce insurance for liability arising out of negligence because it would promote wrongdoing 
and allow wrongdoers to benefit from their own wrongdoing. See Lazenby, 383 S.W.2d at 5. 
Indeed, critics of insurance have made similar claims about every new form of insurance that has 
been introduced. ALEXANDER c. CAMPBELL, INSURANCE AND CRIME 378 (1902) (claiming 
that various forms of insurance have caused the "building of unseaworthy ships, the mismanage-
ment of a friendly society, the burning of a town, and the starving of a baby"). For instance, 
when child life insurance was first introduced, there was a tremendous public outcry for its aboli-
tion, as critics claimed that the availability of insurance would devalue the lives of children and 
encourage parents to murder their own children. See generally VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, PRICING 
THE PRICELESS CHILD: THE CHANGING VALUE OF CHILDREN (1985) (describing the contro-
versy created by the development of child life insurance). Like the public policy exclusion 
against insuring liability for intentional wrongdoing, each of these challenges was based, at least 
in part, on assumptions about the perverse incentives that insurance would create for insureds to 
"benefit from their own wrongdoing." See McNeely, supra note 47, at 34-59 (describing chal-
lenges to various forms of liability insurance). 
Insurance for intentional wrongdoing, however, is the only form of insurance that has not 
weathered challenges to its validity. The courts have not prohibited the enforcement of child life 
insurance and have universally accepted the validity of insurance for negligence. See 12 AP-
PLEMAN & APPLEMAN, supra note 34, § 7031, at 145 ("It is now unquestioned that insurance 
against liability arising from acts of negligence is valid."). In fact, a similar trend may be dis-
cerned toward the acceptance of liability insurance covering intentional wrongdoing. Notwith-
standing the protestations of the Ranger court, intentional act insurance has become widely 
available and widely accepted in the insurance industry. See supra notes 70-79 and accompany-
ing text. 
168. Employers have an incentive to avoid discrimination regardless of whether they have 
insurance to cover their discrimination liability. See James, supra note 87, at 558 (listing the 
incentives, other than civil liability, that an insured employer faces - including the threat of 
"disrupt[ion] of the normal process of ... business life," "bad public relations, or bad labor 
relations," and the fear of "criminal liability"). Insured employers that fail to sanction individu-
als who discriminate would face the prospect of substantial uninsured liability. They would have 
to pay any deductible or coinsurance required by their insurance, and they would face the "un-
limited" liability that exceeds the policy limits. See Kent D. Syverud, The Duty to Settle, 76 VA. 
L. REV. 1113, 1133 (1990) (describing the infinite potential for liability faced by individual in-
sureds and suggesting that tort liability is not fully insurable). The employer might also face 
liability for uninsured punitive damages. See Ranger Ins. Co. v. Bal Harbour Club, Inc., 509 So. 
2d 945, 948 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (en bane), revd., 549 So. 2d 1005 (Fla. 1989) 
("[W]rongdoers can be adequately punished under present law by the imposition of punitive 
damages, where appropriate, since it is against the public policy of this state to insure against 
such damages."). An insured employer that allowed its agents to discriminate would also incur 
greater losses than insured employers that took measures to avoid liability, and because of these 
losses the employer will have to pay a higher premium for insurance. See Willborn, supra note 
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companies that provide coverage for intentional wrongdoing have 
every incentive to police the moral hazard effects of that insurance, t69 
and they can take measures to ensure that policyholders do not rely on 
the availability of insurance to incur insured-against losses. 170 Indeed, 
10, at 1022 (discussing how competitive concerns motivate compliance with antidiscrimination 
laws). 
Also, the availability of insurance to cover the employer's liability may not affect individual 
employees responsible for an employer's discrimination liability in their decision to discriminate. 
These individuals are already effectively "insured" against the consequences of intentional dis· 
crimination. See RICHARD PERES, DEALING WITH EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 13S (1978) 
("The supervisor who inappropriately fires a worker is not liable for the back pay which may be 
incurred against the company. The employer pays the attorney's fees, court costs, and damages. 
The employer takes the time to comply with an investigation, meet with government officials, go 
to public hearings, etc."). Take for instance the supervisors responsible for the discrimination in 
Hamilton v. Rodgers, 791 F.2d 439 (5th Cir. 1986). Even though the court in Hamilton held 
that individual supervisors could be held liable for their own intentional discrimination, the court 
also held that their employer was jointly and severally liable for that discrimination. 791 F.2d at 
444-4S. Therefore, even though they made the decision to discriminate and thereby caused the 
company's liability to accrue, the individual supervisors in Hamilton did not face any real pros· 
pect of personal liability; the plaintiffs could recover fully from the corporation. See PERES, 
supra, at 132-33; infra text accompanying notes 240-41. Individuals, whether they are members 
of the board or low-level supervisors, are not deterred from discriminating by the threat of liabil· 
ity but rather by the threat of "internal" sanction imposed by the company. Cf. James, supra 
note 87, at SSS (listing the deterrents employees face to getting in an accident while at work, 
including "the fear of discipline for a job badly done"). Consequently, as with imputed liability, 
insurance may only promote employers to incur liability for intentional discrimination to the 
extent that it will promote employers to take fewer measures to sanction the individuals responsi· 
ble for the discrimination. 
169. See Willborn, supra note 10, at 1029-30 ("[T]he interests of insurance companies corre-
late with the interests supporting the public policy restriction. Most insurance contracts will 
consequently contain warranties designed to further the same deterrence goals as the [public 
policy exclusion].") (emphasis added). 
170. Most companies offering coverage for intentional discrimination would take some meas-
ures to combat moral hazard. At the very least, such companies would have to structure their 
policies and the premiums they charge in a way that would deter insured employers from engag· 
ing in intentional discrimination. Willborn, supra note 10, at 1024-2S (describing the measures 
insurance companies take to combat moral hazard); Telephone Interview with Dana Marino, 
Underwriter, Lexington Insurance Company (Sept. 23, 1992). The marketing of "Employment 
Practices Liability Insurance" (EPLI) illustrates the two approaches insurance companies might 
take. EPLI policies largely exclude coverage for intentional discrimination, see supra notes 6-7, 
but some companies offering EPLI take additional measures to combat moral hazard. "Con· 
servative" insurance companies require potential insureds to meet objective criteria of insurabil· 
ity before writing a policy, and they try to reduce their insured's exposure to employment 
discrimination liability even after they have underwritten the policy. Telephone Interview with 
Dana Marino, supra. For instance, some insurance companies require the insured employer to 
have in place or to institute an official policy concerning sexual harassment before they will 
underwrite insurance, and most broker an "employment practices audit" that is designed to re· 
duce an employer's exposure to employment discrimination liability. Id.; see also Fletcher, supra 
note 6, at 39. Many companies also refuse to write policies for high-risk employers, such as 
employers that have a history of discrimination or other employment-related liability, and they 
might also refuse to write policies for employers that do not adopt a grievance procedure or other 
official policy to discourage discrimination. Telephone Interview with Dana Marino, supra. 
Other insurance companies offering EPLI policies are less conservative and write policies for any 
employer, regardless of whether the employer has taken measures to reduce its exposure to dis· 
crimination liability. Id. These companies maintain the profitability of their policies by setting 
premiums to reflect the individual risk insured; for high-risk employers, this premium may be 
prohibitively expensive whereas, for low-risk employers, it may mirror the premium charged on 
"conservative" policies. Id. Therefore, employers insured under these aggressive policies would 
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the insurance market might not support insurance for intentional 
have an incentive to avoid discrimination liability to the extent that it would lower their premium 
to do so and to the extent that they are otherwise forced to retain some risk of liability in the 
form of a deductible, coinsurance, or a limit upon coverage. 
Regardless of whether they are conservative or aggressive in their underwriting practices, 
insurance companies offering intentional discrimination insurance would force insured employers 
to retain some risk of liability as a deterrent to discrimination. See Schwartz, supra note 20, at 
316-17; see also JERRY, supra note 21, § 10[c][2], at 13. For instance, they would place limits 
upon the amount of coverage they provide. See Golub, supra note 3, at 944 (noting that employ-
ment practices policies have limits on coverage ranging from $25,000 to $1,000,000). They 
would also require the insured to pay a deductible or coinsurance against any recovery sought 
under the policy. See id. (describing a policy with a range of deductibles from $1,500 to $ 
10,000); id. at 948 (minimum deductible of $2,500); Fletcher, supra note 6, at 39 (noting that 
Lexington requires a minimum $25,000 premium on its policy, which covers up to $5 million in 
liability, and requires a minimum deductible of $5,000). 
Insurance companies can also be expected to deter insured employers from intentionally dis-
criminating by charging a responsive premium that reflects the employer's history of discrimina-
tion liability. Although no insurance policy offers a perfectly responsive premium, see Schwartz, 
supra note 20, at 321, insurance companies can "experience rate" their policies or raise premiums 
to penalize insured employers that incur losses against the policy. Under experience rating, 
"[t]he premium that [the insurer] charges to employers is based on ... the cost of providing 
benefits to the employees of that company in previous years. The more benefits paid out under 
the plan, the higher the premium will be far the employer." Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Borges, 869 
F.2d 142, 143 (2d Cir.) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 811 (1989). Insurance compa-
nies might also "retrospectively rate" their policies. See Schwartz, supra note 20, at 317. "Under 
retrospective rating, the insured pays a premium at the beginning of the policy year. At the end 
of the year, the insured's actual liability record is toted up, and the insured is then either given a 
rebate or assessed a surcharge to take that actual record into account." Id. These measures force 
the insured to pay for some of its own losses, and this retained risk of liability deters insured 
employers from intentionally discriminating. See id. at 316-17. 
Insurance companies may also take further steps to reduce losses. For instance, they might 
investigate whether potential insureds have a history of discrimination and refuse to underwrite a 
policy for a "high-risk" employer that is likely to discriminate. Farbstein & Stillman, supra note 
51, at 1253 (noting that just because insurance for intentional acts "is legal does not mean that it 
will be sold to everyone"); Willborn, supra note 10, at 1024 ("The rational insurer will attempt to 
avoid providing coverage to employees that view insurance as a license to discriminate."). They 
might also refuse coverage to any employer that did not meet certain minimum requirements of 
insurability. See Farbstein & Stillman, supra note 51, at 1253. For instance, an insurance com-
pany might require employers to show that they have made some attempt to reduce their expo-
sure to discrimination liability, or require an employer to adopt a grievance procedure and 
educate its employees about the importance of avoiding discrimination liability before selling 
insurance to the employer. SHAVELL, supra note 103, at 195 ("[I]nsurers may make premiums 
depend on insured's risk-reducing actions .... "). Insurance companies might also offer an 
employment practices audit in conjunction with their policies, or otherwise undertake to educate 
employers about avoiding discrimination liability. See JOHN B. LEWIS, EMPLOYMENT PRAC-
TICES Loss PREVENTION GUIDELINES 51 (1992) (a manual prepared by the law firm Arter & 
Hadden for promulgation by the Chubb Group oflnsurance Companies); SHAVELL, supra note 
103, at 199 ("[I]nsurers often supply advice about risk reduction .... "); Schwartz, supra note 20, 
at 356 (noting that insurance companies may offer advice on loss-reduction techniques because 
they are repeat players); Willborn, supra note 10, at 1021-22 ("Insurance may be deterrence-
enhancing because insurance companies have an incentive to engage in loss prevention activi-
ties .... [T]hese activities translate into anti-discrimination counseling and advice which should 
promote compliance with, rather than violations of, the law.") (citation omitted); Fletcher, supra 
note 6, at 39. 
In this regard, courts have not only approved insurance for disparate impact discrimination, 
but they have also predicted that the availability of insurance might reduce the incidence of 
unintentional discrimination. For instance, in 1980, the Seventh Circuit stated: 
We do not think that allowing an employer to insure itself against losses incurred by 
reason of disparate impact liabilities will tend in any way to injure the public good, which 
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wrongdoing unless the companies providing that coverage were able to 
control against moral bazard. 171 
we equate here with that equality of opportunity mandated by Title VII. To the contrary, 
the fact of insurance may be helpful toward achieving the desirable goal of voluntary com· 
pliance with the Act. •.• [I]t is not undesirable, nor inconceivable, that discrimination insur-
ers might aid in preventing the injury of discrimination as well 
Solo Cup Co. v. Federal Ins. Co., 619 F.2d 1178, 1188 (7th Cir.) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 
449 U.S. 1033 (1980). The courts have not explained why they have not made similar predictions 
about the risk-reducing efforts of insurance companies offering insurance for intentional 
discrimination. 
171. Mechanisms in insurance would ensure that the availability of insurance for intentional 
employment discrimination would lead to only a marginal increase in the incidence of discrimi-
nation. SHAVELL, supra note 103, at 213 ("[T]he availability of insurance does not necessarily 
dilute injurer's incentive to reduce risk; and where it does do that, the dilution of incentives 
[moral hazard] will be moderate, for policies that would substantially increase risks would be so 
expensive that they would not be attractive for purchase."). Aggressive insurance companies 
that did not control for moral hazard would have to predict higher losses under their policies 
than companies that combat moral hazard because the premium charged on an insurance policy, 
whether it is set as an average across a pool of insureds, Priest, supra note 43, at 1541, or on an 
individualized basis, id. at 1544, must reflect the level of risk posed by the insured employers. 
The higher the moral hazard associated with each insured, the higher the premium the insurance 
company will have to charge to cover expected losses against the policy. Id. at 1541. Conse-
quently, aggressive insurance companies would have to raise the price of their policies relative to 
those offered by more conservative insurance companies. As the price of insurance rises, those 
employers facing the lowest risk of Joss, and consequently not relying on insurance to commit 
wrongdoing, would buy a cheaper form of insurance. Id. at 1541, 1576 (describing the "unrav-
eling" of the insurance pool that occurs as low-risk insureds drop out). They would buy insur-
ance that controls against moral hazard, or they would simply go uninsured. Id. at 1549. At the 
same time, employers bent on intentional discrimination would be precluded from buying poli-
cies from insurance companies that monitor against high risks, and these employers would there-
fore continue to buy policies without a screen for moral hazard. Willborn, supra note 10, at 1022 
("[l]nsurance companies would deny coverage or charge higher than normal premiums to em-
ployers with questionable employment practices .... " (citation omitted)). Through this process 
of "adverse selection," which is the tendency for "high risks to buy more coverage than low risks 
at a given rate," Priest, supra note 43, at 1540-41, high-risk insureds would gravitate toward 
policies that do not account for moral hazard, and low-risk insureds would gravitate toward 
policies that do account for moral hazard. As this occurs, the pool of potential insureds would 
"unravel" for policies that do not account for moral hazard, and the price of these policies would 
continue to rise. Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The First-Party Insurance Externa/ity: An 
Economic Justification for Enterprise Liability, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 129, 140 (1990) (describing 
the "unravelling" effect); Priest, supra note 43, at 1542, 1576. At some point, employers choos-
ing whether to buy insurance to cover their potential liability would decide that the price of 
insurance is too high and that it is cheaper and more efficient to avoid liability than it is to buy 
insurance. Because of these effects, the market in insurance for intentional discrimination would 
evolve toward an equilibrium. Id. Policies that do not effectively account for adverse selection 
and moral hazard would be priced out of the market, while policies that do account for moral 
hazard and adverse selection would thrive. 
The market in insurance might tend toward an equilibrium in which some insurance pro-
motes intentional discrimination. Economists might justify this increase in discrimination in 
terms of efficiency. They might suggest, for instance, that insurance is efficient because tort 
recoveries fully compensate the victims of discrimination and that any increase in the level of 
discrimination can be justified on the grounds of victim "indifference" and the efficient allocation 
of resources to loss avoidance. SHAVELL, supra note 103, at 212; Steven Shavell, On Liability 
and Insurance, 13 BELL J. EcoN. 120, 128 (1982) ("[T]he welfare of victims is unaffected by the 
occurrence of the accidents because victims are fully compensated for losses. Thus there is no 
apparent opportunity for beneficial intervention in the insurance market."). This assumption has 
come under attack. See Hanson & Logue, supra, at 132 n.10 (citing the economic literature 
justifying insurance on the grounds that it is "Pareto superior" and noting that "the justification 
depends on the unrealistic assumption that consumers are fully compensated for their injuries"); 
March 1994] Note - Employment Discrimination Insurance 1295 
Courts refusing to adopt the public policy exclusion can resort to 
other arguments as well. First, the public policy exclusion is both in-
consistent and self-defeating. It involves an unprincipled distinction 
between insurance for disparate impact and disparate treatment dis-
crimination, 172 and it encourages an imprecision in the drafting of in-
surance policies that may itself promote discrimination by insured 
Schwartz, supra note 20, at 351 (noting the same justification and demonstrating its shortcom-
ings). Efficiency, moreover, is incommensurate with the goals behind employment discrimina-
tion liability. See Cass R. Sunstein, lncommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. 
REV. 779, 850 (1994). Efficiency is not among the announced goals of the antidiscrimination 
laws, which are designed to be a "spur" and a "catalyst" to employers to "eliminate discrimina-
tion in employment.'' H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 26 (1963), reprinted in 
1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2355, 2401 ("The purpose of this title is to eliminate ... discrimination in 
employment based on race, color, religion, or national origin.") (emphasis added). The courts 
that have refused to adopt the public policy exclusion for insurance covering intentional employ-
ment discrimination have not done so on the basis of this efficiency argument. Rather, they have 
started from the presumption that courts should enforce contracts as they are written and have 
failed to find the mere assumption that insurance promotes discrimination to be sufficient 
grounds to depart from that presumption. 
172. See Willborn, supra note 10, at 1010-13 (describing problems with the distinction). The 
concept of "intent" in employment discrimination is elusive. Id. at 1010 (noting that "disparate 
impact cases may be intent-based"). Indeed, as Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 
977 (1988), illustrates, disparate treatment discrimination is not always "intentional" discrimina-
tion, and disparate impact discrimination is not always "unintentional" discrimination. See infra 
notes 247-56 and accompanying text. The two types of liability are in fact difficult to distinguish. 
See JOEL W. FRIEDMAN & GEORGE M. STRICKLER, JR., CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW 
OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 297 (3d ed. 1993) ("In light of the Supreme Court's holding 
in Watson that disproportionate impact analysis can be applied to subjective employment deci-
sions and the Court's dilution in Wards Cove Packing of the employer's burden in disproportion-
ate impact cases, are the distinctions between the types of cases theoretical only?"). 
More important, the difference between disparate impact and disparate treatment discrimina-
tion does not reflect the rationale behind the public policy exclusion. Willborn, supra note 10, at 
1011-12 (noting that the distinction is not "useful" because it is often impossible to tell whether a 
case is one for disparate impact or disparate treatment discrimination, especially when the case is 
settled before a trial on the merits). Like an employer insured for disparate treatment discrimi-
nation, an employer insured against liability for disparate impact discrimination can act in reli-
ance on the availability of insurance to change its behavior in ways that increase the incidence of 
discrimination. The scientific proofs and validations required of an employer trying to avoid 
disparate impact liability are quite complex, and beyond the means of all but the largest compa-
nies. Solo Cup, 619 F.2d at 1188; see also Equal Employment Advisory Council, Position State-
ment on Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, in EMPLOYEE SELECTION: LEGAL AND 
PRACTICAL ALTERNATIVES TO COMPLIANCE AND LmGATION 13-14 (Edward E. Potter ed., 2d 
ed. 1986) (discussing the expense associated with test validation). Rather than engaging in the 
expensive process of validating a test, a process that is not itself guaranteed to insulate the com-
pany from liability, see, e.g., Richardson v. Lamar County Bd. of Educ., 729 F. Supp. 806, 817-
25 (M.D. Ala. 1989) (assessing and denying the validity of a test developed by a trained test 
developer for use in hiring teachers for the Alabama public schools), affd. sub nom. Richardson 
v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 935 F.2d 1240 (11th Cir. 1991), an employer with insurance may 
forgo the expense of validation because it can shift the risk ofliability to an insurance company. 
Indeed, with the insurance company picking up the cost of defending the suit and indemnifying 
any liability, the employer can use tests whose validity is suspect and wait until liability is immi-
nent before validating its employment criteria. An employer with insurance for disparate impact 
discrimination could, in effect, deliberately incur losses in reliance on insurance. Therefore, not 
only can an employer intend to commit disparate impact discrimination, but disparate impact 
discrimination is also the sort of wrongdoing that would be "promoted" by the availability of 
insurance. 
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employers. 173 Second, the logic used by some courts adopting the 
173. The public policy exclusion often acts only as a supplement to poorly drafted intentional 
act exclusions. Currently, many of the insurance companies that draft policies to cover employ-
ment discrimination insurance do not explicitly exclude coverage for intentional discrimination. 
Some, like the Lexington Insurance Company, have excluded coverage for risks by stating that 
"[t]his insurance does not apply for the benefit of any individual insured who intentionally 
caused the harm alleged to have arisen out of an insured event." LEXINGTON POLICY, supra 
note 6, at 5. When coupled with other provisions of the policy, even this rather explicit exclusion 
might allow coverage for intentional discrimination in the case of imputed liability or negligent 
supervision liability. See supra note 7. Other insurance companies only exclude coverage for 
"risks that shall be deemed uninsurable as a matter of state law," and they leave the interpreta-
tion of this vague exclusion to the employers that purchase employment discrimination coverage. 
School Dist. for Royal Oak v. Continental Cas. Co., 912 F.2d 844, 846 (6th Cir. 1990). Still 
other companies include an inartful intentional act exclusion in their policies and later invoke 
public policy as a stop-gap measure to contest coverage in cases in which the contractual exclu-
sion fails. For instance, the coverage in Ranger resulted from an imprecise exclusion of coverage. 
Ranger Ins. Co. v. Bal Harbour Club, Inc. 509 So. 2d 940, 942 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) 
(describing a policy that excluded coverage for intentional wrongdoing in the case of property 
damage and bodily injury but not in the case of personal injury), revd., 549 So. 2d 1005 (Fla. 
1989). The policy provided coverage for personal injuries, property damage, and bodily injury 
but only excluded coverage for intentional wrongdoing in the case of property damage and bodily 
injury. The Florida trial court therefore found, under the personal injury provisions, that the 
policy indemnified against liability for intentional discrimination. Ranger, 509 So. 2d at 942-44. 
These practices create the impression that the policy provides coverage for an employer's 
intentional employment discrimination. Absent express language excluding coverage, employers 
might justifiably assume that their employment discrimination coverage includes coverage for 
intentional discrimination. In fact, the courts have recognized this possibility, and at least one 
court has found coverage for an employer's intentional employment discrimination liability on 
the grounds that the language of the employer's policy created a "reasonable expectation" of 
coverage. Clark-Peterson Co. v. Independent Ins. Assocs., 492 N.W.2d 675, 677-79 (Iowa 1992). 
But see Continental Ins. Co. v. McDaniel, 772 P.2d 6, 9 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988) (refusing to base 
coverage for sexual harassment upon the reasonable expectations of the insured). This expecta-
tion of coverage could itself promote wrongdoing; an employer who thinks he has coverage will 
be just as likely to rely on the availability of insurance to commit wrongdoing as an employer 
that actually has coverage. 
The public policy exclusion thus rewards insurance companies for drafting vague and impre-
cise contractual exclusions and operates as a safety net for insurance companies that do not 
exclude coverage for intentional employment discrimination from their policies. Insurance com-
panies can contest coverage under the public policy exclusion even though they have presumably 
charged a premium that reflects all potential tosses against the policy. See Anderson et al., supra 
note 5, at 120-21 (describing how insurance companies manipulate the definition of terms like 
"preconceived design" and "intent" to defeat coverage). Therefore, the public policy exclusion 
itself "promotes wrongdoing" on the part of insurance companies that can benefit from the pre-
miums they charge on imprecise coverage. The public policy exclusion also provides insurance 
companies with little affirmative incentive to draft precise policies because they can always rely 
on public policy to preclude coverage for risks they fail to exclude. By lifting the public policy 
exclusion, courts might force insurance companies to draft more precise intentional act exclu-
sions, and insurance companies in all likelihood could provide more precise and more compre-
hensive exclusion of coverage than courts operating at the remove of "public policy." See First 
Bank (N.A.)-Billings v. TransAmerica Ins. Co., 679 P.2d 1217, 1222-23 (Mont. 1984) ("It is 
conceivable that a combination of different approaches by insurance companies may result in a 
delineation of the limits of coverage better than anything this Court could establish."); KEETON 
& Wm1ss, supra note 63, § 5.4(d), at 519 ("[T]he terms of contemporary liability insurance poli-
cies probably impose a more extensive limitation or exclusion than that which would be recog-
nized by the courts in the absence of an explicit policy provision."). 
Note that the insurance companies in Solo Cup, 619 F.2d at 1187, and Union Camp Corp. v. 
Continental Cas. Co., 452 F. Supp. 565, 567 (S.D. Ga. 1978), were both challenging coverage 
that was clearly within the scope of the policies they had drafted. In those cases, the insurance 
companies were boldly arguing that they should be permitted to avoid their contractual agree-
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public policy exclusion is faulty. The court in Ranger "found" that 
insurance promotes wrongdoing merely by stating that "it is axiomatic 
in the insurance industry that one should not be able to insure against 
one's own intentional misconduct."174 This axiom, however, is a state-
ment about insurance companies, not a statement about empirical ten-
dencies. The Ranger court did not indicate how this axiom proved 
that insurance for intentional torts promotes discrimination. Its proof 
is not appreciably greater than that offered by the similar axiom that 
insurance generally tends to promote negligence. To the contrary, the 
industry "axiom" suggests that insurance companies recognize when 
they need to take steps to combat the moral hazard associated with 
insurance for intentional wrongdoing; the "axiom" suggests that insur-
ance companies exclude coverage for intentional wrongdoing without 
the need for court intervention. 
B. The Imputed Liability and Negligent Supervision Exceptions 
This Note does not propose any resolution to the debate summa-
rized in section II.A. but only suggests that courts adhering to the 
public policy exclusion should adopt a modification that permits the 
enforcement of insurance to cover an employer's imputed liability and 
negligent supervision liability for the intentional torts committed by its 
employees. In this regard, several recent cases support the develop-
ment of these exceptions for insurance covering intentional employ-
ment discrimination liability.175 A few courts have considered the 
validity of insurance that covers an employer's liability for the sexual 
harassment committed by its supervisory or management personnel.176 
Using an approach that might equally be applied to imputed liabil-
ity, 177 these courts addressed the enforceability of the employer's lia-
bility under the negligent supervision exception. 
In Seminole Point Hospital Corp. v. Aetna Casualty Co., 178 the U.S. 
District Court for the District of New Hampshire considered whether 
a worker's compensation and employer liability policy provided cover-
age to a hospital for the intentional sexual harassment committed by 
ments - contractual agreements that expressly covered the risks involved - on the grounds that 
the policies they had drafted would promote wrongdoing. They argued, in essence, that they 
should benefit from the fact that they had drafted policies that violate public policy. 
174. Ranger Ins. Co. v. Bal Harbour Club, Inc., 549 So. 2d 1005, 1007 (Fla. 1989). 
175. See, e.g., Chicago Bd. of Options Exch., Inc. v. Harbor Ins. Co., 738 F. Supp. 1184, 
1187 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (finding that retaliatory discharge is uninsurable, but a corporation's vicari-
ous liability for a retaliatory discharge would be insurable); Seminole Point Hosp. Corp. v. Aetna 
Cas. & Sur. Co., 675 F. Supp. 44 (D.N.H. 1987) (holding that a corporation's executive officer 
cannot indemnify himself against sexual harassment claims but that the corporation can indem-
nify itself against claims of negligent supervision). 
176. See Seminole, 675 F. Supp. at 44; McDaniel, 772 P.2d at 9; Coit Drapery Cleaners, Inc. 
v. Sequoia Ins. Co., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 692, 699-702 (Ct. App. 1993). 
177. See infra section III.C. 
178. 675 F. Supp. 44 (D.N.H. 1987). 
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the hospital's president. The underlying claim for sexual harassment 
was brought in state court by the president's secretary, who claimed 
that the president sexually harassed her by confronting her at work 
with "unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and 
other verbal and physical conduct of a sexual nature." 179 The court 
found that the policy provided no coverage to the president on the 
grounds that coverage was excluded under a contractual intentional 
act exclusion. 180 Without addressing the public policy implications of 
permitting coverage, however, the court found that, as long as the 
plaintiff did not establish that the hospital acted intentionally or with 
gross negligence in permitting the harassment to occur, the hospital 
could be indemnified under the policy for its "own negligent supervi-
sion and failure to undertake an investigation to find out what was 
taking place."181 The court therefore concluded that the president's 
intentional acts of sexual harassment "did not constitute an intentional 
act as to the corporation" and that the contractual exclusion only pre-
vented coverage if the hospital intended for the harassment to occur. 182 
The Seminole court did not explicitly consider invoking public pol-
icy to void the contractual coverage. The court did note, however, 
that the hospital's liability should be insurable, under the terms of its 
insurance contract, so long as the hospital was only negligent in failing 
to prevent its president from harassing its employees. 183 The court 
relied on the same logic that underlies the negligent supervision excep-
tion: if the hospital was only negligent, its liability should not be ex-
cluded from coverage under the contractual intentional act 
exclusion. •84 This logic parallels the logic underlying the negligent su-
pervision exception to the public policy exclusion, and courts look to 
interpretations of contractual intentional act exclusions in determining 
the scope of the public policy exclusion. 185 Consequently, the logic of 
the Seminole decision supports the adoption of an exception to the 
public policy exclusion that permits employers to enforce insurance 
coverage for their sexual harassment liability. 
Courts that have refused to enforce insurance for sexual harass-
ment have also addressed the scope of the negligent supervision excep-
tion. In Coit Drapery Cleaners, Inc. v. Sequoia Insurance Co., 186 the 
California Court of Appeal considered whether to enforce a corpora-
179. 675 F. Supp. at 46. 
180. 675 F. Supp. at 46-47. 
181. 675 F. Supp. at 47. 
182. 675 F. Supp. at 47. 
183. 675 F. Supp. at 47. 
184. 675 F. Supp. at 47. 
185. See Continental Ins. Co. v. McDaniel, 772 P.2d 6, 9 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988); see also 
KEETON & Wm1ss, supra note 63, § 5.4{d){5), at 527-29 {describing the imputed liability excep· 
tion to the contractual exclusion and suggesting the exception is tied to public policy). 
186. 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 692 (Ct. App. 1993). 
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tion's general liability insurance policy to cover liability incurred as 
the result of sexual harassment committed by its president. The plain-
tiff in Coit Drapery settled her sexual harassment claim with the corpo-
ration for slightly more than one million dollars, but the settlement 
required the insurance company to pay $705,000 of that amount. 187 
The insurance company had refused to defend the case on the grounds 
that liability for sexual harassment was not covered under the policy, 
opposing the enforcement of this settlement on the grounds that the 
coverage would violate public policy.188 Because of the settlement, the 
plaintiff in Coit Drapery had a direct interest in convincing the court to 
adopt the negligent supervision exception. Nevertheless, the court ap-
plied section 533 of the California Insurance Code189 to prevent the 
plaintiff and the corporation from enforcing the settlement against the 
insurance company. The court concluded that, even though the settle-
ment would have provided compensation to an actual victim of harass-
ment, "section 533, and the public policy it represents, bar[s] the 
attempt to shift liability for intentional sexual harassment . . . to an 
insurer." 190 
A closer analysis of the particular facts of Coit Drapery sheds light 
on the court's decision and suggests that one can reconcile Coit Drap-
ery with Seminole. In refusing to enforce coverage for the corpora-
tion's liability under a negligent supervision exception, the Coit 
Drapery court first noted that the plaintiff had made no allegation of 
negligent supervision; in fact, in a move that may have foreclosed re-
covery against the insurance company, the plaintiff's counsel explicitly 
stated that " '[t]his is not an action involving negligent supervi-
sion.' " 191 The court also refused to adopt a negligent supervision ex-
ception because the harassment was particularly egregious and 
because the corporation's board ratified and endorsed the president's 
behavior.192 The president had a well-established reputation for being 
a "dirty old man," and he repeatedly and consistently harassed and 
sexually assaulted his female employees. 193 More importantly, the 
president of the company was also the company's founder, a major 
shareholder, and the chairman of the board of directors. 194 The court 
cited this close connection between the president and the management 
187. 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 696. 
188. 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 696-97. 
189. CAL. INS. CODE § 533 (West 1993). 
190. 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 698 (emphasis added). 
191. 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 699. 
192. With respect to ratification of the president's harassment, the court in Coit Drapery 
noted that the "sexual abuse of female employees by [the president] was so widespread, well-
known, and so ratified by the corporation as to constitute intentional corporate policy, which 
cannot be the subject of insurance coverage." 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 701. 
193. 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 695. 
194. 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 695. 
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of the corporation, as well as the corporation's long-standing acquies-
cence in the president's harassing conduct, as the primary factors in its 
refusal to allow coverage under the negligent supervision exception: 
"[T]here was no way ... the corporate entity could have disciplined or 
supervised its president, chairman of the board, and major share-
holder; further, the evidence showed his sexual misconduct with fe-
male employees was affirmatively known to, and ratified by, the board 
of directors .... " 195 Thus, in contrast to Seminole, the court in Coit 
Drapery stressed that the employer was not a "separate entity" from 
its president and that the employer had itself implicitly engaged in 
intentional wrongdoing by ratifying and endorsing its president's acts 
of harassment. 
The Arizona Court of Appeals endorsed a similar analysis and 
reached a similar conclusion in Continental Insurance Co. v. McDan-
iel 196 without addressing the negligent supervision exception. The 
court in McDaniel considered whether liability for intentional sexual 
harassment committed by one of two owners of a coffee shop could be 
insured under a general liability policy. The plaintiff in the underlying 
discrimination case claimed that over the course of a year one of the 
owners sexually harassed her by speaking to her in a vulgar way, fon-
dling her, and exposing his genitals to her. 197 The insurance company 
denied coverage for the partnership's liability, claiming that sexual 
harassment was not a covered "occurrence" under the partnership's 
policy because the injuries were "expected []or intended from the 
standpoint of the insured [owners]."198 Considering this claim, as well 
as the public policy that forbids insurance for intentional wrongdoing, 
the court concluded that "contractual intent and public policy coin-
cide to prevent an insured from acting wrongfully knowing his insur-
ance company will pay the damages." 199 The court therefore held that 
the insurance company did not have to indemnify the coowner for his 
intentional acts of sexual harassment.200 
The Arizona court's decision in McDaniel is consistent with both 
Coit Drapery and Seminole. The two owners in McDaniel were not 
only partners, they were brothers, and they directly supervised their 
employees. 201 Therefore, there was no separation between the individ-
uals responsible for the harassing conduct and the highest levels of 
management and little chance that one owner could have "supervised" 
195. 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 699. 
196. 772 P.2d 6 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988). 
197. 772 P.2d at 7. 
198. 772 P.2d at 7; cj Employers Surplus Lines v. Stone, 388 P.2d 295 (Okla. 1963) (al-
lowing one partner in a business to be indemnified against liability arising out of his partner's 
intentional assault). 
199. 772 P.2d at 9. 
200. 772 P.2d at 9. 
201. 772 P.2d at 7. 
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his brother to prevent the harassment. Moreover, although the court 
did not recount the facts in any detail, it is clear that the harassment 
was egregious; the harassing conduct continued for over a year, and 
the court noted that "the conduct ... was so certain to cause injury to 
McDaniel that [the owner's] intent to cause harm is inferred as a mat-
ter oflaw."202 Therefore, as in Coit Drapery, the facts indicate that the 
employer was not a separate entity from the individual responsible for 
the discrimination and that the harassment was so pervasive that the 
employer must be held to have ratified or endorsed it. 
These cases demonstrate both the scope and the limits of the negli-
gent supervision exception. Seminole enforced coverage for liability a 
corporation incurred by negligently permitting its corporate officers to 
sexually harass their employees. McDaniel and Coit Drapery limit this 
"negligent supervision" exception in two substantial ways. First, they 
suggest that the exception should not apply when the employer is not 
in a position to "supervise" the harasser's conduct because the har-
asser is also an owner of the business. Second, they suggest that at 
some point employer inaction amounts to more than mere negligence 
and that implicit employer ratification of harassing conduct should 
preclude the enforcement of insurance coverage. 
Although the courts in these cases only consider the scope of the 
negligent supervision exception, courts should adopt the logic of these 
cases in considering the scope of the imputed liability exception as 
well. As noted above, the imputed liability and negligent supervision 
exceptions are both predicated on the same underlying rationale. 203 
Under both exceptions, the enforceability of the employer's insurance 
coverage depends on the employer's conduct, regardless of whether 
the employer's liability derives from that conduct. Even in cases of 
imputed liability, in which liability stems only from the employer's 
relationship to its employees, the enforceability of insurance for the 
employer's liability should depend on the employer's conduct because 
the relevant question with respect to the application of the public pol-
icy exclusion is whether the availability of insurance will promote an 
employer's intentional wrongdoing. 
III. THE IMPUTED LIABILITY AND NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION 
EXCEPTIONS AND INSURANCE FOR INTENTIONAL 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 
Speaking to those courts that have chosen to apply the public pol-
icy exclusion, this Part advocates application of the negligent supervi-
sion and imputed liability exceptions and suggests a structure for 
applying these exceptions to insurance covering employer liability for 
202. 772 P.2d at 8. 
203. See supra section I.C. 
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intentional employment discrimination. Section III.A addresses the 
insurability of sexual harassment liability, the area already explored in 
the caselaw, and demonstrates that both quid pro quo and hostile 
work environment sexual harassment under Title VII fall within the 
exceptions. Using sexual harassment as a paradigm and applying the 
principles developed in the caselaw covering insurance for sexual har-
assment, section III.B illustrates that employer liability for other 
forms of disparate treatment also fits the exceptions. Section III.C 
proposes a structure for applying these exceptions to enforce coverage 
for employment discrimination liability. Specifically, section III.C 
suggests three factors courts should consider in limiting the exceptions 
to cases in which employer liability for intentional employment dis-
crimination reflects the insured employer's negligent failure to prevent 
employees from discriminating rather than its intentional decision to 
discriminate. 
A. Applying the Exceptions to Sexual Harassment 
The few cases applying the negligent supervision exception to in-
surance for sexual harassment have not explored the significance of 
insuring all forms of sexual harassment. Rather, the courts have fo-
cused on the facts of the cases before them. This section briefly de-
scribes the law of sexual harassment in order to demonstrate more 
generally how employer liability for sexual harassment fits the negli-
gent supervision and imputed liability exceptions to the public policy 
exclusion. 
The Supreme Court has interpreted Title VII to provide for two 
forms of sexual harassment liability: quid pro quo and hostile work 
environment harassment.204 In quid pro quo harassment, a supervisor 
requires an employee to submit to sexual advances as an express or 
implied condition of receiving tangible employment benefits.205 The 
plaintiff must show that the supervisor "condition[ed] the granting of 
an economic or other job benefit upon the receipt of sexual favors from 
a subordinate, or punishe[d] that subordinate for refusing to 
comply. "206 
By contrast, a prima facie claim of hostile work environment har-
204. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64-65 (1986) (citing Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex: Sexual Harassment, 29 
C.F.R. § 1604.ll{a) (1985)). 
205. Meritor Savings, 477 U.S. at 65-68. 
206. Lipsett v. University of P.R., 864 F.2d 881, 897 (1st Cir. 1988). Though Lipsett in-
volved a Title IX and§ 1983 discrimination claim rather than a Title VII employment discrimi-
nation claim, Barbara Lindemann and David Kadue cite it to define the cause of action for sexual 
harassment in employment. See BARBARA LINDEMANN & DAVID D. KADUE, SEXUAL HAR-
ASSMENT IN EMPLOYMENT LAW 129 (1992). In addition to Lipsett, Lindemann and Kadue cite 
several other cases for the proposition that quid pro quo harassment involves " 'an employer's 
sexually discriminatory behavior which compels an employee to elect between acceding to sexual 
demands and forfeiting job benefits, continued employment or promotion, or otherwise suffering 
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assment requires proof of five elements. The plaintiff must establish 
(1) that the plaintiff belongs to a protected category under Title VII; 
(2) that the plaintiff was subjected to unwelcome conduct that is sex-
ual in nature; (3) that the conduct complained of affected a term, con-
dition, or privilege of employment; ( 4) that the harassing conduct was 
made on the basis of sex; and (5) that the employer can be held respon-
sible for the harassing conduct.207 Unlike quid pro quo harassment, 
which necessarily involves the harassing conduct of a supervisory em-
ployee, hostile work environment harassment can result from the 
harassing conduct of coemployees as well as that of supervisors, as 
long as the harassment is " 'sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the 
conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive working 
environment,' " 208 and as long as there is some basis for imputing lia-
bility to the employer.209 
In determining whether to permit employers to enforce insurance 
for sexual harassment under the imputed liability and negligent super-
vision exceptions, courts must focus on the nature of the employer's 
conduct and the basis of the employer's liability, not upon the conduct 
of the individual responsible for the harassment.210 Under the public 
policy exclusion, negligence is insurable while intentional wrongdoing 
is not. Employer liability for sexual harassment should therefore be 
insurable to the extent that it reflects an employer's negligent failure to 
prevent discrimination and not its intentional decision to discrimi-
nate. 211 The primary concern is not the label placed on the employer's 
liability, but rather whether an employer's sexual harassment liability 
reflects the employer's negligent or intentional wrongdoing. 
In this regard, the Supreme Court has held that traditional 
"agency principles" should govern decisions concerning employer lia-
tangible job detriments.'" Id. at 129 n.2 (quoting Highlander v. K.F.C. Natl. Mgmt. Co., 805 
F.2d 644, 648 (6th Cir. 1986)). 
207. Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1522 (M.D. Fla. 1991) 
(citing Meritor Savings, 477 U.S. at 66-69 (1986) and Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 
903-05 (11th Cir. 1982)). Lindemann & Kadue call these elements the "basis" for the claim, the 
"activity," the "issue," and the "causal connection." LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 206, at 
168-69. They prefer to drop the term "respondeat superior" from the fifth element of a hostile 
work environment claim and to focus instead upon "employer responsibility." Id. at 169 & n.20. 
In the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in Meritor Savings, several courts have recharacter-
ized this element of a hostile work environment claim, and Lindemann and Kadue adopt "em-
ployer responsibility" because "the standard that courts actually apply incorporates negligence 
concepts far broader than the traditional standard of respondeat superior." Id.; see also Robinson, 
760 F. Supp. at 1522 n.7 ("Although this fifth element bears the label 'respondeat superior,' it 
actually embraces a negligence standard for employer liability .... "). 
208. Meritor Savings, 477 U.S. at 67 (quoting Henson, 682 F.2d at 904). 
209. LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 206, at 169. 
210. The question is whether the employer was grossly negligent, reckless, or willful in its 
failure to supervise its employees, not whether the responsible employee intended for the harass-
ment to occur. See supra sections l.C, Il.B; infra section Ill.C. 
211. See infra section Ill.C. 
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bility for sexual harassment,212 and the Supreme Court has endorsed 
the Second Restatement of Agency as the source of these principles.213 
The Second Restatement provides that an employer should be held lia-
ble for the acts of its employees in the following circumstances: (1) 
when the employee committed acts of wrongdoing within the scope of 
his employment;214 (2) when the employer "intended the conduct or 
the consequences" of the employee's actions even when the employee's 
conduct was outside the scope of employment;215 (3) when the em-
ployee's acts violate a nondelegable duty of the employer;216 or (4) 
when the employer has negligently failed to prevent its employees 
from committing wrongdoing.217 
Most courts impose liability for quid pro quo harassment directly 
on the employer under the first principle announced by the Second 
Restatement. 218 Supervisory employees have the authority to affect an 
employee's tangible job benefits, and a supervisor's acts of quid pro 
quo harassment fall within the scope of the supervisor's employ-
ment. 219 Courts therefore hold employers strictly responsible for a su-
pervisor's acts of quid pro quo harassment, regardless of whether the 
employer intended that the harassment occur and despite any efforts 
the employer made to prevent the harassment.22° Consequently, em-
212. Meritor Savings, 477 U.S. at 72. 
213. 477 U.S. at 67. 
214. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1) (1957). 
215. Id. § 219(2)(a) (1957). 
216. Id. § 219(2)(c) (1957). 
217. Id. § 219(2)(b) (1957). 
218. The Supreme Court's pronouncement in Meritor Savings that employer liability should 
be governed by agency principles applied, on the facts of that case, only to hostile work environ· 
ment claims. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72-73 (1986). However, like other forms 
of disparate treatment discrimination, see infra section 111.B, quid pro quo harassment can be 
viewed as a form of strict vicarious or respondeat superior liability. See 477 U.S. at 70-71 
("[T]he courts have consistently held employers liable for the discriminatory discharges of em· 
ployees by supervisory personnel, whether or not the employer knew, should have known, or 
approved of the supervisor's actions." (citing Anderson v. Methodist Evangelical Hosp., Inc., 
464 F.2d 723, 725 (6th Cir. 1972))). Because supervisory employees have the authority to affect 
tangible job benefits, they have at least the apparent authority to commit quid pro quo harass-
ment within the scope of their employment. As the Seventh Circuit has stated, 
[B]y delegating power to [a supervisor,] the "employer" and [the supervisor] essentially 
merged; as long as the tort complained of was caused by the exercise of this supervisory 
power, [the supervisor] should be deemed as acting within the scope of his employment, and 
the employer should be held liable for the tort. 
Horn v. Duke Homes, 755 F.2d 599, 605 (7th Cir. 1985); see also LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra 
note 206, at 220-22. This form of imputed liability fits within the first "principle" announced by 
the Second Restatement; it is liability imposed on the employer for the actions of its employees 
taken within the scope of their employment. 
219. See, e.g., Morgan v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 901 F.2d 186, 192 (1st Cir. 1990) (quid 
pro quo claim fails if alleged harasser did not possess supervisory authority over the victim); 
Horn, 755 F.2d at 605. 
220. See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 910 (1 lth Cir. 1982) ("We hold that an 
employer is strictly liable for the actions of its supervisors that amount to sexual discrimination 
or sexual harassment resulting in tangible job detriment ... . ");see also LINDEMANN & KA DUE, 
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ployer liability for quid pro quo harassment fits the paradigm of the 
imputed liability exception; the individual supervisor acts within the 
apparent authority vested in him by his employer, and his actions and 
intentions are strictly imputed to the employer to form the basis of the 
employer's liability.221 
The precise nature of employer liability for hostile work environ-
ment harassment is less clear. Some courts impose hostile work envi-
ronment liability on an employer on the basis of the same principles 
applied in quid pro quo cases. They find that a supervisor has the 
apparent or actual authority to establish working conditions, and they 
therefore impute his acts of sexual harassment directly to the em-
ployer.222 In these circumstances, liability for hostile work environ-
ment harassment should fall within the imputed liability exception. 
Most courts do not find, however, that supervisors have the authority 
to create a hostile work environment because most employers at least 
officially disavow any intent to discriminate. Rather, courts generally 
find that employer liability for hostile work environment harassment is 
neither respondeat superior nor vicarious liability nor direct liability 
stemming from the violation of a nondelegable duty.223 
Instead, in most hostile work environment cases, the courts impose 
liability on the employer only if the plaintiff can establish that the em-
ployer knew or should have known of the harassing conditions created 
by its employees and failed to respond appropriately.224 The standard 
for imposing this failure to supervise liability on an employer may vary 
depending upon whether the harasser is a supervisory employee rather 
than a coworker225 and upon whether the employer has established an 
supra note 206, at 152 ("The discriminatory act is imputed to the employer without regard to 
whether it knew or should have known of the discrimination or granted actual authority to 
discriminate."), 221 (stating that the "supervisor's actions are properly imputed to the employer, 
without regard to whether the employer knew of the supervisor's discriminatory intent or 
whether the supervisor had actual authority to discriminate on that basis" and that "[c]ourts 
generally endorse this view [of quid quo pro liability]" and citing cases from every circuit). 
221. LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 206, at 221-22. 
222. Id. at 229-30. 
223. But see Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 70-71 (1986); Henson, 682 F.2d at 
905 (interpreting respondeat superior in hostile environment cases to be limited to situations in 
which the employer "knew or should have known of the harassment . . . and failed to take 
prompt remedial action"); LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 206, at 227 ("(S]ome decisions 
have in fact based employer liability on the doctrine of respondeat superior liability, in the scope-
of-employment sense, even when the court could have relied on the sounder ground of direct 
employer liability for negligence.") (emphasis added). 
224. See Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1517-18 (M.D. Fla. 
1991) (describing an employer's efforts, including the promulgation of a sexual harassment policy 
and grievance procedure, to avoid discrimination liability but concluding that "the policies and 
procedures •.. for responding to complaints of harassment are inadequate"); LINDEMANN & 
KADUE, supra note 206, at 192 n.160 ("Employer liability is usually a matter of failing to correct 
harassment."). 
225. In cases of hostile work environment by a supervisor, the courts generally apply a "di-
rect liability" standard that turns on employer negligence. LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 
206, at 227. Although some courts have found that supervisors have the authority, or the appar-
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effective grievance procedure to respond to employee complaints about 
harassment. 226 Regardless of the standard applied, however, an em-
ployer's "failure to supervise" could reflect either negligence or an in-
tent to discriminate. Employer liability for hostile work environment 
harassment therefore falls within either the "intended the conduct" or 
the "negligent failure to prevent wrongdoing" principles from the Sec-
ond Restatement. 221 
Employer liability under Title VII for sexual harassment fits the 
paradigm for the imputed liability and negligent supervision excep-
tions. In both quid pro quo and hostile work environment cases, an 
employer's liability reflects the employer's failure to prevent harass-
ment, and in each case the employer's liability can reflect either negli-
ent authority, to create a hostile work environment, other courts find employers liable for super-
visor harassment only upon a showing that the employer knew or should have known of the 
harassing conduct and failed to take measures to remedy the harassment. Id. at 223; see also 
Hirschfeld v. New Mexico Corrections Dept., 916 F.2d 572, 577 (10th Cir. 1990) (rejecting the 
contention that hostile environment harassment could be imposed against an employer on the 
basis of supervisor conduct taken in the scope of the supervisor's employment and stating that 
the standard for hostile work environment cases is "employer negligence or recklessness in failing 
to respond to hostile work environment sexual harassment by employees ..•. "). Therefore, 
employer liability for supervisor harassment "most often stems from a negligent failure to pre-
vent or remedy sexual harassment" rather than respondeat superior, vicarious liability, or "auto-
matic" liability. See LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 206, at 231; id. at 220 n.4a 
(distinguishing, in the context of quid pro quo harassment imputed to an employer, "automatic" 
imputed liability from "vicarious liability" and "strict" liability, on the grounds that strict liabil-
ity connotes a lack of fault, while vicarious liability implies the "function of the doctrine of 
respondeat superior, a doctrine that does not adequately describe an employer's liability for sex-
ual harassment"). 
The courts also apply a negligence standard in cases of coworker harassment. "The employer 
is not necessarily liable for co-worker harassment. Rather, the inquiry as to employer liability 
focuses on whether the employer had actual or constructive notice of the harassment and, if so, 
whether the employer acted appropriately to control the harassment." Id. at 234; see also Steele 
v. Offshore Shipbuilding, Inc., 867 F.2d 1311, 1316 (11th Cir. 1989) (denying liability because 
the employer took "prompt remedial action"); Bohen v. City ofE. Chicago, 799 F.2d 1180, 1189 
(7th Cir. 1986) (supporting its finding that the plaintiff had an actionable § 1983 claim against 
the employer by noting that the employer was aware of the harassment, took only superficial 
steps to address the problem, and "had no policy against sexual harassment"). The measures 
taken must be adequate to combat the harassment. See Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 636 
(6th Cir. 1987) (finding that an employer's remedial measures were no defense because they were 
inadequate). The plaintiff can also prevail in a coworker case by establishing that the employer 
in fact knew of the harassment and nevertheless permitted it to persist. See Katz v. Dole, 709 
F.2d 251, 256 (4th Cir. 1983) ("[T]he plaintiff must show that the employer knew or should have 
known of the harassment, and took no effectual action to correct the situation."); Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex: Sexual Harass-
ment, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.l l(d) (1993) ("With respect to conduct between fellow employees, an 
employer is responsible for acts of sexual harassment in the workplace where the employer (or its 
agents or supervisory employees) knows or should have known of the conduct, unless it can show 
that it took immediate and appropriate corrective action."). Therefore, courts impose liability on 
the employer for negligence in failing to take corrective actions to remedy harassing conditions 
or for failing to take effective steps to prevent hostile work environment harassment before it 
occurs. See generally LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 206, at 233-47 (describing the stan-
dard in cases of sexual harassment by coworkers). 
226. LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 206, at 232. 
227. See Hirschfeld, 916 F.2d at 576-80; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 219(1), 
219(2)(a) (1957). Generally, courts apply a negligence standard. See supra note 223. 
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gence or an intent to discriminate. Consequently, the only question 
the court must address in determining whether to enforce coverage for 
sexual harassment is whether an employer's "involvement" in the 
harassing conduct of its employees reflects an intent to harass or a 
mere negligent failure to prevent harassment. 22s In most cases, hostile 
work environment liability should fall within the negligent supervision 
exception because "[e]mployer liability for a hostile environment most 
often stems from a negligent failure to prevent or remedy sexual har-
assment. "229 Similarly, quid pro quo harassment liability will often fit 
the imputed liability exception because it is imposed on the employer 
without regard to the employer's intent to discriminate.230 Therefore, 
courts should enforce insurance coverage, under the imputed liability 
exception, for quid pro quo liability that stems from an employer's 
negligent failure to screen supervisors prone to discrimination and not 
from its intent to harass or discriminate. Likewise, to the extent that 
hostile work environment liability reflects a negligent failure to pre-
vent harassment, courts should enforce insurance that covers such lia-
bility under the negligent supervision exception. 
B. Disparate Treatment Discrimination 
An analysis similar to that applied to quid pro quo sexual harass-
ment should apply to employer liability for other forms of intentional 
employment discrimination.231 Courts applying the public policy ex-
clusion generally refuse to enforce insurance to cover liability for dis-
parate treatment on the grounds that disparate treatment 
discrimination is intentional, and therefore uninsurable, conduct. 
Nevertheless, except in cases in which an employer's liability stems 
from an official policy to discriminate,232 the rationale for imposing 
liability on the employer in disparate treatment cases is respondeat 
228. See supra section I.C.2. 
229. LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 206, at 231; see also Hirschfeld, 916 F.2d at 577 
(holding that the standard for hostile work environment cases is "employer negligence or reck-
lessness in failing to respond to hostile work environment sexual harassment by employees"); 
Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1522 n.7 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (finding 
that employer liability for hostile work environment harassment "embraces a negligence stan-
dard ... that essentially restates the 'fellow servant' rule"). 
230. LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 206, at 152 (noting that an employer's liability is 
generally considered to be automatic in a quid pro quo case); see also id. at 220 n.4a (distinguish-
ing between automatic imputed liability and vicarious liability or strict liability). 
231. Cf id. at 8 (arguing that the theories of quid pro quo and hostile environment harass-
ment "overlap" and "converge"). 
232. One could even argue that to the extent that the decision to adopt an official policy has 
to be made by some individual within the company, the company's liability for that decision 
should be considered a form of potentially insurable imputed liability. However, any individual 
sufficiently powerful to make the decision to adopt such an official policy would probably fail this 
Note's meaningful separation test for applying the imputed liability exception. See infra section 
III.C.1. 
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superior or strict vicarious liability.233 Therefore, just as quid pro quo 
sexual harassment liability should be insurable as long as the basis for 
employer liability is negligence rather than an intent to discriminate, 
an employer's disparate treatment liability should be insurable under 
the imputed liability exception as long as the employer's liability re-
flects a negligent failure to prevent individual employees from commit-
ting intentional acts of discrimination.234 
Most courts that have considered the issue have determined that 
employer liability under Title VII provides a form of respondeat supe-
rior liability that is imputed directly to the employer, regardless of the 
employer's conduct or intent, as a result of the unauthorized acts of 
discrimination committed by employees. 235 This view of Title VII lia-
bility appears most notably in the debate over whether Title VII af-
fords plaintiffs a cause of action against individual supervisors or 
board members responsible for an employer's discrimination. Plain-
tiffs have pointed to section 701(b) of Title VII,236 which defines "em-
ployer" to include both the "employer" itself and the employer's 
"agents," and they have argued that Congress intended to provide a 
cause of action against the individual employees who are responsible 
for an "employer's" discrimination. 237 The courts have split on the 
issue, with the Ninth Circuit holding that Title VII imposes no indi-
vidual liability, 238 and the Fifth Circuit holding that Title VII does 
233. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 70-71 (1986) ("[T]he courts have consist-
ently held employers liable for the discriminatory discharges of employees by supervisory person-
nel, whether or not the employer knew, should have known, or approved of the supervisor's 
action." (citing Anderson v. Methodist Evangelical Hosp., Inc., 464 F.2d 723, 725 (6th Cir. 
1972))); Miller v. Maxwell's Intl. Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587·88 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating that 
Congress intended to limit Title VII liability to a "respondeat superior principle"), cert. denied, 
1994 U.S. LEXIS 1424 (Feb. 22, 1994); Fuchilla v. Layman, 537 A.2d 652, 663 (N.J.) (Handler, 
J., concurring) (drawing an analogy to Title VII in a state Jaw employment discrimination case 
and stating that "the doctrine of respondeat superior is an integral part of the protection provided 
by [Title VII]. Employers are held strictly liable for the discriminatory employment decisions of 
their supervisory personnel." (second emphasis added)), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 826 (1988). 
234. For these reasons, courts and commentators draw explicit comparisons between quid 
pro quo harassment and disparate treatment or intentional discrimination. See, e.g., Chris-
toforou v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 294, 302 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (casting a quid pro 
quo case of sexual harassment in terms of the prima facie case necessary to make out a Title VII 
disparate treatment claim under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) and 
Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981)). 
235. See the cases cited supra note 233. 
236. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1988). 
237. See, e.g., Miller, 991 F.2d at 587-88; Hamilton v. Rodgers, 791 F.2d 439, 442-43 (5th 
Cir. 1986); LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 206, at 514-25; PERES, supra note 168, at 1-4 
(describing attempts to bring actions against individual employees in addition to the action 
against the employer). 
238. Miller, 991 F.2d at 588. The Ninth Circuit held that "Congress assessed liability only 
against an employer under Title VII" and that "individual defendants cannot be held liable for 
damages under Title VII." 991 F.2d at 587. The plaintiff in Miller alleged sex and age discrimi-
nation, and, after settling these claims against her corporate employer, she brought similar claims 
against individual defendants: the CEO of the corporation, several general managers, and a few 
lower-level employees. 991 F.2d at 584. 
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afford such a remedy, at least to the extent that the action is brought 
against the individual in his official capacity as the employer's 
agent.239 Both the Ninth and the Fifth Circuit have concluded, how-
ever, that Title VII imposes a form of respondeat superior liability in 
which an employer's liability is ultimately predicated on its failure to 
prevent employees from engaging in discrimination. 
An analysis of the circuit court opinions in these cases provides 
further support for the contention that employer liability under Title 
VII is a form of imputed liability that should be insurable under the 
imputed liability and negligent supervision exceptions. In Miller v. 
Maxwell's International Inc., 240 the Ninth Circuit refused to afford a 
cause of action against individual supervisors because "[t]here is no 
reason to stretch the liability of individual employees beyond the re-
spondeat superior principle intended by Congress."241 The court also 
noted that "[n]o employer will allow supervisory or other personnel to 
violate Title VII when the employer is liable,"242 and that denying a 
cause of action against individual supervisors "would [not] encourage 
supervisory personnel to believe that they may violate Title VII with 
impunity."243 
The Fifth Circuit in Hamilton v. Rodgers244 reached a different 
239. Hamilton, 791 F.2d at 442-43. The Fifth Circuit has limited its holding to individuals 
acting in their official capacity as agents of their employer, but the logic of these decisions never-
theless supports the interpretation that employer liability under Title VII is a form of imputed 
liability in which an employer's liability stems ultimately from its failure to supervise its employ-
ees properly. See Harvey v. Blake, 913 F.2d 226, 227-28 (Sth Cir. 1990) (citing Clanton v. Or-
leans Parish Sch. Bd., 649 F.2d 1084 (Sth Cir. 1981), to limit the apparently broad holding in 
Hamilton to liability imposed against supervisors in their official and not their individual capac-
ity). The plaintiff in Hamilton claimed that he was subjected to racial harassment in the work-
place and that he was fired in retaliation for complaining about the unwelcome working. 
conditions created by that harassment. 791 F.2d at 441. The district court held the employer 
and the individual supervisors jointly and severally liable for back pay and compensatory dam-
ages under Title VII and under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983. 791 F.2d at 441. On appeal, the Fifth 
Circuit affirmed the Title VII claim. Though it "recognize[d] that it is only employers that are 
subject to statutory liability" under Title VII, the Fifth Circuit found authority to impose liabil-
ity on the individual supervisors based on the broad definition of "employer" in§ 70l(b). The 
Fifth Circuit found, essentially, that the individual supervisors were "employers" under§ 701(b) 
in their own right. 791 F.2d at 442-43. The Fifth Circuit also held, however, that the plaintiff 
could not sustain a § 1983 action against the employer because the employer had no official 
policy encouraging racial discrimination and because " 'the doctrine [of respondeat superior] has 
no application in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.'" 791 F.2d at 443 (quoting Dean v. 
Gladney, 621F.2d1331, 1336 (Sth Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 983 (1981) (quoting Jones v. 
City of Memphis, 586 F.2d 622, 625 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 914 (1979))). Conse-
quently, there could not have been any independent basis for imposing liability on the employer 
under Title VII. Nevertheless, the court found both the individual employees and the employer 
responsible for violating Title VII. 791 F.2d at 443. Therefore, the employer's liability had to 
have been predicated on the acts of discrimination committed by its supervisors, and it had to 
have been imputed to the employer under an agency theory of liability. 
240. 991 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, U.S. LEXIS 1424 (Feb. 22, 1994). 
241. 991 F.2d at 588. 
242. 991 F.2d at 588. 
243. 991 F.2d at 588. 
244. 791 F.2d 439 (Sth Cir. 1986). 
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result but applied a logic similar to that applied by the Ninth Circuit 
in Miller. The court held that an employer is not liable under Title 
VII unless there is some "predicate" liability against the individual 
employee responsible for the discrimination.245 As commentators in-
terpreting Hamilton have explained: 
Corporate liability can result under the doctrine of respondeat superior 
only because an employee of the corporation is directly liable because of 
that employee's own wrongful conduct . . . . Thus, the offending em-
ployee must necessarily also be liable as an individual, because individual 
liability is the predicate for invoking the doctrine of respondeat 
superior. 246 
Both Miller and Hamilton, therefore, support the argument that em-
ployer liability for intentional employment discrimination is a form of 
respondeat superior liability that should be insurable under the im-
puted liability exception. 
The Supreme Court's treatment of "subjective hiring criteria" in 
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust 247 provides further illustration. 
In Watson, a black woman who was a bank teller brought a Title VII 
suit claiming she was denied a promotion on the basis of her race. 248 
The employer had delegated authority over promotions to its supervi-
sory employees, who repeatedly passed over the plaintiff for promo-
tions.249 The plaintiff claimed that the individual supervisors 
intentionally discriminated against her, but she claimed that the em-
ployer should be liable for disparate impact as well as disparate treat-
ment discrimination.250 The plaip.tiff's disparate impact theory was 
that the employer had chosen a facially neutral employment practice 
- delegation of employment decisions to a supervisor - that resulted 
in the disproportionate exclusion of black and female applicants from 
promotions.251 The Supreme Court approved this theory and held 
that the use of "subjective hiring criteria" could form the basis of a 
disparate impact claim under Title VII.252 
The plaintiff in Watson therefore pursued her claim under both a 
disparate impact and a disparate treatment theory. She asserted that 
the employer's delegation of decisionmaking authority resulted in the 
disproportionate exclusion of women and minorities from supervisory 
positions253 and grounded her claim in a disparate impact analysis. 
245. See supra note 239. 
246. LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 206, at 517. 
247. 487 U.S. 977 (1988). 
248. 487 U.S. at 983. 
249. 487 U.S. at 982. 
250. 487 U.S. at 984. 
251. 487 U.S. at 989. 
252. 487 U.S. at 989; see also 487 U.S. at 991-99 (plurality opinion) (describing the standard 
to be applied in these cases). 
253. 487 U.S. at 984. 
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Alternatively, she also asserted that the individual supervisors inten-
tionally discriminated against her by refusing to promote her to a 
supervisory position and that liability for that intentional discrimina-
tion should be imputed to the corporate employer under a disparate 
treatment theory.254 
The facts of Watson could argue either for or against the applica-
tion of the public policy exclusion, depending on their characteriza-
tion. The employer might have intended for the individual supervisors 
to discriminate and instructed its supervisors not to promote minori-
ties to managerial positions. The employer also might have intention-
ally delegated the authority to :rµake employment decisions to 
supervisors it knew to be prone to discriminate. Under either of these 
characterizations of the facts, the employer's conduct should be 
viewed as intentional wrongdoing, and it thus should be uninsurable 
under the public policy exclusion. On the other hand, the employer 
might have intended that the hiring practice be nondiscriminatory but 
failed to take measures to prevent supervisors from intentionally dis-
criminating. If this were the case, the employer's liability would be 
better characterized as a form of insurable negligence for failing to 
screen supervisors who are prone to discriminate. Watson therefore 
illustrates that simply labeling the employer's conduct disparate treat-
ment discrimination does not mean that the employer intended the 
discrimination to occur.255 An employer could be strictly liable as a 
matter of respondeat superior or vicarious liability for the unauthor-
ized and illegal disparate treatment discrimination committed by its 
supervisory employees. 256 
This reliance on the characterization of liability under Title VII 
highlights a serious problem with the approach taken by the Solo Cup 
line of cases. 257 Under a rigid public policy exclusion like that applied 
in Solo Cup, 258 the enforceability of an employer's insurance for Title 
254. 487 U.S. at 983-84. 
255. Courts have long recognized that employers can be held liable for disparate treatment 
liability in cases in which they have not intended that the discrimination occur, and even in cases 
in which the employer made a good faith effort to avoid incurring liability. See Note, Sexual 
Harassment and Title VII: The Foundation for the Elimination of Sexual Cooperation as an 
Employment Condition, 76 MICH. L. REV. 1007, 1025 & nn.131-34 (1978) (describing the various 
circumstances in which the courts have held employers responsible for the discriminatory acts of 
supervisors notwithstanding the employer's efforts to avoid discrimination). 
256. By contrast, disparate impact discrimination is not always unintended by the employer 
because the facially neutral practice of delegating employment decisions to supervisors could 
reflect an employer's intent to discriminate. Take for example the "disparate impact" cases in 
which height and weight requirements have been struck down as discriminating against women. 
See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 331-32 (1977). In these cases, it is plausible given 
the lack of a job-related explanation for the requirement that the "facially neutral" requirement 
was adopted by an employer in order to exclude women from the positions. 
257. See supra section II.A. 
258. Solo Cup Co. v. Federal Ins. Co., 619 F.2d 1178 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1033 
(1980). 
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VII liability would depend upon the characterization given the cause 
of action and not upon proof of the employer's intent to discriminate. 
If the court in Watson were to find the bank liable under a disparate 
impact theory, the bank's liability would be insurable as "uninten-
tional discrimination," regardless of whether the individual supervi-
sors or the bank intended to discriminate. 259 By contrast, if the court 
were to find the bank liable under a disparate treatment theory, the 
bank's liability would be uninsurable as "intentional" discrimination 
even if the bank was unaware of its supervisors' discriminatory 
practices. 260 
On the other hand, courts applying the imputed liability exception 
would look to the actual intent and conduct of the employer, not the 
intent of the individual employees responsible for the liability or the 
characterization given to the cause of action.261 For these courts, ap-
plication of the public policy exclusion is fact dependent. If the em-
ployer directed the discrimination - for instance, if the supervisors in 
Watson were complying with a formal company policy that required 
them to favor white men when making promotion decisions - then 
the exceptions obviously would not apply and the courts would refuse 
to enforce coverage. The courts would recognize the employer's liabil-
ity as stemming from the employer's own intentional decision to dis-
criminate. On the other hand, if an employer faced imputed liability 
as a result of a supervisor's unauthorized decision to discriminate, the 
employer's liability would be insurable under the imputed liability ex-
ception, at least to the extent that liability only reflected the em-
ployer's negligence. 262 
C. A Proposed Approach 
The premise of this argument for adopting the imputed liability 
and negligent supervision exceptions for intentional employment dis-
crimination has been that an employer can act only through employ-
ees who act on the employer's behalf,263 and that these employees can 
choose to engage in discriminatory conduct that reflects liability upon 
259. See 619 F.2d at 1187 ("With respect to the coverage of disparate impact liabilities, there 
is clearly no basis for voiding or limiting the contract."). 
260. See 619 F.2d at 1187 (reserving the question); Legg Mason Wood Walker v. INA, 23 
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 778, 782 n.12 (D.D.C. 1980) ("An insurance policy covering inten· 
tional discrimination by the insured would likely violate public policy and thus be held unen-
forceable." (citing Union Camp Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 452 F. Supp. 565, 567-68 (S.D. 
Ga. 1978))). 
261. See supra sections l.C, II.B; infra section IIl.C. 
262. The employer may not be in fact merely negligent in failing to prevent the discrimina· 
tion, however, and for this reason courts should inquire into the employer's conduct and motiva· 
tion for failing to prevent the discrimination. See infra sections ·111.c.2, 111.C.3. 
263. See Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 797 F.2d 1417, 1422 (7th Cir. 1986) ("to say that 
the 'corporation' has committed some wrong ... simply means that someone at the decision· 
making level in the corporate hierarchy has committed the wrong"). 
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the employer regardless of whether the employer endorses or ratifies 
their behavior. Employer liability may be strict liability in the sense 
that employers are directly liable for a supervisor's intentional dis-
crimination, or in the sense that employer liability stems from the vio-
lation of a nondelegable duty. However, employer liability may also 
reflect an employer's negligence in failing to prevent discrimination 
rather than in its intent to discriminate. An employer can be held 
liable absent its own intent to discriminate. Therefore, the pivotal 
question in determining whether courts should enforce insurance for 
intentional employment discrimination under the imputed liability and 
negligent supervision exceptions is whether and to what extent the em-
ployer has intended the discrimination to occur. Courts must inquire 
whether the employer has "participated" in the· wrongdoing of its 
employees. 264 
Most courts applying the public policy exclusion have not taken a 
fact-specific approach to the public policy exclusion, and cases other 
than those dealing directly with insurance for intentional discrimina-
tion provide little guidance as to how courts should approach this 
question of fact. The courts have been unable to define the precise 
point at which employer involvement in the wrongdoing of its employ-
ees becomes intentional wrongdoing within the meaning of the public 
policy exclusion. 265 Some courts have tried to arrive at this distinction 
by defining a simple standard for determining the degree of employer 
misconduct required to destroy the exceptions. For instance, some 
courts have distinguished gross from simple negligence as the standard 
for enforceability.266 Other courts have reached a similarly rigid, but 
ultimately unhelpful, standard by distinguishing a willful or reckless 
failure to supervise from mere negligence. 267 In this as in other cir-
cumstances, however, the "distinction between intent and negligence 
obviously is a matter of degree,"268 and simply formulating a verbal 
264. See Beaver v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 420 N.E.2d 1058, 1061 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (al-
lowing insurance for imputed liability, but only if" 'the employer did not participate in the 
wrong'" (quoting Northwestern Natl. Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 440 (Sth Cir. 1962))); 
supra section I.C. 
265. See supra sections I.C, 1.D. 
266. See Dayton Hudson Corp. v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 621 P.2d 1155, 1161 (Okla. 
1980) ("We think the ultimate answer depends in each instance on whether prior knowledge 
makes the master's negligence 'ordinary' or 'gross.' "). The court in Dayton Hudson did not have 
occasion to apply the distinction, nor did the court provide any guidance as to how other courts 
should distinguish simple from gross negligence. See 621 P.2d at 1161. 
267. See JERRY, supra note 21, § 65[f], at 353 ("Where punitive damages are vicariously 
imposed, the public policies against coverage of punitive damages are much less compelling .... 
The employer [may have] no meaningful ability to prevent the conduct of an employee bent on 
acting in a destructive way. At best, the employer was simply negligent - not reckless or grossly 
negligent - in failing to supervise the employee.''). 
268. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 47, at 36; see also McNulty, 301 F.2d at 444 ("The 
borderline between willful and wanton injury and injury as the result of simple negligence is often 
a hairline distinction."). 
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standard does not provide the courts with any guidance as to how they 
should approach difficult fact patterns. 
The best courts can do in trying to define the scope of the imputed 
liability and negligent supervision exceptions is to approximate the 
standard for the public policy exclusion itself. The rationale underly-
ing the public policy exclusion suggests that the validity of an em-
ployer's imputed liability insurance should tum on whether the 
employer's conduct is "a type that will be encouraged by insur-
ance."269 Courts do not apply the public policy exclusion to preclude 
coverage for negligence, even though insurance creates an incentive for 
negligent wrongdoing.270 Rather, courts apply the public policy exclu-
sion to void coverage for wrongdoing that is, by some definition, "in-
tentional."271 Negligence, therefore, is insurable generally, and it 
.should be insurable under the exceptions as well. 
The cases addressing the enforceability of insurance for sexual har-
assment and the general purpose of the public policy exclusion suggest 
the following structure for determining whether the exceptions should 
apply: First, courts should consider whether an employer simply 
failed to supervise its employees or actually decided to discriminate. 
In making this determination, courts should inquire whether any 
meaningful separation exists between the employer and the individual 
responsible for the discrimination. If there is no meaningful separa-
tion - that is, if the employee responsible for the·discrimination is the 
employer for the purposes of assessing the impact of insurance cover-
age on the employer's conduct - then the inquiry should go no fur-
ther. Courts should apply the public policy exclusion to refuse to 
enforce coverage for liability stemming from what is essentially the 
employer's intentional decision to discriminate. If, however, the court 
finds that there is a meaningful separation between the employer and 
the responsible employee, and the employer's liability stems from its 
failure to prevent an employee from discriminating, the courts should 
inquire into an employer's motivation for permitting the discrimina-
tion to occur; they should determine whether the employer intention-
ally rather than negligently failed to prevent its employees from 
discriminating. In conducting this second level of inquiry, courts 
should first consider whether the employer's failure to prevent the dis-
crimination resulted from an implicit endorsement or authorization of 
the employee's conduct. They should therefore inquire whether the 
employer failed to respond to blatant, long-standing, or pervasive pat-
terns of discrimination. Alternatively, courts should consider whether 
an employer in fact acted in reliance on insurance when it decided to 
269. See Ranger Ins. Co. v. Bal Harbour Club, Inc., 549 So. 2d 1005, 1007 (Fla. 1989); see 
also supra notes 48-54 and accompanying text. 
270. See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text. 
271. See supra notes 48-54 and accompanying text. 
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permit its employees to discriminate - whether an employer has ac-
ted with a "calculating intent" to gain from the availability of insur-
ance. 272 Below, this section explores this structure and considers each 
of these factors in turn. 
1. Meaningful Separation 
If the individual responsible for the discrimination is the com-
pany's alter ego273 - that is, if the individual discriminator essentially 
is the employer - then the rationale for applying the imputed liability 
and negligent supervision exceptions to enforce coverage for the em-
ployer's liability does not apply.274 The reason for inquiring into this 
meaningful separation is simple. If the "employer" cannot prevent an 
individual employee or agent from committing intentional acts of dis-
crimination, and if the individual responsible for the discrimination 
benefits personally from the availability of insurance to cover the com-
pany's liability, then the availability of insurance can be expected to 
promote the individual's intentional discrimination. The public policy 
exclusion removes the incentive an insured employer may otherwise 
have to commit intentional wrongdoing by eliminating the potential 
that the employee might "benefit" from intentionally engaging in in-
sured wrongdoing. The negligent supervision and imputed liability ex-
ceptions apply when the interjection of a third party removes the need 
for courts to impose this disincentive.275 The individual employee 
who causes an employer to incur imputed liability does not personally 
benefit from the availability of insurance to cover the employer's liabil-
ity, and even an insured employer has an incentive to prevent its em-
ployees from discriminating.276 If there is no separation between the 
employer as a distinct entity and the individual responsible for the 
discrimination - if an individual controls the employer's decision 
272. One commentator has suggested that this factor, which he terms the employer's "calcu-
lating intent" to gain from insurance, should govern the application of the public policy exclu-
sion in all cases. See Willborn, supra note 10, at 1014-18. 
273. Courts have applied a similar limitation on the imputed liability exception to prevent 
the enforcement of insurance in cases in which the individual responsible for the wrongdoing is in 
fact the alter ego of the corporation. See Sam P. Rynearson, Exclusion of Expected or Intended 
Personal Injury or Property Damage Under the Occurrence Definition of the Standard Comprehen-
sive General Liability Policy, in THE COMPREHENSIVE GENERAL LIABILITY POLICY 3, 13-14 
(Arthur J. Liederman ed., 1985) (citing cases in which the alter ego or managing agents incurred 
liability for their intentional wrongdoing and in which the corporation's vicarious liability for 
this liability was deemed to be intended for the purposes of a contractual exclusion). 
274. The court in McLeod v. Tecorp Intl., Ltd., 844 P.2d 925 (Or. Ct. App. 1992), noted that 
when the issue is the interpretation of coverage under a contractual exclusion, 
[i]t is the insured's actual conduct, not the imputed conduct of another, that determines 
coverage. A corporation can be denied coverage because of the intentional acts of a share-
holder or officer only when the shareholder or officer so dominates and controls the officers 
of the corporation that the corporate entity must be disregarded. 
844 P.2d at 927 n.3. 
275. See supra section I.C. 
276. See supra section I.C. 
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whether to sanction individuals who discriminate or benefits person-
ally from the availability of insurance - then insurance coverage for 
the employer's liability resembles personal insurance for an intentional 
decision to discriminate. Similarly, if the individual responsible for 
the discrimination benefits financially from the availability of insur-
ance to cover the company's liability, then coverage for the individ-
ual's liability resembles coverage for an individual's liability for his 
own intentional discrimination. The availability of insurance allows 
this controlling employee to commit intentional discrimination with-
out facing either an internal or external sanction; the controlling em-
ployee can discriminate without the threat of any deterrent liability 
because his investment in the company is protected by insurance and 
because he knows the company will not impose any internal sanctions 
against him. 
Coit Drapery and McDaniel illustrate these limitations on the negli-
gent supervision and imputed liability exceptions. Each case involved 
harassers who exhibited significant control over the company and who 
stood to gain personally from the availability of insurance to cover the 
company's liability.277 In Coit Drapery, the individual responsible for 
the harassment was the corporation's founder, its president, and a ma-
jor shareholder.278 He benefited personally from the corporation's 
failure to police his sexual harassment of his employees; he satisfied his 
urge to harass.219 He also benefited financially from the decision to 
buy insurance; as a major shareholder, he would have borne the brunt 
of an uninsured liability judgment. The harassing partner in McDaniel 
was in a similar position. He controlled the partnership's decision to 
discriminate, both in the sense that he was the one who decided to 
harass his employees, and in the sense that his significant ownership 
interest in the business made it unlikely his partner would stop the 
harassment.280 Like the president in Coit Drapery, the harassing part-
ner in McDaniel also benefited financially from the decision to buy 
insurance; the partnership's insurance protected his personal invest-
ment in the business. Therefore, in both Coit Drapery and McDaniel, 
the responsible individual controlled the employer's decision whether 
to permit its employees to discriminate, and in each case the availabil-
ity of insurance provided a financial incentive for the individual to 
harass his employees. 
Coit Drapery and McDaniel therefore suggest two factors courts 
should consider in deciding whether a meaningful separation exists be-
277. See supra section 11.B. 
278. Coit Drapery Cleaners, Inc. v. Sequoia Ins. Co., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 692, 695 (Ct. App. 
1993). 
279. See Willborn, supra note 10, at 1015 (suggesting that the decision to discriminate can be 
motivated by an urge to satisfy a personal predilection for discrimination). 
280. The two partners in McDaniel were brothers. Continental Ins. Co. v. McDaniel, 772 
P.2d 6, 7 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988). 
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tween the responsible individual and the employer. First, courts 
should consider the responsible individual's place within the company. 
If an employee is low in the chain of command, it is unlikely the em-
ployee will be able to influence the employer's decision whether to im-
pose sanctions on employees who discriminate.281 Therefore, if a low-
level supervisor decides to harass one of his subordinates, and the em-
ployer fails to respond to that harassment, courts should view the re-
sulting liability as liability for the employer's failure to supervise 
rather than the employer's decision to discriminate. In contrast, if the 
individual responsible for the discrimination is a high-level supervisor 
or a manager, the employer's liability might be recast; the more senior 
the individual responsible for the discrimination, the more likely it is 
that individual has the authority to decide to discriminate on the em-
ployer's behalf. 2 82 
Coit Drapery and McDaniel also suggest a second, more important 
factor: whether the individual responsible for the discrimination has a 
significant ownership interest in the company. If the responsible indi-
vidual has a substantial financial stake in safeguarding the employer 
from liability - for instance, when the individual is a partner or a 
major shareholder who bears the company's losses and profits - then 
the existence of insurance may influence that individual's decision 
whether to engage in discrimination. In this respect, it is significant 
that the president in Coit Drapery was also a major shareholder,283 and 
that the harasser in McDaniel was a partner.284 In these cases, the 
responsible individual was not only insulated from employer supervi-
sion by his position of power within the firm, but also faced only one 
other deterrent - the prospect of reduced profits for the firm as a 
whole - which was also removed by the availability of insurance. In 
this situation, there is no reason for the courts. to enforce insurance 
under an imputed liability exception because the rationale for that ex-
ception simply does not apply. The situation is indistinguishable from 
that in which the individual responsible for the discrimination has ob-
tained insurance against his own liability. 
281. For instance, if the responsible individual is a low-level foreman, like the line foremen 
responsible for the discrimination in Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486 
(M.D. Fla. 1991), then the court should presume that the individual does not have the ability to 
control the employer's decision to discriminate. See 160 F. Supp. at 1527 (describing the stan-
dard for imposing "employer liability" in hostile work environment cases and stating: "Because 
these principles [of employer liability] are so broad ... they should be applied with an eye toward 
finding liability only against individuals who exercise effective control in the workplace - those 
persons who make or contribute meaningfully to employment decisions."). 
282. This likelihood would increase, for instance, ifthe responsible individual owns the busi-
ness, as did the defendants in both Coit Drapery and McDaniel. See also Rynearson, supra note 
273, at 13-14; section II.B. 
283. Coit Drapery Cleaners, Inc. v. Sequoia Ins. Co., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 692, 695 (Ct. App. 
1993). 
284. McDaniel, 112 P.2d at 7. 
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2. Evidence of Employer Intent 
Courts considering whether to enforce insurance for intentional 
discrimination liability under the imputed liability or negligent super-
vision exception should also consider whether the employer intention-
ally failed to supervise its employees, or whether the employer directed 
or authorized the discriminatory conduct of its employees. If an em-
ployer directed the discrimination, or if the discrimination occurred as 
a result of the employer's official policy to discriminate, the court 
should invoke the public policy exclusion and void coverage on the 
grounds that the employer intentionally discriminated. Similarly, if an 
employer fails to prevent its employees from discriminating in a way 
that suggests the employer intended for the discrimination to occur -
even if the employer does not expressly direct them to discriminate -
the courts should refuse to enforce insurance coverage for the resulting 
liability. 
This proposition is easy to announce but may prove difficult to 
apply because direct proof of an employer's intentional failure to su-
pervise will be rare.285 Therefore, courts will have to consider circum-
stantial evidence of the employer's intent to discriminate and decide if 
this evidence indicates the sort of intentional misconduct that courts 
have held uninsurable in other contexts. Coit Drapery illustrates how 
courts might make this assessment. In Coit Drapery, there was no di-
rect evidence that the board participated in the harassment committed 
by the company's president, nor was there any direct evidence to sug-
gest that the other members of the board ratified the president's har-
assment of his employees. The harassing conduct, however, was 
pervasive, long-standing, and obviously within the knowledge of the 
other members of the board.286 The president, moreover, had a well-
established and well-publicized reputation as a "dirty old man," with a 
long-standing habit of harassing and even assaulting his female em-
ployees. 287 Given the board's inexplicable failure to take any action to 
restrain the president from discrimination, the court inferred that the 
corporation had ratified or acquiesced in the president's harassing con-
duct. 288 It was reasonable for the court to use this finding of ratifica-
tion as an approximation of the sort of intentional wrongdoing courts 
have held uninsurable under the public policy exclusion. 
The court may also reasonably infer an employer's intent to dis-
criminate in cases in which employees have repeatedly complained 
about harassing conditions on the job,289 or in which the employer has 
285. Evidence of an employer's intent to discriminate would be entirely within the em· 
ployer's control, and the "smoking gun" memorandum is rare. 
286. See Coit Drapery, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 695. 
287. 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 695. 
288. See 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 701-02; see also supra section 11.B. 
289. See, e.g., Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991) 
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repeatedly been held liable for discrimination and has done nothing to 
improve its practices. These considerations might vary depending on 
the type of discrimination involved. In the sexual harassment context, 
the court should focus on the employer's indifference to complaints of 
sexual harassment and on the measures an employer takes to avoid or 
allay the problem of sexual harassment. If an employer has developed 
an effective grievance procedure, responded promptly to complaints 
about sexual harassment, and educated its employees about the impor-
tance of avoiding sexual harassment, the courts should be reluctant to 
conclude that the employer intentionally failed to prevent harassment 
from occurring. By contrast, if an employer repeatedly ignores com-
plaints about harassing conditions, forgoes training seminars for its 
employees because they are too expensive, and refuses to adopt an ef-
fective grievance procedure, courts should find that the employer in-
tentionally failed to prevent the harassment.29° Courts might also 
inquire into other measures an employer might have taken to prevent 
its employees from discriminating depending on the context. For 
instance, a court inquiring into the employer's participation in 
Watson 291 might inquire whether the employer took any steps to re-
view the decisions made by its supervisors or issued any specific in-
structions not to make decisions on the basis of race. 
In short, the inquiry should focus on any circumstantial evidence 
that indicates the employer acquiesced in its employee's decision to 
discriminate or consciously failed to take measures to safeguard 
against discrimination. Focusing on these factors, the courts should 
determine whether an employer intentionally failed to prevent its em-
ployees from engaging in discrimination or whether the employer's 
conduct constituted mere negligence.292 
3. Insurance as a Cause of the Employer's Conduct 
Because courts invoke the public policy exclusion to void coverage 
in cases in which one could expect insurance to promote wrongdoing, 
courts should consider a third factor in limiting the imputed liability 
exception: the causal connection between the availability of insurance 
and the prohibited conduct.293 In this regard, courts should consider 
(holding an employer liable for hostile work environment after the employer's supervisors repeat-
edly ignored, and even patronized, a woman who complained about the hostile work 
environment). 
290. In other words, the court should infer an employer's intent from the employer's con-
scious ignorance of the discriminatory conduct. 
291. See supra notes 247-55 and accompanying text. 
292. This standard has the beneficial effect of forcing employers that want to obtain liability 
insurance to institute effective measures to combat discrimination in the workplace because a 
failure to institute such measures would result in an inference that the employer intended dis-
crimination to occur and in the avoidance of coverage under the public policy exclusion. 
293. See Willborn, supra note 10, at 1014-15 (suggesting that courts should void coverage 
under the public policy exclusion in cases in which the insured's wrongdoing can be explained as 
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whether the existence of insurance has in fact changed an employer's 
response to the threat of discrimination liability and whether the em-
ployer has acted with a calculating intent to gain from its employee's 
intentional acts of discrimination. 294 An insured employer acts with a 
calculating intent to gain from the availability of insurance if it forgoes 
preventative measures in reliance on insurance. 295 In contrast to "de-
signing intent," which is the sort of "intent to gain from the availabil-
ity of insurance" that underlies the public policy exclusion in first-
party insurance, "calculating intent" is reliance upon insurance as the 
deciding factor in an insured's decision to commit wrongdoing.296 
Like evidence of an employer's intentional failure to supervise, di-
rect evidence of such a calculating intent to discriminate in reliance on 
insurance would be rare.297 Courts could infer an employer's calculat-
ing intent, however, by studying the employer's response to the eco-
nomic incentives created by insurance. Courts could find that an 
employer has acted with calculating intent to gain from insurance 
"when the employer would obtain economic benefits through insur-
ance coverage,"298 or when an employer "discontinue[d] ... anti-dis-
crimination efforts when it obtains insurance coverage."299 
the product of insurance); Anastassiou, supra note 10, at 196 ("The test [for the public policy 
exclusion] is not simply whether the insured acted intentionally or unintentionally, but rather 
whether he may have been stimulated by the prospect of indemnification."). 
294. This standard of "calculating intent to gain" comes from Willborn, supra note 10, at 
1014-15, 1027-30. Willborn argues that the public policy exclusion should be applied to void 
coverage in all cases in which an employer's liability for discrimination can be seen as resulting 
from an employer's "calculated intent." Id. An insured acts with "calculating intent" to benefit 
from insurance when it commits intentional acts of discrimination that it would not have com-
mitted but for the availability of insurance. Id. The inquiry, therefore, is not whether the em-
ployer stands to "gain" from the availability of insurance but whether the insured has bought 
insurance in order to allow it to satisfy some nonmonetary urge to discriminate. Id. at 1015 
("Rather [than intending to 'gain' from the availability of insurance], the employer had other 
motives, possibly to satisfy a desire for discrimination or to maintain a contented workforce." 
(footnotes omitted)). 
295. Id. at 1015. 
296. Id. 
297. Id. at 1028 (citing Herschensohn v. Weisman, 119 A. 705, 105 (N.H. 1923)). 
298. Id. Willborn offers the following example of an employer that stands to benefit econom-
ically from the availability of insurance: 
An employer employing men and women to do equal or comparable work, for example, may 
decide that women would be willing to work for a lower wage rate than men. In the absence 
of insurance, the employer may hesitate to lower the wage rate for women employees, 
because such action would violate the law, and the employer, if prosecuted, would be liable 
to each woman employee for the difference in pay . • . . With insurance the employer may be 
more likely to lower the wage rate for women employees; by doing so, the employer would 
reap an immediate economic benefit by paying women less, and if the employer is later 
found liable for the wage disparity, the insurance would pay the damages. 
Id. at 1028-29 (footnotes omitted). Obviously, this sort of "calculating intent" standard, if it 
were to be applied as the standard by which courts were to determine the validity of insurance 
for employment discrimination, would void coverage in many cases in which damages were cal-
culated as back pay damages. In adapting this standard for use in limiting the imputed liability 
exception, courts should require a more direct showing of economic benefit. 
299. Id. at 1029 (footnotes omitted). 
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Courts should refuse to enforce insurance to cover an employer's 
imputed liability if an employer has relied on the availability of insur-
ance to forgo taking measures to prevent its employees from discrimi-
nating. 300 In this regard, courts should consider whether the employer 
has undertaken to prevent its employees from discriminating in spite 
of the availability of insurance to cover its liability, or whether the . 
employer has bought insurance in lieu of taking such measures.Jot To 
this end, courts should look to quantifiable measures of an employer's 
efforts to avoid discrimination. Once an employer obtains insurance it 
might "discontinue anti-discrimination workshops for its supervisors 
or repeal an internal grievance procedure designed to handle sexual 
harassment complaints. "302 
The correlation between the decision to forgo preventative meas-
ures and the availability of insurance might also be established in other 
ways - for instance, through the timing of the decision to buy insur-
ance. If an employer did not have a history of discrimination before 
buying employment discrimination insurance, it might be reasonable 
to infer that a spate of discrimination cases resulted from the em-
ployer's calculated decision to forgo previously adopted measures to 
avoid discrimination. By contrast, if an employer had a history of dis-
crimination liability before buying insurance but bought insurance as 
part of a comprehensive risk management plan that effectively reduced 
the employer's exposure to discrimination liability, courts might make 
the opposite inference. 
D. Summary 
The above three factors provide a coherent framework within 
which courts applying the public policy exclusion should consider 
whether to enforce coverage for intentional employment discrimina-
tion liability under the imputed liability and negligent supervision ex-
ceptions. Courts should first consider whether an employer simply 
failed to prevent discrimination or decided to discriminate. If the em-
ployer promulgates an official policy to discriminate, or if there is no 
meaningful separation between the employer and the individual re-
sponsible for the intentional discrimination, the court should find that 
the employer has intentionally decided to discriminate and should re-
fuse to enforce coverage under the exceptions. If, however, the court 
finds that the employer has been held liable for a failure to prevent 
300. Id. at 1018 n.82 ("[T]he employer may have acted with calculating intent ... if the 
employer because of the protection provided by insurance coverage relaxed its active, anti-
discrimination supervision of employees, and that relaxation resulted in the discrimination creat-
ing the insured loss."). 
301. See Anastassiou, supra note 10, at 195-96 (suggesting that the insurability of employ-
ment discrimination liability should tum on the employer's "good faith efforts" to avoid 
discriminating). 
302. Willborn, supra note 10, at 1029 n.147. 
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discrimination, it should proceed to a second inquiry designed to de-
termine whether the employer intended the discrimination to occur. 
This second inquiry into employer intent itself has two elements. 
Courts should determine whether there is any circumstantial evidence 
that the employer intentionally failed to supervise its employees or 
whether an employer's intent that the discrimination occur can be in-
ferred from its calculated effort to gain from the availability of 
insurance. 
IV. "EXPRESSIVE" CONCERNS 
In keeping with the approach taken by the majority of courts, this 
Note has argued that the primary reason that courts impose a public 
policy exclusion to void coverage for intentional employment discrimi-
nation is to maintain the deterrent effect of discrimination liability. 
Therefore, in arguing that courts should modify the public policy ex-
clusion, this Note has focused on purely utilitarian concerns. The 
question addressed has been whether insurance covering an employer's 
imputed liability and negligent supervision liability should be declared 
void as a matter of public policy on the grounds that it would promote 
discrimination by insured employers. This Note has argued that in-
surance for these forms of employer liability would not promote 
wrongdoing, within the meaning of the public policy exclusion, be-
cause these forms of liability often reflect an employer's negligence 
rather than an intent to discriminate. Courts should therefore adopt 
an exception to the public policy exclusion that permits the enforce-
ment of insurance for some forms of imputed liability and negligent 
supervision liability for intentional employment discrimination. 
Proponents of a rigid public policy exclusion might counter these 
proposals by arguing that courts should void insurance for intentional 
employment discrimination, regardless of whether that insurance can 
be expected to promote wrongdoing, because insurance is inconsistent 
with the "expressive purpose" behind the antidiscrimination laws. 303 
The antidiscrimination laws represent our society's collective expres-
sion that discrimination is wrong, and the prohibition against discrimi-
nation is animated by a strong desire to stigmatize discrimination.304 
Proponents of the public policy exclusion might argue that this stigma 
303. See Willborn, supra note 10, at 1030 n.156 ("[A]Ithough the cases do not discuss it, 
insurance coverage for employment discrimination liability may be limited in part to express 
social disapproval of illegal employment discrimination."); cf. Sunstein, supra note 171, at 820-
24 (arguing that law has an expressive function that may take precedence over its consequences). 
304. Though Title VII is largely ineffective at reaching "private prejudice and biases,'' it is 
generally accepted that one purpose of Title VII is to "inform[ ] people that the expression of 
racist or sexist attitudes in public is unacceptable." Davis v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 858 F.2d 345, 
350 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1110 (1989). "Thus, Title VII may advance the goal of 
eliminating prejudices and biases in our society" at large by stigmatizing employers that discrimi-
nate and expressing opprobrium at discrimination. 858 F.2d at 350. 
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would disappear if discriminators could "buy the right to discrimi-
nate. "305 According to this argument, courts should void coverage for 
any employer liability arising out of intentional acts of discrimination 
by its employees. Courts should refuse to adopt the exceptions, the 
argument goes, because "society would like to condemn discrimina-
tion quite apart from consequentialist arguments" about the tendency 
of insurance to promote wrongdoing and because insurance casts the 
injuries caused by discrimination in monetary terms. 306 
This argument for a public policy exclusion based on expressive 
rather than utilitarian concerns about the availability of insurance for 
discrimination could draw on the debate over the validity of child life 
insurance. Critics of child life insurance decried the availability of 
that insurance on the grounds that it might promote wrongdoing. 
They argued, in essence, that child life insurance would create per-
verse incentives for parents to kill their own children. 307 Critics of 
child life insurance also aimed their barbs at the meaning the insur-
ance expressed about society's valuation of the lives of children: the 
condemnation of child life insurance went "beyond the arguments of 
possible child neglect or murder,'' because "it was not the danger of 
death but the profanation of the child's life that was at stake."308 Pro-
ponents of the public policy exclusion for employment discrimination 
insurance could frame a similar argument and claim that insurance 
"profanes" the victims of discrimination by suggesting that employers 
can buy the right to cause their injuries. The concern is not utilitarian 
- whether the availability of insurance would promote discrimination 
- but expressive - whether the availability of insurance would inap-
propriately express a willingness to tolerate discrimination. 
This argument about the expressive quality of insurance for em-
ployment discrimination fails on several grounds. First, the real prob-
lem with employment discrimination insurance is not that it allows 
employers to buy the right to discriminate, but that it allows employ-
ers to buy that right at a discount. Unless insurance companies per-
fectly monitor their policies, an employer bent on discrimination could 
pay a premium for insurance that is lower than the employer's ex-
pected liability for employment discrimination. This capacity to buy 
the right to discriminate exists, however, regardless of whether an em-
ployer has insurance for employment discrimination liability. Unin-
sured employers are also perfectly capable of buying the right to 
discriminate, simply by absorbing the costs of employment discrimina-
tion liability or by self-insuring against them. Moreover, liability in-
305. See Sunstein, ·supra note 171, at 850 ("[I]f discriminators could buy the right to discrim-
inate, perhaps discrimination would not be stigmatized in the way we want."). 
306. Id. 
307. ZELIZER, supra note 167, at 117-21. 
308. Id. at 121. 
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surance does not itself cause a victim's injuries to be cast in monetary 
terms. Unlike child life insurance, which would require the calcula-
tion of a parent's insurable interest in the life of a child, insurance for 
discrimination profanes the victims of discrimination only to the ex-
tent that their injuries are necessarily calculated as part of a tort recov-
ery. 309 Any profanation, therefore, occurs during the calculation of 
damages rather than in the performance of the insurance contract. 
In addition, the argument based on expressive concerns proves too 
much with respect to the nature of the public policy exclusion. Courts 
applying the public policy exclusion have not considered expressive 
concerns, either in their specific application of the exclusion to insur-
ance for discrimination or in their application of the exclusion to other 
types of insurance.310 Thus, for example, courts have applied the pub-
lic policy exclusion to prohibit coverage only for disparate treatment 
and not for disparate impact discrimination.311 This distinction be-
tween disparate impact and disparate treatment discrimination cannot 
be justified on the basis of expressive concerns. Congress passed Title 
VII to eradicate all forms of discri.mination in employment,312 and, 
although Congress in 1991 amended Title VII to afford greater reme-
dies to the victims of intentional discrimination,31 3 these amendments 
do not warrant a diminished concern with unintentional discrimina-
tion. 314 Indeed, in 1991 Congress explicitly recognized and codified 
309. See generally JERRY, supra note 21, § 41. 
310. Willborn, supra note 10, at 1030 n.156. 
311. Id. at 1008-09. 
312. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 243 (1989) (plurality opinion of Brennan, 
J.) (describing "Title VIl's goal to eradicate discrimination while preserving workplace efficiency: 
'The broad, overriding interest, shared by employer, employee, and consumer, is efficient and 
trustworthy workmanship assured through fair and racially neutral employment and personnel 
decisions ..•. [I]t is abundantly clear that Title VII tolerates no racial discrimination, subtle or 
otherwise.'" (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973)) (emphasis 
added)); H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 26 (1963), reprinted in 1964 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2355, 2391, 2401 ("The purpose of this title is to eliminate ... discrimination in 
employment based on race, color, religion, or national origin." (emphasis added)); see also 
Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975) (noting that the provision of the 
back pay remedy under Title VII was intended to " 'provide the spur or catalyst which causes 
employers and unions to self-examine and to self-evaluate their employment practices' " (quoting 
United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 379 (8th Cir. 1973))). 
313. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, sec. 102, § 1977A, 105 Stat. 1071, 
1072-74 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981A (Supp. III 1991)) (providing for punitive and compensa-
tory damages in cases ofintentional discrimination); H.R. REP. No. 40, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 
1, at 14 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 552 (commenting on the purpose of the 1991 
amendments and stating that the amendments were intended to "provide monetary remedies for 
victims of intentional employment discrimination"). 
314. Rather, Congress has reaffirmed its commitment to eradicating discrimination in em-
ployment. See H.R. REP. No. 40, 102d Cong., !st Sess., pt. 1, at 14 (1991), reprinted in 1991 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 552 (stating that the concern behind the amendments was to increase com-
pensation and deterrence for intentional discrimination and to "respond to the Supreme Court's 
recent decisions" impairing the ability of plaintiffs to recover in disparate impact cases); H.R. 
REP. No. 40, at 23-32, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 561-70 (citing the need to overturn 
Wards Cove and other cases "diluting" the standard of business necessity in a disparate impact 
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the disparate impact theory of recovery.315 It would be incongruous, 
therefore, to distinguish the validity of insurance for intentional em-
ployment discrimination from the validity of insurance for uninten-
tional employment discrimination on the basis of the expressive 
quality of liability for intentional discrimination. 
Indeed, this argument based on expressive concerns would require 
a reformulation of the public policy exclusion itself. Courts have ap-
plied the public policy exclusion to other forms of liability insurance in 
a way that is inconsistent with concerns about the expressive quality of 
the liability. For instance, in spite of the expressive quality of criminal 
liability, courts do not necessarily void insurance for civil liability aris-
ing out of criminal misconduct,316 and several courts have even en-
forced insurance to cover civil liability for criminal sexual assault.317 
Society can no more clearly express its condemnation of conduct than 
by declaring it criminal, and, if the public policy exclusion is to be 
applied consistently with expressive concerns, courts would have to 
void insurance for all civil liability arising out of criminal conduct. 
Even the courts that first developed the public policy exclusion have 
rejected this expansive approach, however, primarily on the grounds 
that the penal code does not always precisely reflect the degree of op-
probrium society attaches to a particular form of wrongdoing.318 No 
court has shown itself willing to rank the different forms of criminal 
liability according to their expressive quality, and no court is equipped 
to undertake a similar ranking for the different forms of civil 
liability.319 
CONCLUSION 
This Note has sought to clarify the standard by which courts judge 
case); H.R. REP. No. 40, at 47-48, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 585-86 ("Legislation is 
needed to restore Title VII's comprehensive ban on all impermissible considerations of race, 
color, religion, sex or national origin in employment."). 
315. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105(a), 105 Stat. 1071, 1074 (codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(B)(i) (Supp. III 1991)). 
316. See 43 AM. JuR. 2o Insurance§ 260 ("[I]t has long been held that insurance policies 
providing for indemnity to an insured against the civil consequences of his own willful criminal 
acts, of injuries to others that he actually intends, are not necessarily violative of public policy."). 
But see Haser v. Maryland Cas. Co., 53 N.W.2d 508, 512 (N.D. 1952) (refusing to enforce insur-
ance to cover liability arising out of rape). 
317. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
318. See Messersmith v. American Fidelity Co., 133 N.E. 432, 433 (N.Y. 1921) (noting that 
insurance coverage for some forms of wrongdoing should be barred by "the fundamental princi-
ple that no one shall be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong," but refusing to apply this 
principle to preclude coverage for an automobile accident merely because the accident involved 
the violation of a traffic code). 
319. Cf First Natl. Bank v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 389 A.2d 359, 365 (Md. 1978) ("[f]he 
legislature is the normal policy-declaring department of government." (citing 5 SAMUEL WILLIS-
TON & GEORGE J. THOMPSON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS§ 1629A, at 4558 n.4 
(rev. ed. 1937))). 
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the validity and enforceability of insurance for intentional employment 
discrimination. Courts refuse to enforce insurance coverage for liabil-
ity arising out of the intentional misconduct of the insured on the 
grounds that the availability of that form of insurance coverage pro-
motes wrongdoing. The rationale behind the public policy exclusion is 
utilitarian - courts invoke public policy only to refuse enforcement of 
liability insurance that can be expected to promote wrongdoing, and 
courts do not refuse enforcement of insurance for negligence because 
they do not assume that such insurance promotes wrongdoing. There-
fore, the public policy exclusion in liability insurance does not reflect a 
concern with the "expressive" quality of insurance. 
Drawing on the utilitarian rationale behind the public policy exclu-
sion, some courts have developed exceptions to the public policy ex-
clusion that permit enforcement of insurance for imputed liability and 
liability stemming from an employer's negligent failure to prevent its 
employees from committing intentional torts. Employer liability for 
many forms of intentional employment discrimination fits these excep-
tions. Adopting appropriate limitations that preclude enforcement of 
coverage for an employer's intentional decision to discriminate, courts 
should enforce coverage for an employer's discrimination liability 
when that liability stems from the employer's negligent failure to pre-
vent its employees from engaging in intentional discrimination. To 
determine whether an employer has merely been negligent in failing to 
prevent its employees from committing intentional discrimination, 
courts should ensure that three conditions are met: the court must 
find that there is a meaningful separation between the employer and 
the individual responsible for the discrimination, that the employer 
did not intentionally fail to supervise its employees to prevent them 
from discriminating, and that the employer did not act with a calculat-
ing intent to gain from the availability of insurance in permitting the 
discrimination to occur. Enforcing coverage in these narrow circum-
stances is consistent with the concerns that animate the public policy 
exclusion. 
